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 ABSTRACT 
 
Theories of mindfulness emphasise its role in enhancing self-regulation, including 
in the presence of negative emotion. However, most studies of mindfulness in social and 
clinical psychology have focused on its influence on affective outcomes such as stress, 
anxiety and well-being, rather than on outcomes relating to self-regulation. In this thesis I 
aim to address this gap by examining whether mindfulness enhances approach and inhibits 
avoidance coping responses following stressful events. 
In two studies, mindfulness was manipulated using a brief induction (Study 1) and 
a multi-session intervention (Study 2), and the effects of both manipulations on approach 
and avoidance coping were examined, relative to controls. In Studies 3 and 4, I examined 
the effects of two mindfulness components – acceptance and cognitive defusion – on 
coping responses. Study 3 manipulated acceptance and cognitive defusion via a brief 
induction and examined effects on behavioural measures of approach and avoidance. Study 
4 measured the effects of acceptance and cognitive defusion as intra-individual difference 
variables on coping with daily stressful events. In addition, Studies 1 to 3 examined whether 
perceived stress moderated the effects of mindfulness manipulations on coping responses, 
which has not been done before. 
Across Studies 1 to 3, there were significant, small-to-medium main effects of 
mindfulness manipulations on coping responses, as well as consistent evidence for 
perceived stress as a moderator of these effects on avoidance coping. In Study 4, I found 
that cognitive defusion predicted greater approach and less avoidance coping both within 
the same day and across days. Together these findings suggest that mindfulness and 
mindfulness components have an important role to play in enhancing coping responses. 
Mindfulness appears to most consistently reduce avoidant forms of coping, and these 
 effects are most substantial among relatively stressed individuals. These findings are 
consistent with theories of mindfulness which emphasise its role in behaviour-regulation, 
and provide novel evidence for these effects in the context of coping with stressful events. 
At a practical level, this research suggests that mindfulness interventions serve to reduce 
general avoidant behaviours such as blame-shifting, conflict-avoidance and defensive 
responding; and should have particular benefits in high-stress contexts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The costs of stress 
 
 There is evidence that psychological stress and anxiety are taking a significant toll 
on populations in industrially developed countries. It has been estimated that in OECD 
countries, around 5% of the working-age population has a severe mental illness and an 
additional 15% of the population is effected by more common conditions such as mild-to-
moderate depression and anxiety (OECD, 2015). The fourth European Survey of Working 
Conditions (Parent-Thirion, Macais, Hurley & Vermeylen, 2007) concluded that stress is 
the second-most reported workplace health problem in Europe, affecting on average 22% 
of workers across 27 countries. And data from the United Kingdom indicates that one 
worker in six experiences mental health problems such as depression, anxiety or stress at 
any given time; and this figure rises to one-in-five if problems related to drug and alcohol 
misuse are included (Seymour & Grove, 2005). 
Just as alarmingly, there is evidence that the way individuals are coping with these 
stressors is often ineffective, with increases in absenteeism, presenteeism (i.e. being at work 
while ill or unproductive) and the use of pharmaceuticals to cope with mental ill-health. 
For example, a 2002 US survey found that 42.1% of absences attributed to mental ill-health 
involved 31 or more days away from work per annum (National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health, 2004). An Australian study (Medibank, 2008) found that stress-related 
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workplace absenteeism and presenteeism cost the Australian economy around AUD 11.6 
billion in 2006, equating to around 1.5% of Australia’s GDP. 
The incidence of anti-depressants and anti-anxiety medications as means of coping 
with stress is also on the rise across OECD countries. For example, in 2010, more than one‐
in‐five US adults was regularly consuming at least one mental health drug, an increase of 
22% from the year 2000 (Medco, 2011). The OECD estimates that the direct (e.g., cost of 
medications and long-term care costs) and indirect costs (e.g., absenteeism, presenteeism 
and stress-related staff turn-over) of mental ill-health exceeds 4% of GDP in a number of 
OECD countries (OECD, 2014).  
As a consequence, the past five years has seen a growing interest among 
governments, employers and civil society organisations across the OECD in tackling 
mental health problems (OECD, 2015). An important part of this effort lies in helping 
individuals to access healthy ways of coping with stress, such as seeking counselling or 
psychological support, or broader social support, rather than engaging in avoidant or 
addictive coping strategies that are maladaptive over the long-term. In this context, a 
number of alternative ‘life-style’ therapies and approaches to handling stress have gained 
popularity, as they have minimal side-effects, are cheap to administer, are highly flexible 
to the individuals’ life-situation and are not addictive. Central among these is mindfulness. 
The mindful revolution 
 
Over the last decade, there has been an exponential rise in interest in mindfulness-
based approaches to coping with stress and building mental health. The world’s largest 
organisations such as Google, Apple and IBM are embracing mindfulness programs as a 
means of enhancing staff engagement and managing the demands of an ‘always-on’ work 
culture. There has also been an upsurge of interest in mindfulness in the helping 
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professions, including for staff and students or patients in schools, hospitals, law-
enforcement agencies and other service organisations as a means of enhancing resilience 
and protecting against burnout (Poulin, Mackenzie, Soloway, & Karayolas, 2008). Finally, 
mindfulness-based approaches to treating psychopathology (so-called ‘third-wave’ 
therapies; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006) have increased substantially over 
the past decade (Khoury et al., 2013). Indeed, in February 2014 Time Magazine declared a 
‘mindful revolution’ in the developed world, running a cover-story on mindfulness that 
captured global media attention, perhaps marking a high-point in popular media interest in 
the construct. 
Accompanying this rise in popular interest in mindfulness has been an exponential 
increase in mindfulness research over the past two decades. Mindfulness-based 
interventions have been studied for their effects on clinical outcomes such as anxiety, 
depression and psychosis (Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010; Khoury et al., 2013), 
physical health behaviours (Keng, Smoski, & Robins, 2011), addictions (Bowen & Marlatt, 
2009), and more recently, outside the clinic, on stress-reduction and well-being 
enhancement, in domains including corporations (Reb, Narayanan, & Chaturvedi, 2012), 
schools (Zenner, Herrnleben-Kurz, & Walach, 2014), healthcare organisations (Khoury, 
Sharma, Rush, & Fournier, 2015) and law-enforcement agencies (Williams, Ciarrochi, & 
Deane, 2010). 
Mindfulness-based theoretical models 
 
Mindfulness research has largely occurred in a bottom-up way, with research 
programs mainly driven by empirical research testing the efficacy of mindfulness across a 
range of domains and outcomes, such as those outlined above. However in the last decade, 
researchers have started to offer theoretical accounts of how mindfulness operates, 
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including possible mediators of mindfulness processes on outcomes of interest (e.g., 
Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Hayes et al., 2006; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 
2006).  
A common explanation for how mindfulness has its effect is through a shift in an 
individual’s perspective: from experiencing thoughts, feeling and sensations as oneself 
(i.e., as the subject of one’s experience) to experiencing these phenomena as separate from 
oneself (i.e., as the object of one’s experience). This change in perspective involves the 
increase in ‘psychological distance’, meaning mental and physical experiences are viewed 
with greater objectivity and non-attachment (Shapiro et al., 2006). This same basic process 
has been described in several theoretical accounts of mindfulness as ‘reperceiving’ (Shapiro 
et al., 2006), ‘decentering’ (Teasdale et al., 2002) and as the experience of ‘self-as-context’ 
(Hayes et al., 2006).  
Shapiro et al. (2006) describe how reperceiving in-turn facilitates enhanced 
behavioural regulation - that is, a greater willingness to be exposed to unpleasant thoughts, 
feelings and sensations, reduced emotional reactivity, and greater response flexibility due 
to being less ‘caught up’ in events as they occur. Other mindfulness theorizing is consistent 
with these basic descriptions of enhanced behavioural regulation following mindfulness 
practice, independent of how much negative affect a person experiences (e.g., Brown et al., 
2007; Hayes et al., 2006).  
Mindfulness and behavioural responses to stress 
 
Despite these clear theoretical predictions regarding the effects of mindfulness on 
behavioural regulation, the vast majority of mindfulness research to-date has focused solely 
on affective outcomes such as anxiety, depression, stress and well-being in both clinical 
(Hofmann et al., 2010; Khoury et al., 2013) and non-clinical settings (Khoury et al., 2015; 
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Sharma & Rush, 2014).  
Much less research has examined the role of mindfulness in enhancing behavioural 
responses to aversive experiences, such as individuals’ coping responses following stressful 
events. Coping responses are one way of examining individuals’ behavioural responses to 
stress, and include both publically observable behaviour, such as active coping, planning 
and behavioural disengagement, as well as ‘private’ behaviour, such as positive 
reinterpretation, denial and self-distraction (Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003; 
Weinstein, Brown, & Ryan, 2009). Empirical support for the effects of mindfulness on 
coping will provide valuable evidence for the basic theoretical claim outlined above: that 
is, that mindfulness enhances behavioural regulation in the presence of negative affect. The 
need to fill this research gap is underscored at a practical level, given the growing costs of 
maladaptive coping with stress outlined above, and the associated upsurge in interest in 
mindfulness-based interventions as a stress-management tool within organisations and the 
general community (Virgili, 2013). 
The present thesis 
 
 The aim of this thesis is to test whether mindfulness enhances individuals’ coping 
responses following stressful experiences. In studying coping responses, the frame-work of 
approach versus avoidance coping (Roth & Cohen, 1986) is used in this thesis to describe 
two basic (and orthogonal) responses an individual may have to stressful experiences. 
Approach coping describes attention directed toward a stressor, while avoidance coping 
described attention directed away from a stressor (Roth & Cohen, 1986). Approach and 
avoidance is one of the most widely-researched models of coping (Kato, 2013) and has 
been used in several previous studies of mindfulness and coping (e.g., Halland et al., 2015; 
Sears & Kraus, 2009; Walach et al., 2007).  
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As outlined in Chapter 2, studies of mindfulness and coping have to-date been 
hampered by problems of small sample sizes and limited statistical power to detect effects. 
Moreover, the heterogeneity of mindfulness interventions in studies of mindfulness and 
coping to-date makes it difficult to draw clear conclusions from this research. The aim of 
this thesis is therefore to highlight several of these gaps in this literature, and then to fill 
them using a multi-method approach: that is, using both experimental and longitudinal 
research methods. In this thesis, a multi-method approach enabled basic psychological 
processes relating to mindfulness and coping to be tested in a controlled laboratory 
environment (Studies 1 and 3); and then these same processes to be tested in vivo, using 
both experimental (Study 2) and longitudinal daily diary methods (Study 4).  
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the extant 
research on coping, mindfulness, and studies exploring both constructs together. It 
highlights several of the limitations and gaps in this literature and then frames these as 
research questions to be examined in this thesis. Chapter 3 is an overview of the analytic 
methods used in this thesis, and introduces structural equation modelling and multi-level 
modelling, the two main analytic approaches used in this thesis.  
Chapters 4 to 7 are the substantive chapters of the thesis. Chapter 4 reports Study 1, 
a laboratory experiment in which a brief mindfulness induction was compared with two 
control inductions (self-affirmation and relaxation) for its effect on coping responses. 
Chapter 5 reports Study 2 which extended Study 1 by testing the effects of a multi-session 
mindfulness intervention on coping with significant monthly stressors. Chapters 6 and 7 
tested two mindfulness ‘components’ hypothesized to particularly enhance coping 
responses: acceptance and cognitive defusion (Hayes et al., 2006). Chapter 6 reports Study 
3, a laboratory-based experiment that compared brief acceptance and cognitive defusion 
inductions with two control inductions (self-affirmation and relaxation) upon coping 
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responses measured behaviourally. Chapter 7 reports Study 4 which was a longitudinal 
study testing whether both acceptance and cognitive defusion predicted greater approach 
and less avoidance coping with daily stressors, over a 20-day period. Chapter 8 discusses 
the results of these studies and attempts to identify coherent themes emerging from this 
body of work, before drawing together its main conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on coping and mindfulness, and 
reviews the evidence for why mindfulness interventions should enhance coping responses. 
In addition, this chapter identifies several under-researched areas of this literature that 
warrant further investigation and are addressed in the substantive chapters of this thesis. 
The chapter concludes with the aims of the thesis and the major research questions it 
addresses. 
Coping responses 
 
According to Lazurus and Folkman’s (1987) transactional theory, stress occurs 
when the demands of a situation are appraised as exceeding the individual’s capacity to 
respond to it. In such situations, the individual makes two general kinds of appraisal: a 
primary appraisal of whether the stressor represents a threat, potential harm or a challenge; 
and a secondary appraisal of the person’s ability to influence the stressful situation 
(Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986; Lazarus, 1993). These 
appraisals are said to occur simultaneously but shape a person’s coping response to a 
stressful experience (Folkman et al., 1986). 
Coping responses have been defined as “efforts to prevent or diminish threat, harm, 
and loss, or to reduce associated distress” following a stressful experience (Carver & 
Connor-Smith, 2010, p. 685); and as “thoughts and behaviors that people use to manage 
the internal and external demands of situations that are appraised as stressful” (Folkman & 
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Moskowitz, 2004). In this way, coping describes the different methods individuals’ employ 
to reduce the impact of stressful encounters, and is an inherently situation-specific construct 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1987).  
Coping responses are generally viewed as conscious, effortful responses to stress, 
and this distinguishes them from defenses, which are generally viewed as automatic and 
unconscious responses to stress or threat (Cramer, 1998; Kramer, 2010). The research on 
coping is extensive, and dozens of classifications of coping responses have been offered 
over the past four decades (see Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). Within this 
literature, the distinction between avoidance and approach coping is one of the most widely 
used (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010; Skinner et al., 2003). Moreover, this distinction has 
been used in a number of studies of mindfulness and coping (e.g., Halland et al., 2015; 
Josefsson, Lindwall, & Broberg, 2012; Sears & Kraus, 2009; Weinstein et al., 2009), so 
using it in the present thesis builds upon previous research into mindfulness and coping. 
Approach and avoidance coping 
 
Approach and avoidance coping have been described as being, respectively, 
“cognitive and emotional activity that is oriented either toward or away from threat” (Roth 
& Cohen, 1986, p. 813). Approach coping involves reducing distress by taking steps to 
directly remove the stressor or reduce its impact (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010). On the 
other hand, avoidance coping involves efforts to reduces distress by taking actions (e.g., 
behavioural disengagement) or cognitions (e.g., denial) to avoid direct contact with or 
exposure to the stressor (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010). A key distinction between 
approach and avoidance coping is the orientation of the individual in relation to the stressor 
– either toward (i.e., approach coping) or away from it (i.e., avoidance coping). Examples 
of approach coping include seeking to learn from a stressful experience, planning a 
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response and positively reframing the experience, while examples of avoidance coping are 
denial, distraction and mental disengagement (Weinstein et al., 2009).  
 Although avoidant coping responses often serve short-term adaptive functions by 
reducing exposure to a threat (e.g., Sherman & Cohen, 2006), they come at the cost of not 
learning from the stressful experience (van ‘t Riet & Ruiter, 2013) or missing out on 
important information (Brown & Locker, 2009). Over the long term, avoidance coping has 
been associated with significantly worse psychological well-being (Penley, Tomaka, & 
Wiebe, 2002; Rayburn et al., 2005; Roesch et al., 2005) whereas approach coping has been 
found to predict enhanced well-being (Duangdao & Roesch, 2008; Penley et al., 2002; 
Roesch et al., 2005; Suls & Fletcher, 1985). 
Measuring approach and avoidance coping responses 
 Several psychometrically reliable and valid scales have been used to measure 
approach and avoidance coping. Perhaps the most commonly-used of these is the COPE 
Inventory (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). This scale is composed of 13 subscales, 
each describing a specific coping response (e.g., denial, self-distraction, planning, positive 
reinterpretation) using four items for each subscale. Although not explicitly designed to 
measure approach and avoidance coping (but rather designed to measure specific coping 
behaviours), the COPE Inventory has been commonly used to do so (e.g., Deisinger, 
Cassisi, & Whitaker, 1996; Lyne & Roger, 2000; Stowell, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 2001; 
Weinstein et al., 2009). Another scale that has been used more recently to measure approach 
and avoidance coping is the Brief COPE (Carver, 1997), comprised of two items for each 
of the 13 subscales of the COPE Inventory. A number of studies (e.g., Kapsou, Panayiotou, 
Kokkinos, & Demetriou, 2010; Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011) have obtained distinct 
approach and avoidance factors from this scale. In addition, the Coping Inventory of 
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Stressful Situations (CISS) has been used to examine approach and avoidance coping 
(Enders & Parker, 1990). The CISS is comprised of three factors: task-oriented coping 
(similar to approach coping); emotion-oriented coping; and avoidance coping.  
 However a criticism of the coping literature is its reliance on self-report measures 
of global coping traits, rather than measuring coping in the context of specific stressors 
(Shikai, Nagata, & Kitamura, 2014). Reviews of coping measures have found substantial 
discrepancies between measures of global coping traits and retrospective measures of 
specific coping responses (Schwartz, Neale, Marco, 1999; Shikai et al., 2014). To address 
this criticism, versions of major coping scales, such as the Ways of Coping Questionnaire 
(Folkman et al., 1986) and the COPE Inventory, have been recast in situation-specific 
terms. While this goes some way to addressing the problem, other studies have identified 
further discrepancies between retrospective and momentary measures of coping responses, 
due to recall biases associated with retrospective measures (Ptacek, Smith, Espe, & Raffety, 
1994; Stone et al., 1998), though this is not as significant as the discrepancies between 
global and retrospective coping measures (Todd et al., 2004). 
 Based on this evidence, there is merit in using context-specific rather than global 
measures in the study of coping, and when possible, using momentary or daily measures of 
coping-in-context, rather than retrospective measures. This thesis used context-specific 
measures of coping is several ways: in Studies 1 and 2 (Chapters 4 and 5 respectively), 
subjects were asked to recall a recent stressful event and report their coping responses using 
the COPE Inventory; while in Study 4 (Chapter 7), on a daily basis, subjects recorded their 
levels of approach and avoidance coping with daily stressors. 
 Finally, almost no attention has been paid in the coping literature to the use of 
behavioural measures of coping. While behavioural measures are generally more difficult 
 12 
 
to administer than surveys and have been in general decline in social and personality 
psychology research in recent decades (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007), they represent 
a much higher standard of evidence than self-reports and their use could be further explored 
in the study of coping. Such measures have been used, for example, in the study of 
defensiveness (Mueller & Dweck, 1998; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008), and the coping 
literature could arguably draw from literature such as this in designing measures of 
observable coping behaviour. No published study has yet used a behavioural measure of 
coping responses. To address this gap, a behavioural measure of both approach and 
avoidance coping was piloted in Study 3 (Chapter 6), measuring the extent to which 
subjects approached and avoided social comparison following failure. 
The goodness-of-fit hypothesis 
 As well as exploring the antecedents and consequences of various coping 
behaviours, coping researchers have also examined contextual factors that moderate the 
expression of specific coping behaviours (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004). One such 
contextual factor is the extent to which a stressor is controllable (Park, Armeli, & Tennen, 
2004). The concept of ‘stressor controllability’ is conceptually similar to secondary 
appraisal outlined above, in that both concepts relate to an individual’s ability to influence 
a stressful situation. However the two constructs can be distinguished on the basis that 
secondary appraisal relates to an individual’s perceived personal ability or self-efficacy in 
relation to the stressor; while the stressor controllability relates to the nature of the stressor 
itself, and whether it is something that can in fact be influenced or changed (e.g., a heated 
discussion with someone) or not (e.g., a piece of bad news; Lazarus & Folkman, 1987).  
 Individuals are said to adjust their coping response based on how controllable a 
stressor is, and this is known as the goodness-of-fit hypothesis (Folkman & Moskowitz, 
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2004; Park, et al., 2004). According to this hypothesis, when a stressor is controllable, 
problem-solving coping strategies are said to be more likely, whereas when a stressor is 
difficult to control, more emotion-focused and avoidant strategies are more likely (Folkman 
& Moskowitz, 2004). This response-environment fit is claimed to serve an adaptive 
outcome, as individuals are not wasting energy addressing stressors that cannot be changed 
(Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Park et al., 2004). Moreover, the fit between coping 
response and situational control is said to predict how effectively individuals adapt to 
stressors, independent of the effects of specific coping strategies on an individual’s well-
being (Zeidner & Saklofske, 1996). 
 There is partial evidence for the goodness-of-fit hypothesis. Increases in problem-
focused strategies when a stressor is controllable have been found, but there is less evidence 
for the use of avoidant and emotion-focused responses to uncontrollable stressors (Park et 
al., 2004). This may be because some emotion-focused (e.g., venting) and avoidant (e.g, 
distraction or denial) forms of coping may often not be adaptive, including in response to 
uncontrollable stressors. In the present thesis, measures of event controllability were 
administered in Study 4 (Chapter 7), enabling the goodness-of-fit hypothesis to be tested. 
Specifically, I examined whether or not mindfulness facilitates enhanced approach coping, 
measured as efforts to directly engage with the stressor, in controllable (but not 
uncontrollable) stressful situations. I expected that mindfulness would enhance the fit 
between the nature of a stressful situation and a person’s response to it. The next section 
explores the nature of mindfulness and the evidence for its positive effects, before 
reviewing the effects of mindfulness training upon coping responses. 
Mindfulness  
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 The study of mindfulness in psychology research is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Derived from Eastern contemplative traditions, mindfulness has attracted exponentially 
increasing interest among psychology researchers over the past two decades (Chiesa, 2012; 
Keng et al., 2011). Mindfulness interventions in both clinical and non-clinical contexts have 
been shown to have positive effects on psychological symptoms, such as anxiety and 
depression (Chiesa & Serretti, 2011; Keng et al., 2011; Khoury et al., 2013) and on stress 
more broadly (Brown et al., 2007; Khoury et al., 2015).  
Defining mindfulness 
 
Although there is some variation within psychology as to a definition of 
mindfulness, there is general consensus that it describes a particular way of paying attention 
– that is, with an openness and receptivity to moment-by-moment experience (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003; Shapiro et al., 2006). Indeed, perhaps the most widely-cited definition of 
mindfulness is “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present-moment 
and non-judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). A key feature of this definition is that it 
describes a particular form of individual behaviour, rather than a personality trait or a state, 
meaning that mindfulness is something that can be ‘done’ by individuals rather than being 
caused by a separate psychological process or set of behaviours (Hayes & Fletcher, 2005).  
Despite this generally-accepted definition of mindfulness as a particular way of 
paying attention, there are a number of related definitions of mindfulness that vary around 
this basic idea in terms of their emphases. For example, another well-cited definition of 
mindfulness distinguishes the attentional (i.e., present-moment oriented) from the affective 
component (i.e., an attitude of openness and receptivity) of mindfulness, resulting in a two-
facet definition (e.g., Bishop, et al., 2004). Others emphasise multiple facets, such as 
present-moment awareness, acceptance, not taking thoughts literally and viewing 
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experience from the perspective of an observer (Hayes et al., 2006); or observing, acting 
with awareness, describing present-moment experience, non-judging and non-reactivity to 
present-moment experience (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006). Despite 
these variations in how mindfulness has been defined, and in-turn measured (see 
Mindfulness Measures section, below), there is evidence that the main extant measures of 
mindfulness display convergent validity and describe a common, over-arching construct 
(Siegling & Petrides, 2014). From this perspective, mindfulness as a singular construct 
appears to have a conceptual and psychometric coherence that makes it valid to study it as 
a unitary phenomenon. Studies 1 and 2 (Chapters 4 and 5) of this thesis take this approach, 
aiming to manipulate mindfulness as a unitary construct (i.e., an open and receptive 
awareness of present-moment phenomena). 
However, one advantage of examining specific mindfulness facets or components 
is that doing so enables a more fine-grained analysis of which specific mindfulness 
behaviours influence different outcomes of interest (Bishop et al., 2006; Cardaciotto, 
Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008; Hayes et al., 2006). A commonly-cited example 
of why this might be important is that the attentional element of mindfulness (i.e., attention 
directed toward one’s current thoughts and feelings) has been found to undermine well-
being in certain contexts such as rejection (Ayduk, Mischel, & Downey, 2002), physical 
pain (Roelofs, Peters, Patijn, Schouten, & Vlaeyen, 2004) and panic (Ehlers & Breuer, 
1996), while in these contexts, acceptance (i.e., not seeking to change the form or frequency 
of one’s experience) has been found to enhance well-being (Cardaciotto et al., 2008; Hayes 
et al., 2006). Identifying the various contexts in which specific mindfulness facets influence 
outcomes enables a more nuanced and precise understanding of the ‘active ingredients’ of 
mindfulness skills, and in-turn points to potential mediators by which it has its effects (Baer 
et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 2006). 
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In the context of enhancing the ways in which individuals cope with stress, there is 
evidence that two facets of mindfulness should have a particularly strong impact. One is 
acceptance and the other is cognitive defusion. Both these facets have been identified as 
core mindfulness components or sub-processes within the acceptance and commitment 
therapy literature (ACT; Hayes et al., 2006, 1999), though neither of these components is 
unique to the ACT conceptualisation of mindfulness. Next, these two components are 
discussed in more detail, along with the evidence for why one would expect each to have a 
particularly strong influence coping responses. 
Acceptance 
Acceptance has been defined as “actively embracing the private events evoked in 
the moment without unnecessary attempts to change their frequency or form” (Hayes & 
Fletcher, 2005, p. 7). Here, “private events” refer to individual experiences that cannot be 
directly observed by another, such as sensations, thoughts and emotions (Hayes et al., 
1999). Aside from the ACT conceptualisation of mindfulness, other definitions of 
mindfulness similarly identify acceptance as an important component. As discussed, 
Bishop et al. (2006) distinguish acceptance from the attentional component of mindfulness, 
while others include constructs related to acceptance within their definitions of 
mindfulness, such as non-judgement and non-reactivity (Baer et al., 2006; Cardaciotto et 
al., 2008). 
By accepting difficult or aversive thoughts, feelings and sensations, an individual 
is more likely to willingly engage with these expereinces, and, in the context of coping, this 
means their behaviour is likely to be less avoidant and more approach-focused (Hayes et 
al., 2006; Shapiro et al., 2006). There is evidence for this from a number of sources. For 
example, experiential avoidance, which is the tendency to psychologically avoid unwanted 
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thoughts and feelings and the opposite of acceptance, has been shown to predict less 
approach coping (i.e., positive reframing) and more avoidance coping (i.e., denial, self-
distraction and behavioural disengagement) with stressful events (Karekla & Panayiotou, 
2011). Brief manipulations of psychological acceptance have been found to reduce 
behavioural avoidance and increase willingness to be exposed to aversive stimuli. For 
example, two studies randomly assigned individuals to receive brief manipulations of either 
psychological acceptance or experiential control, and then exposed them to CO2-enriched 
air (a commonly-used analogue of a panic attack). Both studies found significantly greater 
willingness to be exposed to the CO2-enriched air among those in the acceptance than the 
experiential control conditions (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 
2004). In another, related study, subjects were randomly allocated to either psychological 
acceptance or thought control manipulations, with those in the former group reporting 
significantly more tolerance of receiving an electric shock (Gutiérrez, Luciano, Rodríguez, 
& Fink, 2004). Although not explicitly measuring approach and avoidance coping, these 
studies provide evidence of greater approach-oriented behaviour and less avoidance 
following an acceptance induction.  
Further relevant evidence comes from studies of the effects of acceptance-based 
inductions on addictive behaviours. For example, Bowen and Marlatt (2009) found that 
brief instruction in mindfully accepting unpleasant smoking-related thoughts, feelings and 
sensations resulted in significantly less smoking over the subsequent seven days, while 
Gifford et al. (2004) found that seven individual and seven group therapy sessions focused 
on cultivating mindful acceptance as well as values-consistent action resulted in reduced 
smoking rates at 12 months follow-up relative to a treatment-as-usual control. Addictive 
behaviours such as smoking can be viewed as avoidance-oriented behaviour, as they take 
the individual away from contact with unpleasant thoughts and feelings (Gifford et al., 
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2004), meaning that reductions in smoking incidence and other substance use implies a 
reduction in avoidance coping. Finally, a study found that following academic failure, self-
compassion was negatively associated with avoidant coping responses among university 
students (Neff, Hsieh, & Dejitterat, 2005). Self-compassion is closely related to acceptance 
(Yadavaia, Hayes, & Vilardaga, 2014). It involves noticing suffering and bringing kindness 
and acceptance to this experiences, and in this sense is closely related to self-acceptance 
(Neff, Kirkpatrick, & Rude, 2007). Taken together, this evidence suggests that acceptance, 
a core component of mindfulness, is likely to have a particularly strong influence on coping 
responses, enhancing approach and inhibiting avoidance coping.  
Cognitive defusion 
A second mindfulness component referred to as ‘cognitive defusion’ in the ACT 
literature (Hayes et al., 1999, 2006) may also have a particularly strong impact on how 
individuals cope with stress. Cognitive defusion describes the process of distancing from 
thoughts and involves a process of recognizing thoughts as verbal processes, rather than as 
literally the objects and events they represent (Blackledge, 2007; Gillanders et al., 2014). 
As a construct, cognitive defusion is similar to ‘reperceiving’ (Shapiro et al., 2006) and 
‘decentering’ (Teasdale et al., 2002) used elsewhere in the mindfulness literature. Common 
to these constructs is ‘stepping back’ from thoughts and gaining perspective on them 
(Shapiro et al., 2006). Exercises designed to foster cognitive defusion typically involve the 
repetition of a word until it loses its literal meaning, or exercises in noticing and distancing 
from thoughts via a metaphor, for example placing each thought on an imaginary leaf and 
watching it float away down a stream (Hayes et al., 1999; and used in Study 3 [Chapter 6] 
of this thesis). With increased psychological distance from the content of one’s thoughts, 
and a perspective in which thoughts can be viewed as words and images rather than as facts, 
they have less influence on behaviour (Blackledge, 2007; Gillanders et al., 2014).  
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In the context of coping with stress, individuals who cognitively defuse from stress-
related thoughts are less likely to avoid situations where they experience such thoughts (i.e., 
avoidance coping) and are more likely to engage with such situations in constructive ways 
(Gillanders et al., 2014). Support for this comes from a number of studies of cognitive 
defusion inductions, involving the repetition of aversive words, and the influence of such 
an induction on believability and distress in relation to aversive thoughts. These studies 
reported reductions in emotional discomfort and negative thought believability among non-
clinical samples following brief cognitive defusion manipulations, relative to control 
conditions that were asked to control their thoughts or distract themselves (Mandavia et al., 
2015; Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & Sheehan, 2010; Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 
2004; Masuda, Twohig, et al., 2010; Watson, Burley, & Purdon, 2010). Another study 
administered the ‘leaves on a stream’ cognitive defusion protocol, used in Study 3 of this 
thesis, prior to a cold-pressor task (i.e., inducing physical pain) and found those in the 
cognitive defusion condition showed significantly more pain tolerance than those in pain-
control and attention-placebo control conditions (Takahashi, Muto, Tada, & Sugiyama, 
2002). Pain tolerance involves the non-avoidance of a potentially stressful experience and 
a willingness to experience such pain, and so has links with greater approach coping. This 
evidence suggests that, by creating psychological distance from one’s stress-related 
cognitions (i.e., cognitive defusion), individuals are less likely to be governed by their 
stress-related thoughts, meaning they are likely to be less avoidant and more willing to 
engage in approach coping behaviours following stressful events. 
Other commonly-studied mindfulness components, such as present-moment 
awareness, have not demonstrated as consistent or large effects on outcomes related to 
coping responses as acceptance and cognitive defusion have (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & 
Hayes, 2012). Further, in relation to present-moment awareness, there is evidence that in 
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stressful or unpleasant situations, greater awareness of internal states can actually enhance 
stress, anxiety and rumination, making avoidant responses such as substance abuse more 
likely (Cardaciotto et al., 2008). This is because increased attention to unwanted and 
negative internal states, without acceptance and distancing from related thoughts (i.e., 
cognitive defusion) is likely to intensify the experience of such unwanted thoughts and 
feelings, amplifying their impact (Cardaciotto et al., 2008; Hayes et al., 2006).  
In this thesis, Studies 3 (Chapter 6) and 4 (Chapter 7) examined the effects of both 
acceptance and cognitive defusion on coping responses. This was done by experimentally 
manipulating acceptance and cognitive defusion in the laboratory and measuring their 
effects on approach and avoidance coping (Study 3), and by examining the effects of both 
mindfulness components on coping with daily stressors outside the laboratory (Study 4). 
Mindfulness measures 
Several measures of mindfulness as a general trait have been developed in the social 
and clinical psychology literature, including single-construct scales and multi-faceted 
scales (for reviews, see Chiesa, 2012; Keng et al., 2011). Commonly-used single-factor 
measures of mindfulness include the Mindful Attention and Awareness scale (MAAS; 
Brown & Ryan, 2003) and the Freiberg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI; Walach et al., 2006). 
A widely-used two-factor measure of mindfulness is the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale 
(PMS; Cardaciotto et al., 2008), which measures the acceptance and attentional 
components of mindfulness as two separate factors. Finally, common multi-factor measures 
of mindfulness include the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer et al., 
2004), which includes four facets: observing, describing, acting with awareness, and non-
reactivity; and the Five-Facets of Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006), 
which adds a fifth mindfulness facet to the KIMS facets: non-judging. All of these scales 
have been found to have acceptable psychometric properties (Siegling & Petrides, 2014). 
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Whereas they are less common in the assessment of mindfulness, several state measures 
have also been validated, including a state-version of the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003), 
the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau et al., 2006), and more recently, the State 
Mindfulness Scale (SMS; Tanay & Bernstein, 2013).   
Studies in this thesis primarily manipulate mindfulness (Studies 1 to 3; Chapters 4 
to 6), rather than measuring it as an individual-difference construct. However in Study 4 
(Chapter 7), state measures of acceptance and cognitive defusion are used, adapted 
respectively from the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Bond et al., 2011) and 
the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ; Gillanders et al., 2014). Further information 
about these scales is provided in Chapter 7. 
Mindfulness interventions 
A range of mindfulness interventions have been used to experimentally study the 
influence of mindfulness on outcomes of interest. These interventions range from multi-
session interventions, such as the eight-week Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction program 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992), through to brief 10-15 minute mindfulness 
inductions (Keng et al., 2011). For the present thesis, both a multi-session mindfulness 
intervention (Study 2, Chapter 5) and a brief mindfulness induction (Study 1, Chapter 4) 
were conducted. A brief review of both kinds of intervention is provided next. In addition, 
induction studies of specific mindfulness components, namely acceptance and cognitive 
defusion, are reviewed below, as these are the focus of Studies 3 and 4 in this thesis. 
Multi-session mindfulness interventions 
 
Several multi-session mindfulness protocols have been developed over recent 
decades. Most notable among these are Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; 
Kabat-Zinn, 1990); Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2002); 
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Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993); and Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999).1 
 MBSR (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) was originally developed as a group intervention for 
patients with chronic pain, but has been since delivered in a wide range of non-clinical 
settings, including workplaces (see Virgili, 2013, for a review). The MBSR program 
teaches mindfulness skills through both meditation and every-day mindful awareness as a 
means of reducing stress and being more present and connected with one’s daily life. 
MBSR typically involves eight sessions, each lasting 2.5 hours, followed by a day-long 
silent retreat (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992). 
MBCT (Segal, Teasdale, Williams, & Gemar, 2002) is an eight week group 
program adapted from MBSR that was developed primarily to reduce instances of 
depressive relapse. It combines mindfulness training with cognitive therapy approaches and 
focuses on changing patients’ relationship to unwanted thoughts and feelings that trigger 
relapse, rather than changing their frequency or content (Teasdale et al., 2002).  
DBT (Linehan, 1993) was developed as a clinical treatment for suicidal and other 
self-harming behaviour. DBT combines traditional Cognitive Behavioral Therapy with Zen 
practices, and focuses on helping clients to increase acceptance of aversive emotions, and 
uses mindfulness to reduce avoidance of difficult emotion and fear responses (Linehan, 
1993). DBT is delivered in four ways: individual therapy, group training, telephone 
consultations between the therapist and patient, and consultation team meetings for 
therapists. 
ACT (Hayes et al., 1999) was also developed as a therapeutic approach that centres 
                                                          
1 For a review of these protocols and their efficacy in relation to psychological outcomes, see Keng et al. 
(2011). 
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on mindfulness skills training, but a significant point of difference between ACT and the 
above interventions is its focus on values-clarification (Hayes et al., 2006). Central to the 
psychological flexibility model in ACT, mindfulness and acceptance skills are used to 
engage in behaviours that are consistent with an individual’s personally-held values, even 
when doing so is uncomfortable or difficult (Hayes et al., 1999). 
In addition, many variants of these protocols have been administered in studies of 
mindfulness (Khoury et al., 2013). These variations are typically due to constraints 
regarding the length of the protocol among a given sample (e.g., Bergen-Cico, Possemato, 
& Cheon, 2013), using a self- rather than instructor-led training approach (e.g., Hülsheger, 
Alberts, Feinholdt, & Lang, 2012), a greater focus on mindfulness meditation (e.g., Sears 
& Kraus, 2009), or the use of mindfulness training approaches linked more directly to 
specific contemplative traditions, such as Vipassana training courses (e.g., Chambers, Lo, 
& Allen, 2007). As a result, there is considerable heterogeneity in the kinds of mindfulness 
interventions reported in the scholarly literature. 
Mindfulness inductions 
 In addition to studying the effects of multi-session mindfulness interventions, 
several studies have examined the effects of brief mindfulness inductions upon outcomes 
of interest. Such mindfulness inductions commonly involve the application of conscious 
attention to an object (e.g., bodily sensations, sounds, etc), with an attitude of openness and 
curiosity, and are typically adapted from longer mindfulness protocols, such as MBSR or 
MBCT (Keng et al., 2011). Examples of protocols used in mindfulness induction studies 
include the ‘raisin eating’ exercise, in which individuals are guided through a process of 
touching, viewing, smelling and tasting a raisin in a deliberate and conscious manner (e.g., 
Heppner et al., 2008; Reb & Narayanan, 2014); attending to one’s breathing in a non-
judgmental way (e.g., Arch & Craske, 2006; Tan, Lo, & Macrae, 2014); and cultivating 
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awareness of sensations in the body (e.g., Ostafin & Kassman, 2012). These mindfulness 
inductions typically range in length from five (e.g., Tan et al., 2014) to 15 minutes (e.g., 
Arch & Craske, 2006). 
 In addition, there have been several induction studies of specific mindfulness 
components, and those focused on acceptance and cognitive defusion are reviewed here 
due to their relevance to this thesis. Acceptance inductions aim to promote willingness to 
be in contact with unwanted thoughts, emotions or sensations (Hayes et al., 2006). 
Examples of such inductions are 10-15 minute guided instructions in paying close attention 
to sensations and thoughts, and not trying to change or get rid of them in any way (e.g., 
Bowen & Marlatt, 2009; Levitt et al., 2004). In addition, other acceptance-focused 
manipulations emphasise self-acceptance (linked to self-compassion; Neff et al., 2005, 
2007), which includes accepting difficult or unpleasant experiences with kindness but also 
knowing that such experiences are a common human experience (Yadavia et al., 2014). A 
self-acceptance induction like this was used in Study 3 (Chapter 6) of this thesis. 
 Several experimental studies over the last decade have administered cognitive 
defusion inductions (e.g., De Young, Lavender, Washington, Looby, & Anderson, 2010; 
Harnett & Carr, 2013; Masuda, Feinstein et al., 2010; Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda, 
Twohig, et al., 2010; Watson, Burley, & Purdon, 2010). Cognitive defusion inductions 
typically use metaphors and verbal exercises to reduce the literal believability of thoughts, 
and therefore undermine the impact of these thoughts upon individuals’ behaviour (Hayes 
et al., 2006). Perhaps the most common research protocol for such inductions is a word 
repetition exercise that involves repeating a neutral word (e.g., “milk”) multiple times, until 
it loses its literal meaning, then repeating negative self-referential words and noticing how 
these also lose their literality, and this has been used in several studies (e.g., De Young et 
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al., 2010; Masuda, Feinstein, et al., 2010; Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda, Twohig, et al., 
2010; Watson et al., 2010). Another exercise used in studies to induce cognitive defusion 
is the ‘leaves on a stream’ protocol (Hayes et al., 1999), as discussed above. In this exercise, 
individuals visualize themselves sitting by a stream, watching leaves float down it. Each 
time they notice themselves thinking about something other than the exercise, they are 
asked to gently place the thought on a leaf and watch it float down the stream. This latter 
exercise is used in Study 3 (Chapter 6) of this thesis, due to its focus on creating 
psychological distance from thoughts and its use in inducing cognitive defusion elsewhere 
(Harnett & Carr, 2013; Takahashi et al., 2002; Tapper et al., 2009). This chapter has so-far 
reviewed mindfulness definitions, measures of mindfulness, and approaches for developing 
mindfulness over either an extended or brief period. I now turn to considering the existing 
literature on the effects of mindfulness interventions on coping responses – the primary 
focus of this thesis. 
Mindfulness and coping responses 
Despite the evidence for the effects of mindfulness interventions on affective 
outcomes such as stress reduction and increases in well-being (Hofmann et al., 2010; Keng 
et al., 2011; Khoury et al., 2013), much less research has examined the effects of 
mindfulness interventions upon overt behaviours following aversive experiences, such as 
coping responses. As discussed in Chapter 1, theories of mindfulness emphasise its role in 
enhancing self-regulation and non-habitual responding to negative affect (e.g., Hayes et al., 
2006; Shapiro et al., 2006). Mindfulness is claimed to facilitate a change in perspective: 
from experiencing thoughts, feeling and sensations as oneself (i.e., as the subject of one’s 
experience) to experiencing these phenomena as separate from oneself (i.e., as the object 
of one’s experience). This change in perspective brings with it less automaticity and a 
greater willingness to be exposed to aversive experiences (Hayes et al., 2006; Brown & 
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Ryan, 2007; Shapiro et al., 2006), which, in-turn, may facilitate greater willingness to take 
direct action to remove or neutralize a stressor (i.e., approach coping) and less avoidance 
of direct contact with a stressor (i.e., avoidance coping). Based on these theoretical 
predictions, mindfulness is therefore expected to predict enhanced approach and inhibited 
avoidance coping responses following stressful events. In the next section, I review this 
literature, focusing on the evidence for the relation between mindfulness – as both a trait 
and an intervention – and approach and avoidance coping.  
Trait mindfulness and coping responses 
 
There is evidence that mindfulness as a general trait is associated with more 
approach and less avoidance coping. Weinstein et al. (2009) found that across two studies, 
trait mindfulness (measured using the MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) predicted less 
avoidance and more approach coping with general life-stress (Study 2) and daily stressful 
events (Study 3), among a student sample. In another two studies reported in the same 
paper, individual differences in mindfulness predicted less avoidance coping with 
laboratory-induced stress (i.e., social comparison following a mental arithmetic task, Study 
1) and the stress associated with the completion of a university course (Study 4). 
Further, Palmer & Rodger (2009) found that higher trait mindfulness was associated 
with more adaptive (rational and detached) coping and less avoidance coping among a 
student sample. Trait mindfulness has also been associated with less avoidance of 
unavoidable distressing experiences (such as being criticised, humiliated or having one’s 
weaknesses exposed) among a community sample (Bergomi, Ströhle, Michalak, Funke, & 
Berking, 2013). Finally, Neff, Hsieh, & Dejitterat (2005) found that following academic 
failure, self-compassion (a construct that includes mindfulness) was negatively associated 
with avoidance-oriented coping strategies. Together, these results suggest that mindfulness 
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and coping (especially less avoidance coping) are correlated, and that self-reported 
mindfulness is associated in particular with non-avoidant responding to threatening 
situations. 
Consistent with these findings, studies of mindfulness interventions and 
behavioural responses to stress more generally have found that mindfulness enhances 
choice and flexibility in responding to aversive experiences, so that the response is less 
avoidant and more values-consistent (Bond, Hayes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2006; Brown et al., 
2007; Glomb et al., 2012). There is evidence that mindfulness reduces avoidance 
behaviours and reactivity across domains as varied as gambling (Lakey, Campbell, Brown, 
& Goodie, 2007), inter-personal communication (Heppner et al., 2008), physical activity 
(Chatzisarantis & Hagger, 2007) and exposure to unpleasant images (Arch & Craske, 
2006). These studies investigating mindfulness and behavioural responses to aversive 
experiences provide further support for the proposition that increases in mindfulness should 
result in more willingness to approach stressful experiences (approach coping) and less 
reactivity to and avoidance of such experiences (avoidance coping).  
Mindfulness inductions and coping responses 
 
Although no study has explicitly examined the effects of a brief mindfulness induction 
on coping responses, a number of studies have found that general mindfulness inductions 
influence behaviours that are closely related to coping responses. For example Arch & 
Craske (2006) found that a brief mindful breathing exercise facilitated greater willingness 
to be exposed to distressing images relative to controls, among a sample of 60 university 
students. In another study, Heppner et al. (2008) found that a mindful raisin-eating 
induction resulted in less aggressive responses to anti-social behaviour, among an 
undergraduate sample of 175 students.  
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 In addition, several studies have examined the effects of acceptance and cognitive 
defusion inductions on outcomes closely related to coping responses, as outlined above (see 
Acceptance and Cognitive Defusion sub-sections within the Defining Mindfulness section, 
above). Together, this evidence suggests that both acceptance and cognitive defusion 
inductions are likely to inhibit avoidance behaviours following stressful or aversive 
experiences and enhance individuals’ willingness to engage with such experiences. 
Together, these studies provide evidence that mindfulness inductions, including those 
focused on acceptance and cognitive defusion processes, should enhance coping responses 
– at least over the short-term. However, studies of more elaborate mindfulness interventions 
have produced more inconsistent findings, as discussed next. 
Mindfulness interventions and coping responses 
 
To date there have been at least five studies of the effects of a mindfulness 
intervention on coping with stress. These interventions include the eight-week MBSR 
program (Tacón, McComb, Caldera, & Randolph, 2003; Walach et al., 2007), a six-week 
version of the MBSR program (Halland et al., 2015) and other multi-week mindfulness-
meditation interventions (Josefsson et al., 2012; Sears & Kraus, 2009).   
One study found that the eight-week MBSR program significantly increased 
positive coping (similar to approach coping) but did not reduce negative coping (similar to 
avoidance coping) among a sample of 17 German sales workers in relatively high-stress 
jobs (Walach et al., 2007; measured using the Coping with Stress Inventory; Janke & 
Erdmann, 1997). Another pilot study of 18 American women living with heart disease 
(Tacon et al., 2003) found that the eight-week MBSR program significantly reduced 
reactive coping (similar to emotion-focused coping) relative to a waitlist control condition, 
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but did not increase reflective coping or reduce suppressive coping (with coping measured 
using the Problem-Focused Styles of Coping; Heppner et al., 1995). 
A more recent study (Halland et al., 2015) found that a six-week version of the 
MBSR program (involving shorter session lengths and a shorter day-long retreat than the 
standard MBSR protocol) increased problem-focused coping (similar to approach coping) 
relative to an active control condition (i.e., studying the standard curriculum) among a 
sample of 288 psychology and medicine university students. Interestingly, this study also 
found that the MBSR intervention reduced avoidance coping but only as a function of 
increased neuroticism, showing that among relatively neurotic individuals, the intervention 
reduced avoidance coping, but not among those reporting moderate and low levels of 
neuroticism. 
 Josefsson, Lindwall, and Broberg, (2012)  assessed whether a (non-MBSR) 
mindfulness intervention enhanced approach and reduced avoidant coping among 126 
working adults, measured using the COPE Inventory (Carver et al., 1989). Josefsson et al. 
(2012) administered eight, 45-minute mindfulness meditation sessions, over a four-week 
period. The mindfulness sessions involved a series of guided, sitting mindfulness 
meditations, including mindfulness of breathing, sensations, and of the body. Control 
conditions were a relaxation intervention of the same length and a waitlist condition. 
Following the interventions, the authors found no differences between either condition on 
either problem-focused or avoidance coping.   
 Lastly, Sears and Kraus (2009) administered two, multi-session mindfulness 
interventions – one focused on mindful attention and the other on loving-kindness – 
composed of weekly, 10-15 minute sessions over a 12-week period; as well as one longer 
intervention combining both mindful attention and loving-kindness meditation, composed 
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of weekly, two-hour sessions over seven weeks. However this study did not report changes 
in approach and avoidance coping following these interventions. 
 Together, these studies provide mixed evidence for the effects of multi-session 
mindfulness interventions upon approach and avoidance coping. While there is some 
evidence for the effects of the MBSR program on approach (Halland et al., 2015; Walach 
et al., 2007) and avoidance coping (Halland, et al., 2015; Tacon et al, 2003), these results 
were somewhat inconsistent (e.g., Josefsson et al., 2012; Sears & Kraus, 2009; Tacón et 
al., 2003), suggesting that mindfulness interventions may only influence an individuals’ 
approach and avoidance coping responses in certain contexts. In the next section, I explore 
possible explanations for these mixed findings. 
Explanations for mixed evidence from mindfulness and coping studies 
 
Low statistical power 
 
 One explanation for these inconsistent findings is that several of the above studies 
(e.g., Sears & Kraus, 2009; Tacón et al., 2003; Walach et al., 2007) had small sample sizes, 
limiting their ability to detect intervention effects. For example, Sears & Kraus (2009) had 
sample sizes across four conditions of n = 19 (brief mindful attention), n = 17 (brief loving-
kindness), n = 11 (extended mindfulness and loving-kindness) and n = 10 (waitlist control); 
Walach et al (2007) had sample sizes of n = 11 (treatment) and n = 16 (active control); and 
Tacon et al. (2003) had sample sizes of n = 9 (treatment) and n = 9 (waitlist control). In 
order to achieve statistical power of 0.8 (a commonly-accepted minimum in the social 
sciences; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013), the total sample would need to be N = 104 (n = 51 
per condition). This is sample-size is based on the following assumptions: the use of 
repeated-measures ANOVA with two experimental conditions and two measurement 
occasions (as in Tacón et al., 2003);  a medium effect size of f  = 0.25; α = .05; and a 
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correlation among repeated measures of 0.7. This number increases to N = 110 for a study 
with two conditions and three measurement occasions (as in Walach et al., 2007).  
These post-hoc power calculations suggest that several of the above coping studies 
were substantially under-powered, perhaps explaining their inconsistent findings. 
However, it should be noted that the study by Joseffson et al. (2012) used a significantly 
larger sample (n = 46 in the mindfulness treatment; n = 40 in the relaxation control; n = 40 
in the waitlist control) and did not find differences between conditions on coping, 
suggesting that low statistical power may not be the only reason for the inconsistent pattern 
of results to-date. 
Application of interventions to every-day experiences 
 
 Another possibility is that mindfulness interventions have a bigger influence on 
coping responses when they are contextualised to participants’ lives and are focused on 
applying mindfulness to every-day situations. The studies that found positive effects on 
coping used MBSR (Tacón et al., 2003; Walach et al., 2007) or its reduced-form (Halland, 
et al., 2015). The MBSR program teaches both ‘formal’ mindfulness meditation, as well as 
‘informal’ mindfulness of every-day events (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). The program aims to tailor 
mindfulness to the experiences of daily living, including focusing on participants’ 
challenges and how mindfulness can help deal with these. In this sense, the program is 
explicitly targeted at helping individuals cope with the stresses they face on a daily basis. 
On the other hand, the interventions administered in the studies reporting null results 
(Josefsson et al., 2012; Sears & Kraus, 2009) were meditation-focused and had no explicit 
focus on informal mindfulness practice and applying mindfulness skills to every-day 
challenges. This difference in emphasis may, in turn, explain the pattern of results among 
these studies. If this were the case, it suggests either using the MBSR program in 
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subsequent mindfulness intervention studies, or more generally administering mindfulness 
interventions that explicitly teach skills in applying mindfulness skills to every-day 
challenges. 
Stress as a moderator 
 
Another explanation for these mixed results that was proposed by Josefsson et al. 
(2012) is that mindfulness training may influence coping behaviour among people 
experiencing high (but not low) levels of stress. The general pattern of findings outlined 
above supports this idea: the studies that did find significant effects of mindfulness 
interventions on coping were with individuals in relatively demanding sales roles (Walach 
et al., 2007) and women living with heart disease (Tacon et al., 2003), while Halland et al 
(2015) found that individual differences in neuroticism interacted with an MBSR 
intervention to predict less avoidance coping. Neuroticism has been shown to be 
consistently correlated with perceived stress and negative affect (Mohiyeddini, Bauer, & 
Semple, 2015). In addition, several studies of brief acceptance and mindfulness inductions 
found reductions in avoidance behaviours in relatively stressful contexts, such as breathing 
CO2 enriched air (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt et al., 2004), receiving an electric shock 
(Gutiérrez et al., 2004), or exposure to threatening images (Arch & Craske, 2006). Studies 
of cognitive defusion inductions found a similar results, such as less thought believability 
and distress (Masuda, Feinstein, et al., 2010; Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda, Twohig, et al., 
2010), following exposure to negative self-referential thoughts. It may be, therefore, that 
mindfulness interventions only influence individuals’ coping responses in relatively high-
stress contexts. Conversely, in low-stress settings, individuals’ coping responses may be 
relatively adaptive, meaning that mindfulness adds less value in terms of coping responses. 
However, this possibility has not been tested in published research.  
 33 
 
Specific mindfulness components 
 
 Lastly, it may be that specific mindfulness components exert a particularly strong 
influence on coping responses. To our knowledge, this possibility has not been tested in 
published research. As discussed, there is evidence that psychological acceptance as well 
as cognitive defusion (which involves psychological distancing from thoughts) should 
positively impact individuals’ coping responses. Based on ACT-based theorising (Hayes et 
al., 1999, 2006), acceptance is expected to influence coping, as acceptance increases 
individuals’ willingness to be exposed to aversive experiences (approach coping) and 
inhibits the tendency to avoid such experiences (avoidance coping). Similarly, cognitive 
defusion is expected to enhance coping responses as individuals who cognitively defuse 
from their stress-related thoughts are less likely to be governed by such thoughts, which are 
commonly avoidant in nature (Hayes, et al., 1999, 2006). The evidence reviewed in the 
Defining Mindfulness section suggests that each of these mindfulness components is likely 
to enhance individuals’ coping responses, increasing approach and decreasing avoidant 
responses. The evidence for the effects of other mindfulness components on coping, for 
example present-moment awareness, is weaker (for a review of the evidence for 
mindfulness components within the ACT framework, see Levin et al., 2012).  
Aims of the thesis 
 
 Rather than building upon each other in a linear manner, the aim of the substantive 
chapters of this thesis was to fill several of the gaps in the mindfulness and coping literature 
identified above. In this context, the four substantive aims of this thesis are now briefly 
explained, followed by the articulation of three principal research questions. 
The effects of brief and extended mindfulness manipulations upon coping responses 
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 First, this thesis aimed to extend the as-yet limited evidence regarding the effects of 
mindfulness interventions upon approach and avoidance coping responses. Specifically, 
Studies 1 and 2 (Chapters 4 and 5) tested whether a brief mindfulness induction (Study 1), 
as well as a longer, multi-session mindfulness intervention (Study 2), increase approach 
coping and reduce the instances of avoidance coping following stressful experiences. The 
evidence reviewed above suggests that a mindfulness intervention increases approach 
(Halland et al., 2015; Walach et al., 2007) and reduces avoidance coping (Halland et al., 
2015; Tacon et al., 2003), but this evidence is limited and preliminary. Further, there is 
evidence that brief acceptance inductions increase behaviours related to approach coping 
(willingness to be exposed to aversive stimuli; Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt et al., 2004; 
Páez-Blarrina et al., 2008), as do cognitive defusion inductions (Masuda et al., 2004; 
Masuda, Twohig, et al., 2010). 
As discussed, several studies of mindfulness and coping have had small sample 
sizes, limiting their ability to draw conclusions. The present thesis aims to address this 
short-coming by including sufficiently large samples that have acceptable levels of 
statistical power (0.8, as suggested by Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  
 In addition, several of the mindfulness interventions reviewed above that did not 
find significant effects on coping responses administered meditation-focused protocols, 
with limited attention to applications of mindfulness in daily life (e.g., Josefsson et al., 
2012; Sears & Kraus, 2009). Study 2 (Chapter 5), which included a multi-week mindfulness 
intervention, aimed to address this issue by administering a mindfulness intervention 
(adapted from MBSR) that was specifically tailored to individuals’ actual experiences of 
stress, rather than teaching mindfulness skills out of the context in which they are applied. 
Stress as a moderator of the effects of mindfulness upon coping responses 
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 Another issue emerging from the above literature is the possibility that mindfulness 
interventions only influence coping behaviour among relatively stressed individuals. Given 
the inconsistent findings within the mindfulness and coping literature, and the pattern of 
results from these studies outlined above, there is value in testing this in the present thesis. 
Accordingly, Studies 1 to 3 of this thesis tested this possibility, examining perceived stress 
as a moderator of the effects of mindfulness interventions upon coping responses. Study 1 
measured general perceived stress over the past month, Study 2 measured perceived stress 
in relation to a specific stressful event, while Study 3 measured both kinds of perceived 
stress. 
Mindfulness components and coping responses 
 
The role of specific mindfulness components in influencing coping behaviour has 
not been examined in research to-date. In this thesis, acceptance and defusion are examined 
for their particular influence upon coping responses. As discussed, there is substantial 
evidence that both these components are likely to enhance coping responses. Study 3 
(Chapter 6) compares the effects of brief 10-minute acceptance and defusion inductions 
with two control inductions (self-affirmation and relaxation) for their effects on coping with 
laboratory-induced stress. Study 4 (Chapter 7) extends this research beyond the laboratory, 
examining inter- and intra-individual differences in levels of acceptance and cognitive 
defusion as predictors of approach and avoidance coping with daily, naturally-occurring 
stressors. 
Behavioural and context-specific measures of coping 
 
 Lastly, the present thesis aims to add to the methodological rigour of studies of 
coping and mindfulness by administering more ecologically valid measures of coping 
behaviour. As discussed, a criticism of many coping studies is their use of self-report 
 36 
 
measures of global coping traits, rather than measuring coping in relation to specific 
stressors (Shikai et al., 2014). Research in the present thesis aims to avoid this criticism by 
using measures of coping that were linked to specific stressful experiences, rather than 
stress in general. In addition, this thesis aims to respond to calls for measuring coping as 
close to the ‘source’ of the stressor as possible (e.g., Ptacek et al., 1994; Stone et al., 1998), 
by studying daily coping with stressful events (Study 4, Chapter 7) as well as behavioural 
measures of coping with laboratory-induced stressors (Study 3, Chapter 6). 
Research questions 
 
 The aims of this thesis as described above can be summarised in the following 
research questions: 
1. Do mindfulness manipulations (both brief and multi-session) result in greater 
approach and less avoidance coping with stress? 
 
2. Are these effects moderated by perceived stress, such that these effects are stronger 
among relatively stressed individuals? 
 
3. Do acceptance and cognitive defusion result in greater approach and less avoidance 
coping with stress? 
 
These questions are explored in the four substantive chapters of this thesis. Studies 
1 and 2 (Chapters 4 and 5) test the effects of general mindfulness protocols on coping: 
Study 1 examines the effects of a brief mindfulness induction in a laboratory setting; while 
Study 2 explores the effects of a multi-session mindfulness group intervention in a 
naturalistic setting.  
Studies 3 and 4 (Chapters 6 and 7) examine the effects of specific mindfulness 
components – acceptance and cognitive defusion – upon coping responses: Study 3 tests 
the effects of these mindfulness components inductions in a laboratory setting; while Study 
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4 seeks to test the relationships between both acceptance and cognitive defusion, and coping 
responses in vivo.  
Studies 1 to 3 test the moderating effect of perceived stress upon the effects of the 
mindfulness inductions and interventions on approach and avoidance coping. Lastly, 
coping is measured in several ways throughout this thesis: Studies 1 and 2 administer 
measures of coping responses following significant life stressors; Study 4 administers 
daily-diary measures of coping with daily stressors; and Study 3 uses behavioural measures 
of coping with laboratory-induced stress. Before presenting the substantive studies of this, 
an overview of the main analytic methods used in this thesis is provided in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
METHODS 
 
 
An outline of the methods of each of the four studies in this thesis is provided with 
each respective study (i.e., Chapters 4 to 7). The present chapter therefore provides a 
general overview of the main analytic methods used in this thesis, which are structural 
equation modelling, to better account for measurement error in regression models (Chapter 
5), and multi-level modelling, to take into account the nested structure of some of the 
datasets reported in this thesis (Chapters 6 and 7). Each of these general analytic approaches 
is briefly outlined next, as well as the approach taken to missing data.  
Structural equation modelling 
 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) enables the analyses of relations between 
latent constructs where measurement error, nonlinear effects and complex sampling designs 
(e.g., clustering) are accounted for (Bollen, 1989). Multivariate analyses using manifest 
models still include a measurement model, however the measurement model is not adjusted 
to reflect the way in which different scale items covary with one-another. A manifest model 
assumes all item covary in the same way. A latent (SEM) model does not make such an 
assumption, and instead allows the covariances between each item in a model to vary. 
In SEM, two kinds of models are generally specified: a confirmatory factor analytic 
(CFA) model and a structural model. The CFA model tests the adequacy of the expected 
relations and constraints between the measured indicators (i.e., manifest items) and the 
underlying latent variables in the proposed model (Bollen, 1989). In the CFA model, all 
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covariances between variables in the hypothesised model are allowed to freely vary, in 
order to assess the degree to which the hypothesised model fits the data. Having established 
that the proposed model adequately fits the data, a structural model is tested in which paths 
between latent variables are specified and estimated based on hypothesised relations 
between variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  
Assessing model fit in SEM 
 
In order to assess the adequacy of the measurement model proposed in each CFA 
model as well as the extent to which each structural model fits the underlying data, a 
number of fit indices are commonly used. These indices assess the fit between the sample 
covariance matrix (of the estimated model) and the estimated population covariance matrix. 
Although the χ2 test has been commonly used to assess model fit, it is sensitive to sample 
size, meaning that with a large sample, a significant difference may be reported between 
the sample and population covariance matrices when the fit is in-fact relatively good. To 
avoid this problem, there has been growing interest in developing estimates of fit that do 
not rely on tests of significance and are therefore less sensitive to sample size in assessing 
model fit. Commonly-used alternative indices are the comparative fit index (CFI), the 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) and the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA; 
Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). In this thesis, I use each of these indices in measuring model 
fit (see Study 2, Chapter 5). Generally-accepted criteria for model fit are as follows: for 
CFI, values of .90 to .95 are considered acceptable and good-fitting, respectively (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999); for TLI, the same criteria apply (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002); and for 
RMSEA, values under .06 are said to reflect a good-fitting model, relative to the degrees 
of freedom in the model (Hu & Bentler, 1999), while values greater than .10 indicate a poor 
fitting model (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). In comparing the fit of different models, a 
number of criteria have been specified, as follows: for CFI and TLI, a change in these 
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indices of ≤ .01 between successive models is recommended (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002); 
for the RMSEA, a change in this index of ≤ .015 is commonly-used (Chen, 2007).  
Time-invariance in SEM 
 
 A common approach in SEM is testing the invariance of a model across different 
groups (e.g., gender, experimental conditions) or over different measurement occasions 
(e.g., time-points; Millsap & Meredith, 2007). Under this approach, certain parameters 
(e.g., factor loadings, item intercepts, uniquenesses) are set to be invariant between groups 
or measurement occasions, depending on the specific research questions, and model fit is 
assessed under these additional constraints. This processes is undertaken at the CFA stage 
of the analysis.  
 In the present thesis (Study 2, Chapter 5), only time-invariance is tested for. 
Specifically, Study 2 sought to test whether experimental interventions predicted changes 
in coping response over time, where the factor-structure of the (latent) coping variables was 
assumed to be consistent across time (i.e., time-invariant). In this situation, constraining 
factor-loadings to be equal across time-points is the only precondition for establishing time-
invariance (Millsap, 2011). More complex models (e.g., longitudinal multi-group models) 
require other parameters (e.g., item intercepts) to be constrained to equality, but such a 
requirement did not apply in the present thesis. Lastly, the model fit criteria outlined above 
(i.e., thresholds for changes in CFI, TLI and RMSEA values) can be used to compare the 
fit of models that are not constrained to be equal over time versus those that are.  
SEM in the present thesis 
 
Study 2 (Chapter 5) is the only study in the present thesis to use an SEM approach. 
In that chapter, three general forms of CFA model were used: a basic measurement model, 
which tested the fit to the data of the hypothesised latent variable model; a CFA model in 
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which factor loadings for the same items were constrained to be equal across time and so 
tested for the time invariance of the model (per the discussion above); and a time-invariant 
CFA model in which relevant baseline covariates were added. In addition, two structural 
models were tested: one in which paths of interest within the time-invariant CFA model 
were specified and estimated; and another where relevant covariates were added to the 
previous structural model. In the present thesis, SEM analysis was undertaken in the 
‘Lavaan’ and ‘Lavaan.survey’ packages of the R program (3.2.2; R Core Team, 2015). 
Multi-level modelling 
 
In cases where units of analysis are nested within each other (e.g., time-points 
within individuals within experimental conditions, or students within classrooms within 
schools), multi-level modelling is appropriate. Ignoring the nested structure of such datasets 
is likely to produce biased regression estimates (Singer & Willett, 2003). A multi-level 
modelling approach reduces this risk by explicitly modelling the effects of variables across 
different levels of analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). For example, in the case of 
longitudinal multi-level modelling, where the predictor (e.g., dispositional mindfulness) 
and the outcome (e.g., coping responses) are each measured over multiple time-points for 
each individual, coping responses may vary based on each individual’s average level of 
dispositional mindfulness (i.e., between individuals), as well as each individual’s variation 
in dispositional mindfulness across time (i.e., within individuals). Thus coping can be 
predicted by both variation in mindfulness within individuals (level 1) as well as individual-
differences in mindfulness (level 2). More complex analyses may include more than two 
levels of analysis (e.g., groups, schools, suburbs).  
Additionally, in modelling these multi-level sources of variance, multi-level models 
include both fixed and random effects terms, in which the clustering variable of interest 
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(e.g., experimental condition) is included as a fixed factor, while the clustering variable(s) 
one wishes to control for (e.g., classroom or individual) is included as a random factor (or 
factors) in the model (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013). In the previous example, if we were 
interested in how within-subjects variation in mindfulness predicts coping over time, we 
would estimate the intercept and slope of the within-subjects variation in mindfulness as 
fixed effects (as well as ‘time’), and the between-subjects variation in mindfulness as a 
random effect. If, on the other hand, we were interested in how two groups of individuals 
varied in their coping behaviour over time, we would treat ‘group’ and ‘time’ as fixed 
effects and ‘individual’ as a random effect term. In this way, the treatment of fixed versus 
random factors depends on which variables one wishes to make predictions from (fixed 
factors) and which variables may still provide an important source of variation in the 
dependent variable, but are not of direct relevance to the research question (random 
factors). In this thesis, both these approaches are taken: Chapter 6 uses multi-level models 
to study group-clustered datasets (i.e., individuals within classrooms within experimental 
conditions), treating ‘experimental condition’ as a fixed factor and ‘classroom’ as a random 
factor; while Chapter 7 explores longitudinal data (i.e., time-points within individuals), and 
so treats ‘within-subjects variation in the predictor over time’ as a fixed factor and 
‘individual’ as a random factor. For a more detailed explanation of fixed and random 
effects, see Singer & Willett, 2003). 
In addition to the standard multi-level modelling approach, I drew in this thesis 
upon two less common multi-level modelling approaches, which are both described next: 
within-subjects multi-level modelling and lagged multi-level modelling. Both these 
approaches are used in Chapter 7 of this thesis. In the present thesis, all multi-level analyses 
were conducted using the ‘lme4’, ‘nlme’ and ‘Hmisc’ packages of the R program (3.2.2; R 
Core Team, 2015). 
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Within-subjects multilevel modelling 
 
When conducting longitudinal analyses, raw scores on level 1 variables for each 
individual can be disaggregated into level 1 and level 2 elements: the deviation in that 
individual’s mean score for the variable from the grand-mean on the variable across all 
individuals in the sample (i.e., a between-subjects’ component; level 2); and the deviation 
in the raw score for any individual at any time-point, from that individual’s mean score on 
the variable (i.e., a within-subjects component; level 1). Figure 1 illustrates this basic 
approach to disaggregating level 1 variables.2 In this figure, the dimonds represent data-
points (one for each of the five time-points in the figure) for a given individual, ID. The 
thick solid line is the grand-mean on the predictor variable across all individuals and time-
points, while the dashed line is the mean score on the predictor variable for a single 
individual (ID1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of a level 1 predictor variable disaggregated into its within- and 
between-subjects components for a single individual across 5 time-points.  
                                                          
2 NB: Calculating the difference between each individual’s mean score and the grand mean on a variable 
(i.e., the between-subjects component in Figure 1) is substantively identical to simply calculating each 
individuals’ mean score on a variable. 
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To calculate within and between-subjects components of an independent variable 
(IV), the grand mean of the variable across individuals and time points is subtracted from 
each subjects’ raw score on the IV at each time point, resulting in a variable called Xij, the 
grand mean-centred score for each individual. This difference term is then divided into 
between and within-subjects components. The former, X.j, is the mean score on the IV for 
each individual, across time points (the between-subjects component). The latter, Xij – X.j, 
is the difference between each individual’s grand-mean-centred score on the IV and their 
individual mean score, and is a measure of how much each rating (at each time point) 
deviates from that individual’s mean score (across all time points; Bolger & Laurenceau, 
2013).  
A model including these within and between-subjects effects is shown in Equation 
1. Here, Yij, is the dependent variable (DV), γ00 is an intercept term, γ01X.j is the between-
subjects mean term for the IV, γ10 (Xij – X.j) is the term for the within-subjects variation in 
the IV, γ20Tij is a time variable, rescaled such that 0 is the middle of the time period (Bolger 
& Laurenceau, 2013). These are the fixed effects terms. The remaining three terms are 
random effects, where u0j is a random intercept term for each individual, u1j(Xij – X.j) is a 
within-subjects random slope term, and εij is a random residual component, specific to each 
subject.  
Yij = γ00 + γ01X.j + γ10 (Xij – X.j) + γ20Tij + u0j + u1j(Xij – X.j) + εij                             (1)  
Failure to identify these two separate sources of variance in a level 1 variable means 
that estimates may be biased, in the sense that putative level 1 effects are influenced by 
level 2 effects and vice-versa (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013; Preacher, Zhang, & Zyphur, 
2015). For example, it is possible that having a high average score on an IV (i.e., between-
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subjects variation) predicts positive changes in a DV; while being above one’s own average 
score on an IV at any given time-point (i.e., within-subjects variation) predicts negative 
changes in a DV, or vice-versa (Preacher et al., 2015). 
Chapter 7 of this thesis takes this within-subjects approach in its longitudinal 
analyses. It focuses on within-subjects variation in two dependent variables (acceptance 
and cognitive defusion) over time and uses these to predict within-subjects variation in 
coping responses, controlling for between-subjects differences in these variables. In 
addition, Study 4 (Chapter 7) uses a lagged modelling approach, described next. 
Lagged multi-level modelling 
 
In order to draw stronger causal inferences about the relations between longitudinal 
IVs and DVs, lagged time-series models can be used (Kleiber & Zeileis, 2008). Such 
models predict the DV of interest by IV(s) lagged by a specified time-period. Evidence of 
such a lagged relationship provides stronger evidence than mere association that changes 
in the IV caused changed in the DV, though other factors such as the presence of possible 
confounds need to be appropriately dealt with  (Schafer & Kang, 2008). Under a lagged 
time-series approach, the lagging period is arbitrary and needs to have a theoretical 
justification (Kleiber, & Zeileis, 2008). In the present research, a lag of one day was used 
on the basis that effects of mindfulness variables on coping outcomes were likely to be 
relatively context-specific and hence short-term, consistent with previous research of stress 
and coping (Affleck, Tennen, Urrows, & Higgins, 1994; Todd, Tennen, Carney, Armeli, & 
Affleck, 2004).  
This approach to lagged multi-level modelling, in its most basic form, is illustrated 
in Equation 2. 
Yij = γ00 + γ01X(i-1)j + γ10Y(i-1)j +u0j + u1j(X(i-1)j) + εij                                                              (2) 
 46 
 
 Here, Yij represents today’s scores on the DV, γ00 is an intercept term, γ01X(i-1)j is 
the IV lagged by 1 day(i-1), across j individuals, and γ10Y(i-1)j is the DV lagged by 1 day, 
across j individuals, to account for the autoregressive effects of the DV across time. Note 
that time is not modelled here, as it is built into the lagging structure of the model. These 
are the fixed effects. The random effects terms are u0j, a random intercept term, u1j(X(i-1)j), 
a random slope term of the IV lagged by 1 day, for each individual, and εij, a random 
residual term for each individual. Additional lagged or unlagged covariates may be added 
to this model as fixed factors.  
Missing data 
 
 Missing data is an issue in nearly all datasets, especially in longitudinal studies, 
where participant drop-out is difficult to prevent. Ad-hoc approaches to missing data, such 
as list and pair-wise deletion methods and mean substitution have been criticised, as they 
tend to produce biased parameter estimates (Baraldi & Enders, 2010; Little, 2013). In recent 
years, more robust methods of handling missing data have been developed, such as full-
information maximum likelihood (FIML) methods (Baraldi & Enders, 2010). FIML 
approaches have been shown to be robust to instances of non-normality in error distribution 
and provide adequate results even for low sample sizes and high rates of missing data 
(Enders, 2010; Graham, 2009; Graham, Olchowski, & Gilreath, 2007). In addition, the 
FIML approach produces unbiased estimates when data are missing at random (as opposed 
to missing completely at random), where traditional approaches do not (Baraldi & Enders, 
2010). In the substantive chapters of this thesis, the FIML approach was used for handling 
missing data. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
STUDY 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this study was to examine the first two research questions of this thesis 
in a laboratory setting. Specifically, this study tested whether a brief mindfulness induction 
enhanced approach and lowered avoidance coping with a stressful experience; and 
secondly, whether individuals’ levels of perceived stress moderated these effects. As noted 
in Chapter 2, several studies have found that brief, 10-15 minute mindfulness inductions 
have salutary effects, including lowering stress levels (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & 
Hofmann, 2006), increasing empathy (Tan et al., 2014) and increasing willingness to 
breathe CO2 enriched air (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt et al., 2004). This study built on 
these approaches and is the first that the author is aware of to examine the effects of a brief 
mindfulness induction on coping responses. 
In addition, no published research has tested whether the effects of a mindfulness 
induction or intervention upon approach and avoidance coping responses are moderated by 
individual-differences in stress levels. As discussed in Chapter 2, the mixed evidence for 
the effects of mindfulness interventions on coping responses may be because such 
interventions only influence coping responses in relatively high-stress contexts. Consistent 
with this, studies that have reported significant effects of multi-session mindfulness 
interventions on coping responses have been with samples likely to be experiencing high 
levels of stress, such as women living with heart disease (Tacón et al., 2003) and workers 
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in a busy telesales centre (Walach et al., 2007). Moreover, brief mindfulness inductions 
have been shown to reduce avoidant responses to threat in relatively high-stress contexts, 
such as exposure to threatening images (Arch & Craske, 2006) and social rejection 
(Heppner et al., 2008). This study therefore tested whether levels of general perceived stress 
between individuals moderated the effects of the mindfulness induction, relative to 
controls, upon coping responses. 
In the mindfulness literature, there has been some criticism of the over-reliance on 
waitlist rather than active controls in mindfulness research to date (Keng et al, 2012). To 
address this, a small number of studies have controlled for the relaxation effects of 
mindfulness interventions by including a relaxation control condition (e.g., Jain et al., 2007; 
Manocha, Black, Sarris, & Stough, 2011). The present study took this approach, including 
a progressive muscle relaxation control induction, described below. Relaxation 
interventions have been associated with less depression, anxiety and distress (Jorm, 
Morgan, & Hetrick, 2008; Manzoni, Pagnini, Castelnuovo, & Molinari, 2008), though the 
author is not aware of any research testing its effects on coping responses. In addition, a 
filler task was used as a no-treatment active control condition, again responding to calls for 
more active controls in studies of mindfulness and following a small number of studies to 
have taken this approach previously (e.g., Reb & Narayanan, 2014; Weinstein et al., 2009). 
Specifically, the present study compared the effects of a brief (15-minute long) 
mindfulness induction with a relaxation induction and a filler task, on how undergraduate 
students reported they would cope with the stress of their most recent university exams 
(which had occurred approximately 5 months earlier), if they were experiencing that stress 
currently. The mindfulness induction was expected to result in increased self-reported 
approach and reduced avoidance coping, relative to the relaxation and filler-task controls, 
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and these effects were expected to occur particularly among individuals reporting relatively 
high levels of stress over the past month. Formally, the hypotheses of this study were: 
Hypothesis 1: A mindfulness induction will result in more approach and less 
avoidance coping with a stressful experience, relative to relaxation and filler-task 
controls. 
Hypothesis 2: Perceived stress will moderate the effect of a mindfulness induction 
upon coping with a stressful experience, resulting in more approach and less 
avoidance coping among individuals reporting relatively high (but not low) levels 
of perceived stress, relative to relaxation and filler-task controls. 
Method 
 
Participants and Procedure 
Undergraduate students (N = 204; 71% female; mean age = 21; age range = 19-27) 
from a Dutch university volunteered in an hour’s lab session for which they received 
financial compensation (9 Euros). This study was approved by the Human Ethics 
Committee at the Australian National University. Upon registering for the study, subjects 
were randomly allocated into one of three experimental conditions (mindfulness, n = 69; 
relaxation, n = 67; filler task, n = 68). Upon arrival at the research site, participants first 
took part in one of the three 15-minute inductions.  
The mindfulness induction was a mindful candy eating exercise in which 
participants were directed to touch, smell, feel and taste a piece of candy in a slow and 
deliberate way, noticing thoughts, feelings and sensations, and re-directing their attention 
to the object of focus each time it wandered off. This induction was adapted from a similar 
exercise used in other mindfulness studies known as the ‘raisin eating’ exercise (Heppner 
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et al., 2008; Reb & Narayanan, 2014). The relaxation induction was the progressive muscle 
relaxation protocol, where individuals were directed to tense various parts of their body 
(e.g., feet, legs, hands) and then gradually relax them (McCallie, Blum, & Hood, 2008). 
The filler task was designed to be mildly challenging, so as to prevent subjects from 
becoming bored, but without inducing anxiety or distress (Reb & Narayanan, 2014; 
Weinstein et al., 2009). The task involved typing onto a screen a series of the same letters 
in a specified pattern, starting from ‘a’. For example, ‘aaa aaa aaa’ then ‘bbb bbb bbb’ up 
to ‘k’. All inductions were pre-recorded by appropriately qualified instructors to ensure 
consistency and accuracy. 
Following the inductions, subjects undertook a problem-solving task that involved 
working in groups of nine people to generate as many uses for a brick as possible within a 
15-minute time-frame. This task was included as part of another study but for the purposes 
of this study, served to create an interval between the inductions and the subsequent data 
collection, to test whether any effects of the brief mindfulness induction on self-reported 
coping were sustained through a challenging intervening problem-solving task. After this 
task, subjects completed the self-report measures of state mindfulness, general perceived 
stress, and approach and avoidance coping, described in the following section. 
Measures 
A four-item measure of state mindfulness was adapted from Reb and Narayan 
(2014; α = .75) as a manipulation check of the effect of the inductions on state mindfulness. 
Items were: “I noticed the sensations of my body”; “I was aware of my thoughts without 
getting lost in them”; “I was aware of whether my muscles were tense or relaxed”; and “I 
was fully in the present moment”, ranked on a one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly 
agree) Likert scale. 
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Monthly perceived stress was measured with the four-item version of the Perceived 
Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983; α = .76). Items were ranked on 
a one (never) to five (very often) Likert scale and sample items were: “In the last month, 
how often have you felt that you were unable to control the important things in your life?” 
and “In the last month, how often have you felt that things were going your way?”  
Self-reported coping behaviour was measured using the Brief COPE Inventory 
(Carver, 1997). Subjects were asked to think of the stress associated with their most recent 
university exams, and rate how they would respond to that stress if they were experiencing 
it right now. Approach and avoidance coping was measured using items from the Brief 
COPE Inventory that relate to each form of coping, following other studies that have taken 
this approach (e.g., Doron et al., 2014; Lyne & Roger, 2000; Stowell et al., 2001; Weinstein 
et al., 2009). All coping items were rated on a one (I do not do this at all) to five (I do this 
a lot) Likert scale. 
Approach coping (6 items; α = .69) comprised items relating to active coping (e.g., 
“I took action to try and make the situation better”), acceptance (e.g., “I accepted the reality 
of the fact that it happened”), and positive reinterpretation and growth (e.g., “I looked for 
something good in what was happening”), with two items for each coping behaviour.  
Avoidance coping (6 items; α = .72) comprised items relating to denial (e.g., “I said 
to myself ‘this isn’t real’”), behavioural disengagement (e.g., “I gave up trying to deal with 
it”) and self-distraction (e.g., “I turned to other activities to take my mind of this”), also 
with two items for each of these coping behaviours.   
Statistical analyses 
 Statistical power for this study (assuming a medium effect size (f = .25); a total 
sample size of 204; and n = 67 in the smallest condition) was .90. Experimental effects 
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were assessed using linear regression analyses with ordinary least squares estimation. 
When analyzing main (Hypothesis 1) and moderated effects (Hypothesis 2), relevant 
continuous variables (i.e., approach and avoidance coping, and perceived stress) were 
standardized. All statistical analyses in this study were conducted using the R software (R 
Core Team, 2015).   
Results 
 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for Study 1 variables appear in 
Table 1. There were no significant differences between the three experimental conditions 
on monthly perceived stress (F [2, 201] = 2.60, p = .077). As a manipulation check, the 
three conditions were compared on state mindfulness after the inductions. There was a 
significant overall difference in state mindfulness between conditions (F [2, 201] = 16.40, 
p < .001) with post-hoc analysis (Tukey’s HSD) indicating significant differences between 
the mindfulness and filler task conditions, MD = .41, p < .001, and between the relaxation 
and the filler task conditions, MD = .39, p < .001, but not between the mindfulness and the 
relaxation conditions, MD = .01, p = .984. The lack of a difference in state mindfulness 
between the mindfulness and relaxation inductions is not surprising, given that this measure 
emphasized awareness of the body, which is central to progressive muscle relaxation. 
Consistent with this, previous research has found that mindfulness and progressive muscle 
relaxation interventions produce increases in attention and awareness that are not 
statistically different from each other (Agee, Danoff-Burg, & Grant, 2009).  
Main effects of mindfulness induction on coping 
Regarding main effects (Hypothesis 1), there were no significant differences 
between the mindfulness condition and either of the control conditions on approach coping 
(mindfulness vs. relaxation: β = .21 [.17], t = 1.23, p = .220; mindfulness vs. filler: β = .09 
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[.17], t = .54, p = .590) or avoidance coping (mindfulness vs. relaxation: β = -.28 [.17], 
t = -1.66, p = .099; mindfulness vs. filler: β = -.02 [.17], t = -.10, p = .917). Nor was there 
a significant difference between the relaxation and filler conditions on either approach (β 
= .11 [.17], t = .66, p = .511) or avoidance coping (β = -.26 [.17], t = -1.52, p = .123).  
Estimates by each condition on both approach and avoidance coping are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1  
Group means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations for study variables 
 
Perceived stress as a moderator of mindfulness induction on coping 
I next tested Hypothesis 2 that monthly perceived stress would moderate the 
impact of the mindfulness induction upon coping, relative to the two control conditions. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, there was a significant interaction between monthly 
perceived stress and the mindfulness induction in predicting less avoidance coping, 
relative to the relaxation induction, β = -.34 (.16), t = -2.18, p = .030, but not between the 
mindfulness and filler inductions, β = -.21 (.18), t = -1.18, p = .240, as illustrated in 
  Mindfulness   Relaxation   Filler   Bivariate correlations 
 
(n = 69) 
 
(n = 71) 
 
(n = 64) 
    
  M SD   M SD   M SD   1 2 3 
    Female (%) 70% 
  
68% 
  
75% 
     
    Age 20.70 0.46 
 
21.10 0.47 
 
20.86 0.44 
    
1. Monthly stress 9.18 2.60 
 
10.16 3.09 
 
9.34 2.41 
    
2. State mindfulness 13.81 2.55 
 
13.76 2.53 
 
11.56 2.58 
 
-.014 
  
3. Approach coping 15.91 4.31 
 
15.42 4.73 
 
15.70 4.34 
 
-.272**  .145*  
4. Avoidance coping 4.32 2.41   4.73 2.50   4.34 2.36    .364** -.066 -.351** 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 2. However, significant interaction effects were not found for the mindfulness 
condition compared to either control condition, on approach coping.
 
Figure 2. Experimental conditions interacting with monthly perceived stress to predict 
avoidance coping. Note. Avoidance coping and monthly perceived stress were standardized 
for this analysis. 
 
Discussion 
 
This study explored the first two research questions of this thesis, via a brief 
mindfulness induction: first, whether mindfulness enhances approach and inhibits 
avoidance coping responses; and second, whether these effects are moderated by 
individuals’ levels of perceived stress. This study is the first that the author is aware of to 
test the effects of a mindfulness induction on coping responses, although previous studies 
have examined the effects of mindfulness inductions on related outcomes (e.g., responses 
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to threatening images, Arch & Craske, 2006; and responses to social rejection, Heppner et 
al., 2008).  
Theories of mindfulness claim that it enhances self-regulation, thereby increasing 
the adaptiveness of an individual’s response to aversive experiences (Brown et al., 2007; 
Shapiro et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 2006). When a person is mindful, they are able to ‘step 
back’ and notice present-moment experience with a sense of perspective, and this 
psychological distance is, in-turn, claimed to give the person more response options, 
including to stressful experiences, meaning their response is more effective and appropriate 
to the situation (Shapiro et al., 2006; Teasdale et al., 2002).  
The findings of this study appear consistent with these theories of mindfulness. 
Regarding our first hypothesis that the mindfulness induction would have significant main 
effects on coping (enhancing approach and inhibiting avoidance coping) relative to the two 
control inductions, we did not find support for this. That is, there were no differences found 
on either approach or avoidance coping between any of the three experimental conditions. 
One explanation for this is that mindfulness interventions only influence coping responses 
among relatively stressed individuals, and it may be that in the present sample there were 
null effects among relatively unstressed individuals which masked the effects of the 
intervention for relatively stressed individuals. On the other hand, it may be that as stress 
levels rise, the self-regulation benefits of mindfulness also increase, meaning a brief 
mindfulness induction will have a bigger effect on coping responses. This was the second 
hypothesis of this study.   
I did indeed find support for the second hypothesis of this study. Specifically, as the 
level of perceived stress increased between individuals, significant differences appeared 
between the mindfulness and relaxation conditions on avoidance coping. This suggests that 
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when levels of general perceived stress are low, being mindful does not improve a persons’ 
coping responses, relative to engaging in relaxation or a filler activity. However, as stress 
levels rise, being mindful appears to have benefits for coping with stress in ways that 
relaxation does not. As discussed, this may be because being mindful facilitates enhanced 
behavioural regulation (i.e., less avoidance coping) in the presence of negative affect (i.e., 
stress) in a way that relaxation does not. 
Of note, there were no differences in self-reported awareness of present-moment 
bodily sensations (i.e., the measure of state mindfulness) between the mindfulness and 
relaxation conditions following the inductions in this study; yet the above moderation 
effects were found. This suggests that mindfulness has its effects on coping responses not 
simply via being more attentive to bodily sensations in the present-moment. Rather, it may 
be the self-regulatory function of mindfulness that is the difference between it and 
relaxation, in terms of enhancing coping responses. Recall that participants in the 
mindfulness induction were directed to attend to the process of eating a piece of candy and, 
when they noticed their attention wander off, to gently re-direct back to the object. On the 
other hand, those in the relaxation condition did not receive any such self-regulatory 
instruction. Therefore it may be this self-regulatory aspect of mindfulness that enhances 
coping responses, perhaps through increased willingness to attend to present-moment 
experience – even if unpleasant – although this was not directly tested in the present study. 
Another caveat from this study is that there were no significant differences between 
the mindfulness and filler conditions in terms of coping. One possibility is that the filler 
condition, in which participants were asked to type a series of letters on a succession of 
frames on a computer screen, may have induced a level of self-regulatory focus (explaining 
why there were no differences between the mindfulness and filler tasks on present-centred 
awareness post-intervention). Increased self-regulatory focus in both conditions may, in-
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turn, explain why there were no significant differences between the mindfulness and filler 
conditions on coping, though I was not able to directly test this possibility. 
There are a number of limitations of this study. First, this study did not measure 
mediators of mindfulness. Future studies of mindfulness inductions and coping responses 
could measure potential mediators of mindfulness, such as self-regulation. Doing this 
would help to isolate the specific mechanisms by which mindfulness has its effects. 
Although exploring such mediators was not a focus of this study, or indeed of this thesis 
more broadly, doing so would be a valuable future line of research. 
Second, coping was measured in this study by asking participants to recall the stress 
of their most recent university exams and responding to how they would cope with such 
stress if they were experiencing it currently. Given that students’ exams were 
approximately five months prior to the time of the present study, there would very likely 
have been issues with recall biases from using such an approach. Measuring coping in 
relation to a more proximal stressor would be an improvement on the present study.  
Third, it may be that the mindfulness ‘dose’ was insufficient in the present study to 
elicit large changes in coping responses. In particular, this may explain the null findings in 
relation to main effects in this study. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Halland et al, 
2015; Tacón et al., 2003; Walach et al., 2007), a more intensive mindfulness intervention 
may be needed for main effects on coping responses to be observed. Study 2 sought to 
address this issue by testing the effects of a multi-session mindfulness intervention upon 
individuals’ coping responses. 
Despite its limitations and exploratory nature, this study provides novel evidence 
that the effects of mindfulness on coping responses may be contingent on individuals’ 
levels of psychological stress. Moreover, this finding is consistent with theoretical claims 
 58 
 
outlined in Chapters 1 and 2 that mindfulness enhances behavioural regulation following 
aversive experiences (Brown et al., 2007; Shapiro et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 1999), and that 
this in-turn should enhance individuals’ coping responses.  
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                                                    CHAPTER 5 
 
STUDY 2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This study extended Study 1 in two main ways. First, it tested the effects of a multi-
week mindfulness intervention (adapted from the MBSR program) upon approach and 
avoidance coping responses to naturally-occurring – rather than laboratory-induced – 
stressors. Second, this study tested whether individuals’ levels of perceived stress in 
relation to a specific stressor (rather than general stress over the past month, as in Study 1) 
moderated the effects of the mindfulness intervention on coping responses, relative to a 
waitlist control. While the author’s preference would have been to use an active control 
group in this study, it was not logistically possible to do so.  
Regarding the first point above, studies of the effects of multi-session mindfulness 
interventions upon coping responses have yielded mixed findings (as discussed in Chapter 
2), possibly due to the use of small samples in several studies, limiting their statistical 
power to detect effects (e.g., Sears & Kraus, 2009; Tacón et al., 2003; Walach et al., 2007). 
The present study addressed this by using a sufficiently large sample so as to draw 
meaningful conclusions regarding intervention effects (see Statistical analysis below). 
Another issue in this literature is that the MBSR-based studies that found positive effects 
on coping (e.g., Halland et al., 2015; Tacón et al., 2003; Walach et al., 2007) included a 
range of non-meditational adjuncts, including: teaching ‘informal’ mindfulness skills such 
as mindfulness in every-day situations, mindful responses to stressful events and mindful 
communication; group conversation designed to reinforce the application of mindfulness 
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skills in every-day life; and written reflection on practice. On the other hand, studies 
reporting null results (e.g., Josefsson et al., 2012; Sears & Kraus, 2009) did not include 
such applications of mindfulness skills to every-day life and focused instead on 
mindfulness meditation. The present study therefore administered a mindfulness 
intervention that was adapted from MBSR and included substantial focus on applying 
mindfulness skills to daily life, alongside meditation, and tested the effects of such an 
intervention on coping responses.  
The second way in which this study extended Study 1 was in testing whether 
individuals’ levels of event-related perceived stress moderated the effects of the 
mindfulness intervention on coping responses, relative to a waitlist control. Evidence for 
this interaction effect will provide further support for the idea that mindfulness 
interventions may enhance coping responses among especially stressed individuals. In this 
study, I used a measure of state perceived stress in relation to an actual stressor, rather than 
perceived stress over the past month which was used in Study 1. Using a state measure of 
perceived stress enabled me to assess the relations between stress perceptions and coping 
responses regarding the same stressor. 
In addition to examining the above primary research questions of this thesis, this 
study had a secondary aim: to compare the effects of the MBSR-adapted intervention with 
one based on ACT (Hayes et al., 1999). ACT is an increasingly popular methodology for 
enhancing psychological flexibility and values-consistent responding to challenging 
experiences (Keng et al., 2011; Öst, 2014). Although ACT is a mindfulness-based 
framework, it takes a different approach to training mindfulness skills that MBSR does. 
ACT teaches mindfulness skills mainly through non-meditational means (i.e., using 
metaphors, experiential exercises and emphasizing the application of mindfulness skills to 
daily life), while MBSR places substantial emphasis on mindfulness meditation, as well as 
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assisting individuals in applying mindfulness in daily life (known as ‘informal’ mindfulness 
practice; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992). In addition, ACT interventions assist individuals in 
clarifying their personally-held values, and then use mindfulness skills to help people to act 
in values-consistent ways within domains of their life that they choose (Hayes et al., 1999, 
2006). The secondary aim of this study was therefore to compare the effects on coping 
responses of an intervention that focuses solely on training mindfulness skills (i.e., the 
MBSR-adapted intervention) with one that combines mindfulness training with values-
clarification exercises (i.e., the ACT intervention).  
To date, there have been no published studies comparing the effects of an MBSR 
intervention with one based on ACT on coping responses, or indeed on any outcome. While 
there is evidence that ACT interventions reduce avoidance of unwanted thoughts and 
emotions, as well as publically observable avoidant behaviour in certain contexts (Keng et 
al., 2011; Levin et al., 2012), the author is not aware of any published research directly 
examining the influence of ACT-based interventions upon coping responses. I next review 
the evidence for the effects of both MBSR and ACT interventions on approach and 
avoidance coping responses.  
MBSR interventions and coping with stress 
As outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the research on the effects of MBSR and 
related group interventions on coping is preliminary and has produced mixed results. There 
is some evidence that MBSR enhances approach forms of coping. For example, Walach et 
al. (2007) found that the full-length MBSR program increased positive coping (similar to 
approach coping) among a group of sales workers, while Halland et al. (2015) found that a 
shortened version of the MBSR program enhanced problem-focused coping among 
undergraduates. However, others have reported null results of a multi-week (non-MBSR) 
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mindfulness intervention on approach coping, among working adults (Josefsson et al., 
2012) and undergraduates (Sears & Kraus, 2009). Given these mixed findings, I did not 
make predictions in the present study regarding the effect of the MBSR-adapted 
intervention on approach coping. Although mindfulness is claimed to increase willingness 
to be exposed to aversive stimuli (Shapiro et al., 2006), it is not clear this extends to 
approach forms of coping with stress and further exploration of this possibility is needed. 
On the other hand, there is stronger evidence that MBSR-related interventions 
should reduce avoidance coping. Halland et al. (2015) found that a truncated MBSR 
program interacted with baseline neuroticism to predict less avoidance coping relative to a 
no-treatment control, while Tacón et al. (2003) found that MBSR resulted in less reactive 
coping (similar to avoidance coping) among women with heart disease. In addition, 
Weinstein et al. (2009) provided non-experimental evidence that trait and state mindfulness 
predicted less avoidance coping across four studies. In light of this evidence and theoretical 
claims that mindfulness facilitates a reduction in experiential avoidance (Hayes et al., 
2006), I expected that an MBSR-adapted intervention would produce less avoidance coping 
relative to a waitlist control.  
ACT interventions and coping with stress 
To the author’s knowledge, there have been no randomised controlled trials of the 
influence of an ACT intervention upon coping behaviour (Keng, et al., 2011; Öst, 2014). 
However, ACT interventions have been shown to reduce cigarette smoking (Bowen & 
Marlatt, 2009; Gifford et al., 2004, 2011) drug use (Hayes et al., 2004), and hair pulling 
(Woods, Wetterneck, & Flessner, 2006), which are avoidance-oriented behaviours, as they 
take the individual away from contact with unpleasant thoughts and feelings. Moreover, 
reductions in experiential avoidance, the avoidance of unwanted thoughts and feelings and 
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a key goal of ACT (Hayes et al., 2006), correlates highly with avoidance coping behaviours 
(Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011). This suggests that an ACT intervention, which aims to 
reduce experiential avoidance, should also reduce avoidant coping behaviours, such as 
distraction, behavioural disengagement and denial. I therefore expected the ACT 
intervention to reduce avoidance coping post-intervention. 
ACT emphasises using mindfulness skills to act in values-consistent ways, and 
there is some evidence that this translates to more approach-type coping behaviours. For 
example individuals high in autonomous motivation, which includes drawing upon 
personally-held values, engage in more approach coping behaviours following stressful 
events (Weinstein et al., 2009) and display greater persistance after failure (Koestner & 
Zuckerman, 1994). However in some contexts, values-consistent responding may not 
involve approach coping. For example, in situations of substantial trauma, emotion-focused 
coping, rather than problem-solving, may be more appropriate and therefore values-
consistent. Moreover, in situations that the individual cannot control (e.g., loss), approach 
coping may not be values-consistent. While there is evidence that over the long-term, 
approach coping predicts greater well-being (Duangdao & Roesch, 2008; Roesch et al., 
2005), it is not clear that values-clarification (as taught in ACT) will, on average, produce 
greater approach coping. I therefore did not make predictions regarding the effect of the 
ACT intervention on approach coping. Based on the above evidence, the first hypothesis 
of this study was:  
Hypothesis 1: An MBSR-adapted and an ACT intervention would both result in less 
avoidance coping with monthly stressors, relative to a waitlist control condition. 
Although I did not make specific predictions regarding the effects of either the 
MBSR-adapted or the ACT intervention upon approach coping in this study, experimental 
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effects of each intervention on approach coping were tested for in exactly the same way as 
effects on avoidance coping were tested for. 
The moderating role of perceived stress 
 Following the findings of Study 1 and the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, it was 
expected that the effects of both interventions upon avoidance coping would be stronger 
among relatively stressed individuals. As discussed, Study 1 found that perceived stress 
moderated the effect of a mindfulness induction in reducing avoidance coping, but there 
were no significant main effects. Further support for this proposition comes from a recent 
study (Halland, et al., 2015) which found that neuroticism (a construct strongly predictive 
of stress appraisals and negative emotions; Mohiyeddini et al., 2015) moderated the effects 
of a mindfulness intervention in reducing avoidance coping. In a similar vein, earlier studies 
found that MBSR interventions enhanced some coping responses among busy sales 
workers (Walach et al., 2007) and women with heart disease (Tacón et al., 2003), both 
populations likely experiencing considerable stress (though stress was not assessed in either 
of these studies). Moreover, brief mindfulness inductions have been shown to reduce 
avoidant responses to threat in relatively stressful contexts, such as exposure to threatening 
images (Arch & Craske, 2006) and social rejection (Heppner et al., 2008).  
Regarding ACT interventions, there is evidence that ACT group therapy reduces 
stress and burnout and enhances well-being among individuals reporting high (but not low) 
levels of stress at baseline (Brinkborg, Michanek, Hesser, & Berglund, 2011). In addition, 
ACT component studies have similarly found reductions in avoidance behaviours in 
relatively high-stress settings, such as being exposed to CO2 enriched air (Eifert & Heffner, 
2003; Levitt et al., 2004) receiving an electric shock (Gutiérrez et al., 2004), an exposure 
to distressing thoughts (Mandavia et al., 2015; Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda, Twohig, et 
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al., 2010). I therefore expected that both interventions will have strongest effects on coping 
among individuals experiencing high levels of stress. The second hypothesis of this study 
was: 
Hypothesis 2: Perceived stress will moderate the effect of an MBSR-adapted and 
an ACT intervention, resulting in less avoidance coping relative to a waitlist control.   
Covariates 
Lastly, this study tested the above hypotheses controlling for the effects of several 
demographic (age and gender) and non-demographic covariates (trait psychological 
distress, general self-efficacy and trait mindfulness). There is evidence that each of these 
covariates predicts greater approach and less avoidance coping with stressful events. 
Controlling for their effects in the present study meant the study was ‘doubly-controlled’ 
(i.e., randomised allocation to experimental conditions; and effects tested for with and 
without covariates in the models).  
Regarding demographic covariates, there is evidence for gender differences in 
coping styles, with men tending to exhibit more approach forms of coping and women 
exhibiting more emotion-focused and avoidance forms of coping (Kapsou et al., 2010; 
Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011; Nicholls & Polman, 2007; Ptacek, Smith, & Zanas, 1992), 
though some studies have failed to find evidence for these differences (e.g., Antoniou & 
Bebetsos, 2003; Pensgaard, Roberts, & Ursin, 1999). In addition, there is evidence that age 
is positively associated with approach coping (Antoniou & Bebetsos, 2003; Goyen & 
Anshel, 1998) and negatively related to avoidance coping (Aldwin, 1991; Gianakos, 2002), 
consistent with developmental theories of coping (Vaillant, 1977).   
Regarding the non-demographic covariates included in this study – trait 
psychological distress, general self-efficacy and trait mindfulness – there is evidence that 
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each is associated with less approach and more avoidance coping. In relation to 
psychological distress, a recent meta-analysis (Kato, 2013) found that active coping, 
planning and positive reinterpretation were each associated with less general distress, with 
small effect sizes (ranging from -0.05 to -0.13), while avoidance coping was associated 
with greater general distress, with small-to-medium-sized effects sizes (ranging from 0.18 
to 0.30).  
General self-efficacy has been found to predict more problem-focused (Chwalisz, 
Altmaier, & Russell, 1992) and active coping (Jex, Bliese, Buzzell, & Primeau, 2001), and 
less avoidance coping (Haney & Long, 1995; Jex et al., 2001; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987). 
I therefore expected appraisals of personal self-efficacy to predict more approach and less 
avoidance coping with stress.  
Lastly, and as reviewed in Chapter 2, there is evidence that trait mindfulness 
predicts less avoidance coping, and also some evidence that it predicts more approach 
coping. For example, Weinstein et al., (2009) found that among a student sample, trait 
mindfulness (measured using the MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) predicted less avoidance 
coping with laboratory-induced stress (Study 1) and exam stress (Study 4), and more 
approach and less avoidance coping with monthly (Study 2) and daily stressors (Study 3). 
Further, Palmer and Rodger (2009) found that higher trait mindfulness was associated with 
more adaptive (rational and detached) coping and less avoidance coping among a student 
sample. Trait mindfulness has also been associated with less avoidance of unavoidable 
distressing experiences (such as being criticised, humiliated or having one’s weaknesses 
exposed) among a community sample (Bergomi et al., 2013).  
Method 
 
Participants and procedure 
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Participants were recruited via online advertising for a mindfulness course at three 
Australian university campuses. The course was advertised as costing AUD 100, with a full 
refund available for course participants who completed the research surveys associated with 
the course. Ethics clearance for collecting these data was obtained from the author’s 
institution. The flow of participants in this study is shown in Figure 1.  
A total of 334 university students and staff registered for the course, and were randomly 
allocated online to one of three conditions: an MBSR-adapted condition, an ACT condition 
and a waitlist control condition. Simple random allocation to the three conditions was 
conducted using a computerised random number generator in the Qualtrics program as 
participants enrolled in the course. Participants, but not those administering the 
interventions, were blind as to which condition they were in.  
 Following allocation to an experimental condition, 44 participants withdrew, 
presumably because the course dates they received (as a result of the random allocation to 
groups) did not suit them. Following allocation to experimental conditions, participants 
provided informed consent to participate in the study and completed the first of two surveys 
in which data for the present study were collected. The first survey was administered in the 
week prior to the interventions commencing (Time 1), and a post-intervention survey was 
administered in the week following the third and final intervention session (Time 2; 
approximately 6 weeks following the Time 1 survey). A total of 85 participants (in the 
MBSR-adapted and ACT conditions) did not make the AUD 100 payment, did not provide 
informed consent or complete the baseline survey, and withdrew from the study. A further 
six participants in the waitlist control did not complete the baseline survey and withdrew 
from the study. 
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 As a part of the baseline survey, all participants were screened for psychological 
distress (using the K10 scale; Kessler et al., 2002). The K10 scale has a range of 10-50 with 
a score above 30 indicating high risk of psychological distress (Kessler et al., 2002). A total 
of 24 participants reported K10 scores of greater than 30 (sample M = 22.41, SD = 6.49). 
These individuals were contacted and offered a phone call to inquire about mental health 
and extra support during sessions however, none were excluded from the study based on 
these follow-up consultations.  
This left a total of 199 participants in the study. Of these, 73% were female with a 
mean age 35 (range =18 to 60; SD = 11). Around 72% identified as Caucasian, 15% as East 
or South Asian and 13% as ‘other’. Ninety five percent of participants held an 
undergraduate diploma or degree and 37% held a master’s or PhD degree. 
A total of 40 participants did not complete the post-intervention survey, but 
remained in the study meaning their data could be used in the analyses. Of these, 25 
participants were in the waitlist group. The larger number of drop-outs in the waitlist 
condition (31% of the total number in the waitlist condition) was likely because these 
individuals had not made the up-front payment prior to commencing the study so had less 
incentive to complete the study measures, whereas those in the other two conditions had 
made an up-front payment.  
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Figure 1. Flow of participants through the study. 
Although 40 study participants (20% of the total) did not complete Time 2 
measures, all participants were included in the analyses, a key advantage of the structural 
equation modelling approach used in this study. Participants who completed both surveys 
for the study and attended all three sessions of the interventions received an AUD 100 
refund at the completion of the data-collection process. The interventions were 
administered at two university campuses in Sydney and one in Canberra, Australia, and are 
described next. 
MBSR-adapted intervention 
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 This intervention used MBSR-related activities and meditations in a reduced dosage 
format and was drawn from material in the Mindfulness-based Stress Reduction Workbook 
(Stahl & Goldstein, 2013). The 3 x 3 hour sessions were conducted in groups of 15-25 
participants, and were led by a trained mindfulness teacher with 5 years’ experience 
teaching mindfulness skills in groups. The intervention combined psycho-education, 
instruction in the practice of formal and informal mindfulness, written reflection, peer-to-
peer discussion and home-practice that participants were encouraged to engage in between 
sessions. A summary of the topics, learning objectives, content and exercises used in each 
of the three sessions are in Appendix A.  
ACT Intervention 
 The ACT intervention was based on the Mindful & Effective Employee protocol 
(Flaxman, Bond & Leventhal, 2013). The protocol was also 3 x 3 hour sessions, led by an 
ACT-trained facilitator with 5 years’ experience facilitating ACT groups. The intervention 
combined psycho-education relating to mindfulness and values-clarification, instruction in 
mindfulness skills based on the psychological flexibility model (Hayes et al., 2006), written 
reflection, peer-to-peer discussion and home-practice. Descriptions of the topics, learning 
objectives, content and exercises used in this protocol appear in Appendix B.  
Adherence  
 In order to ensure that the interventions were delivered in accordance with their 
respective protocols (see Appendices A and B for descriptions of each), audio recordings 
of all training sessions were made and checks for adherence to the protocols for each 
intervention were conducted on a randomly-selected portion of this content (approximately 
30%; Öst, 2008). The checks were undertaken by a third year clinical psychology doctoral 
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student trained in MBSR and ACT, but not otherwise involved in any part of this research. 
The reviewer scored overall adherence to each protocol at 5/5. 
In addition, both protocols were rated for their adherence to the core components of 
ACT and mindfulness interventions, respectively. A valid and reliable adherence scale 
developed for ACT therapy with obsessive compulsive disorder (Pierson, Bunting, Smith, 
Gifford, & Hayes, 2004) and subsequently used elsewhere (e.g., Twohig, Hayes, & 
Masuda, 2006;  Twohig, Shoenberger, & Hayes, 2007) was adapted for the present training 
(rather than therapy) context for the ACT protocol. For the MBSR-adapted protocol, the 
same rating scale was adapted to reflect core mindfulness components, drawing on 
mindfulness-based relapse prevention (Chawla et al., 2010) and MBCT-based adherence 
rating scales (Segal et al., 2002). Each component of each adherence scale was rated on a 
five-point scale of 1 (not at all: the variable never explicitly occurred) to 5 (extensively: 
the variable occurred with great frequency and was address in an in-depth manner). Both 
adherence scales included, respectively, anti-ACT and anti-mindfulness items to rate for 
exclusion (e.g., challenging cognitions and experiential avoidance change strategies). The 
ACT intervention was rated as 33/35 on this scale, while the MBSR-adapted intervention 
was rated as 34/35. 
Competence 
The competence of trainer style and delivery was assessed using two scales adapted 
from (Chawla et al., 2010). The first assessed trainer style/approach (e.g., rating the 
trainer’s “ability to elicit and respond to both verbal and nonverbal feedback”). Both 
trainers were rated as 18/20. The second scale assesses overall trainer performance (e.g., 
“How would you rate the ability of the trainer to keep the session focused and on topic?”). 
Both trainers received ratings of 20/20 on this scale. 
Measures 
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Measures for the present study were administered at two time points: one in the 
week prior to the commencement of the experimental interventions; and another five weeks 
after the end of the intervention. Cronbach’s alphas for each assessed variables are reported 
in Table 3. 
Stress-related measures 
On each measurement occasion, participants were asked to recall their most 
stressful experience of the past month and briefly describe it in writing. The following 
measures were then administered. 
Stress appraisal: A single-item measure of momentary perceived stress during the 
recalled stressful event was adapted from Hodgins et al. (2010) and Tomaka et al. (1993), 
on a 1 (not at all stressful) to 100 (extremely stressful) slider scale: “At the time, how 
stressful did this experience feel to you?” 
 Approach coping comprised the active coping, planning and positive 
reinterpretation subscales of the COPE Inventory (Carver et al., 1989), following similar 
approaches elsewhere (e.g., Deisinger et al., 1996; Fontaine et al., 1993; Lyne & Roger, 
2000; Stowell et al., 2001; Weinstein et al., 2009). Each subscale was composed of four 
items, rated on a five-point Likert scale (I did not do this at all to I did this a lot). Sample 
active coping items were “I did what had to be done, one step at a time” and “I took direct 
action to get around the problem”; sample planning items were “I made a plan of action” 
and “I thought about how I might best handle the situation”; and sample positive 
reinterpretation items were “I learned something from the experience” and “I looked for 
something good in what happened.” 
Avoidance coping was composed of the behavioural disengagement, self-distraction 
and denial subscales of the COPE Inventory (Carver et al., 1989), following similar 
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approaches by Cook & Heppner (1997), Deisinger et al. (1996), Lyne & Roger (2000) and 
Stowell et al. (2001). Each subscale contained four items rated on a five-point Likert scale 
(I did not do this at all to I did this a lot). Sample behavioural disengagement items were 
“I gave up the attempt to get what I want” and “I reduced the amount of effort I put into 
solving the problem”; sample self-distraction items were “I turned to work or other 
activities to take my mind of things” and “I went to the movies or watched TV to think 
about it less”; and sample denial items were “I acted as though it hadn’t happened” and “I 
pretended that it hadn’t really happened.” 
Baseline covariates 
Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006). The ‘act with 
awareness’ and ‘non-judgement’ factors of the FFMQ were respectively used to measure 
the present-moment-awareness and acceptance elements of trait mindfulness. These 
subscales contain 12 and 11 items respectively, each rated on a five-point Likert- scale 
(never or rarely true to very often or always true).  
 New general self-efficacy scale (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001). This scale is made up 
of eight items scored on a five-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree). 
Sample items include “I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself” 
and “Even when things are tough, I can perform quite well”. 
  K10 (Kessler et al., 2003) was used as a measure of baseline psychological distress. 
The K10 asks individuals to rate how they have felt over the past month on a one (none of 
the time) to five (all of the time) Likert scale. Sample items include “About how often did 
you feel nervous?” and “About how often did you feel worthless?”  
Statistical analyses 
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 Power analysis. Statistical power calculations were based on a medium effect size 
(f = .25), three experimental conditions, six covariates, a significance criterion of α = .05, 
and statistical power (1 – β) of .90, producing a target sample of N = 206. Given the study 
in-fact recruited 199 participants, actual statistical power was .89, which is well above the 
generally-accepted minimum of .80 in the social sciences (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). 
 Missing data. Missing data was relatively low at Time 1, ranging from 0.5 to 1.5% 
of cases across study variables, but increased at Time 2, ranging from 1.5% (stress 
appraisal) to 20% (approach and avoidance coping) of cases across study variables. 
Students t-tests were used to examine differences between individuals who remained in the 
study at Time 2 compared with those who dropped out, on baseline approach and avoidance 
coping, psychological distress, gender and age. I did not find significant differences 
between the two groups on any of these variables, suggesting that dropping out was not 
associated with variables of interest in this study. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the FIML 
approach to missing data was used, which has been recognised in the social sciences as 
preferable to ad-hoc deletion methods, as it uses all the available information for parameter 
estimation (Baraldi & Enders, 2010). Using this approach, the sample size for all statistical 
analyses was N = 199 (see Figure 1). 
Structural equation modelling. To measure the effects of the interventions on 
approach and avoidance coping, the two intervention conditions (as dummy variables) were 
regressed on coping responses at post-test, with the waitlist control condition as a reference 
group, following similar approaches elsewhere (e.g., Gaspard et al., 2015). This model is 
represented visually in Figure 3. A regression-based approach avoids problems with 
unequal cell sizes and missing data common in analyses of variance and covariance 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). In addition, I took a structural equation modelling approach 
that corrects for the measurement error of latent constructs and provides unbiased estimates 
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of path coefficients (Bollen, 1989). I ran two sets of five models for each of approach and 
avoidance coping as outcome variables. In each model, I controlled for the effects of 
baseline (Time 1) levels of coping (either approach or avoidance, depending on the model), 
so as to control for the autoregressive effects of coping across time (Gaspard et al., 2015). 
All analyses were conducted in the R program (R Core Team, 2015), using the ‘lavaan’, 
‘lavaan.survey’ and ‘SEMTools’ packages.  
Goodness of fit. In order to compare the fit of the above successively more 
restrictive models, the CFI, TLI, and RMSEA fit measures were used, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. In order to ensure that the latent coping variables remained invariant across time 
points, the longitudinal invariance of the factor loadings were tested (Millsap, 2011). I used 
the criterion of CFI ∆ ≤ .01 for comparing the fit of successive models, as suggested by 
Cheung and Rensvold (2002), and used the same criterion for the TLI. For the RMSEA, I 
used the criterion of RMSEA ∆ ≤ .015 for invariance between nested models, as suggested 
by Chen (2007). Although additional tests of invariance may be used, the models in the 
present study focused solely on the covariance between constructs, meaning the only real 
prerequisite to valid longitudinal comparisons is the invariance of the factor loadings over 
time (Millsap, 2011).  
Results 
 
Marginal means and standard errors for each of the three conditions on both 
approach and avoidance coping at baseline (Time 1) and post-test (Time 2) are shown in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Marginal means and standard deviations for the three conditions at both time-points 
Time Condition Approach Coping 
 
Avoidance Coping 
  
M SD 
 
M SD 
Time 1 MBSR 47.54 5.94 
 
22.58 5.41 
 
ACT 47.18 6.59 
 
23.77 6.00 
 
Waitlist 46.88 6.37 
 
24.35 5.64 
Time 2 MBSR 49.19 5.85 
 
19.98 5.79 
 
ACT 49.28 6.34 
 
22.12 5.59 
  Waitlist 45.78 6.20 
 
23.95 5.69 
 
In order to assess the effects of both interventions on approach and avoidance 
coping, a series of CFA and structural models were ran. I first ran two sets of configural 
CFA models, in which all approach coping items loaded onto a single approach factor 
(Model 1) and all avoidance coping items loaded onto a single avoidance coping factor 
(Model 2). Next, I compared Models 1 and 2 with a second set of configural CFA models 
in which I allowed items pertaining to each of the three approach and avoidance subscales 
(see Measures section) to load onto their respective subscales as first-order factors, and 
each of the first-order factors to load in-turn onto higher order approach (Model 3) and 
avoidance (Model 4) coping factors, following similar approaches elsewhere (Cook & 
Heppner, 1997; Deisinger et al., 1996; Lyne & Roger, 2000; Stowell et al., 2001). As shown 
in Table 3, Models 1 and 2 displayed poor fit, while Models 3 and 4 displayed acceptable 
fit to the data. 
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Table 3 Fit measures for Confirmatory Factor Analytic (CFA) and Structural Equations Models (SEM) 
Model Description χ² df CFI TLI RMSEA 
Approach coping      
CFA       
   Model 1  First-order configural  734.588 287 .755 .723 .088 
   Model 3  Second-order configural  416.754 272 .921 .905 .052 
   Model 5  Time-invariant model 426.785 283 .921 .910 .050 
SEM       
   Model 7  Path model without covariates 426.785 283 .921 .910 .050 
   Model 9  Path model with covariates 562.663 415 .928 .914 .042 
   Model 11 Path model with covariates and interaction (intervention x stress) 480.600 343 .946 .936 .045 
Avoidance coping      
CFA       
   Model 2  First-order configural 562.517 283 .821 .795 .070 
   Model 4  Second-order configural 389.369 278 .929 .917 .045 
   Model 6  Time-invariant model 403.971 289 .926 .917 .045 
SEM       
   Model 8  Path model without covariates 391.315 285 .932 .922 .043 
   Model 10  Path model with covariates 581.580 417 .911 .900 .044 
   Model 12 Path model with covariates and interaction (intervention x stress) 456.470 349 .939 .929 .039 
Note. ‘CFI’ = Comparative fit index; ‘TLI’ = Tucker-Lewis Index; ‘RMSEA’ = Root mean-squared error of approximation. In Models 5 and 6, only the factor-
loadings were constrained to be equal between Times 1 and 2.  
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 Third, I assessed correlations between study variables at baseline, with approach 
and avoidance included in a CFA as second-order factors (see Table 4). All relationships 
were in the expected direction, with trait mindfulness and general self-efficacy associated 
with greater approach and less avoidance coping, and psychological distress predicting less 
approach and more avoidance coping. Notably, age was positively related to acting with 
awareness and non-judgement, suggesting developmental changes in these variables, while 
gender was not correlated with any other variables. Cronbach’s alphas are reported in 
Table 4. 
I next ran CFA models for each of approach (Model 5) and avoidance coping 
(Model 6), in which I constrained the loading of each coping item onto its respective factor 
to be equal across time, in order to test whether both models retained acceptable fit to the 
data across time. Each of these models retained acceptable fit (see Table 3), suggesting that 
both the approach and avoidance coping models were time-invariant. 
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Table 4  
Cronbach’s alphas and bivariate correlations between study variables at baseline 
  
Approach 
coping 
Avoidance 
coping 
Act Aware 
(FFMQ) 
Non-judge 
(FFMQ) 
Psych. 
distress 
General 
self-
efficacy 
Perceived 
stress 
Age 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
Approach coping   -        .87 
Avoidance coping -.72**   -       .81 
Act aware (FFMQ)  .25** -.44**   -      .92 
Non-judge (FFMQ)  .21** -.44**  .53**   -     .94 
Psychological distress -.18* .50** -.41** -.46**   -    .87 
General self-efficacy  .46*** -.44**  .25**  .25** -.52***   -   .91 
Perceived stress  .10 .19* -.14 -.25***  .36*** -.20**   -    - 
Age  .13 -.15  .18*  .29*** -.09 -.04 -.13   -   - 
Gender  .02 .08  .00 -.03  .03  .00  .13 .12   - 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Main effects of both interventions on approach and avoidance coping  
I next ran two structural models (Model 7 for approach coping and Model 8 for 
avoidance coping), in which I specified and estimated path coefficients. An illustration of 
these models is in Figure 3, noting that this figure is a generic representation of the structure 
of both Models 7 and 8. Models 7 and 8 both retained acceptable fit indices, as shown in 
Table 3. The effects of both interventions on approach and avoidance coping are shown in 
Table 5. Model 8 provides partial support for Hypothesis 1, with the MBSR-adapted 
intervention predicting less avoidance coping at Time 2 relative to the waitlist control, 
controlling for baseline levels of avoidance coping, β = -.26 (.10), t = -2.71, p = .007. 
However, contrary to Hypothesis 1, the ACT intervention did not predict less avoidance 
coping at Time 2, controlling for baseline levels of avoidance coping, β = -.11 (.09), t = -
1.27, p = .203.  
Regarding approach coping (Model 7), Table 5 shows that both interventions 
resulted in greater approach coping at Time 2 relative to the waitlist control, and controlling 
for baseline levels of avoidance coping, when this was not predicted in the hypotheses of 
this study. Effects for the MBSR-adapted intervention were β = .26 (.09), t = 2.86, p = .004; 
and for the ACT intervention were β = .27 (.10), t = 2.82, p = .005. 
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Figure 3. A path model illustrating Models 7 and 8, with experimental interventions predicting coping at Time 2, controlling for coping at 
Time 1. Note. Coping respectively refers to approach coping for Model 7 and to avoidance coping for Model 8. 
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Table 5  
Effects of MBSR-adapted and ACT interventions on approach and avoidance coping 
(Models 7 and 8) 
 Approach coping (Model 7)  Avoidance coping (Model 8) 
  β SE z-value p-value 
 
β SE z-value p-value 
Coping (Time 2)  
    
 
    
   MBSR  .26** .09 2.86    .004  -.26** .10 -2.71    .007 
   ACT  .27** .10 2.82    .005  -.11 .09 -1.27    .203 
   Coping (Time 1)  .32*** .09 3.54 < .001   .41*** .09 4.48 < .001 
Coping (Time 1) 
    
 
    
   MBSR   .02 .09 0.22    .826  -.15 .09 -1.62   .105 
   ACT  -.04 .09 -0.48    .630  -.07 .09 -0.77   .441 
Note. All effects are in standardized form. Effects for MBSR and ACT are in comparison to the 
waitlist condition. ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Models 9 and 10 extended models 7 and 8 by adding demographic (gender and age) 
and non-demographic covariates (baseline psychological distress, general self-efficacy, 
present-moment awareness and non-judgement). Both Models 9 and 10 displayed 
acceptable fit to the data (see Table 3). Path estimates for Models 9 and 10 are reported in 
Table 6. These results are almost identical to the findings reported above in Models 7 and 
8, meaning that after including the additional demographic and non-demographic 
covariates in both models, the effects remained substantively the same. Specifically, the 
MBSR-adapted but not the ACT condition predicted significantly less avoidance coping at 
Time 2 than the waitlist control (for the MBSR-adapted condition, β = -.28 [.10], t = -2.88, 
p = .004; and for the ACT condition, β = -.14 [.09], t = -1.54, p = .124), while both 
interventions predicted more approach coping at Time 2 than the waitlist control (for the 
MBSR condition, β = .25 [.09], t = 2.79, p = .005; and for the ACT condition, β = .30 [.09], 
t = 3.14, p = .002). 
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Table 6  
Effects of MBSR-adapted and ACT interventions on coping, controlling for covariates 
  Approach coping (Model 9) 
 
Avoidance coping (Model 10) 
 
β SE z-value p-value 
 
β SE z-value p-value 
Coping (Time 2)  
         
   M-only   .25** .09  2.79 .005 
 
-.28** .10 -2.88 .004 
   ACT   .30** .09  3.14 .002 
 
-.14 .09 -1.54 .124 
   Coping (Time 1)    .31** .10  2.98 .003 
 
 .33** .12  2.75 .006 
   Age   .00 .09 -0.04 .972 
 
-.08 .08 -1.01 .311 
   Gender  -.10 .08 -1.29 .198 
 
 .16 .08  1.95 .051 
   Self-efficacy   .12 .10  1.18 .237 
 
-.07 .09 -0.71 .478 
   Psych. distress    .01 .10  0.09 .926   .05 .11  0.42 .676 
   FFMQ (ActAware)  -.22* .10 -2.26 .024   .14 .10  1.49 .137 
   FFMQ (Non-judge)   .14 .10  1.40 .163  -.13 .11 -1.22 .223 
Note. All effects are standardized. Effects for MBSR and ACT are in comparison to the waitlist 
condition. Predictions of approach and avoidance coping at Time 1 by all independent variables 
and covariates are not shown here, but were included in the model. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
 The means of approach and avoidance coping for each experimental condition, at 
both measurement-occasions, are displayed graphically in Figure 4. In addition, Figure 4 
shows the standardized effect sizes between experimental conditions at Time 2 (i.e., 
differences between conditions at Time 2, controlling for differences in coping between 
conditions at Time 1). 
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(b) 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean scores (indicated by vertical solid bars) by condition on (a) approach and (b) 
avoidance coping at Times 1 and 2; and standardized effect sizes (indicated by horizontal brackets) 
for the MBSR and ACT conditions compared with the waitlist control condition, controlling for 
covariates and baseline approach and avoidance coping at Time 2. Note. ‘WL’ = waitlist. ** p < 
.01. 
 
Perceived stress as a moderator of intervention effects 
 I lastly tested Hypothesis 2 that the effects of both interventions on avoidance 
coping will be strongest among individuals reporting relatively high levels of stress. I found 
some support for this hypothesis. As shown in Table 7, as perceived stress at Time 2 
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increased between individuals, those in the MBSR-adapted condition reported significantly 
less avoidance coping than those in the waitlist condition (Model 12). A similar interaction 
effect was not obtained for the ACT condition, although the effect approached statistical 
significance, in the expected direction. The fit of Model 12 was acceptable, as shown in 
Table 3. There was not an interaction effect between either of the interventions and 
perceived stress on approach coping, however.  
Table 7  
Perceived stress moderating the effect of MBSR-adapted and ACT interventions on 
approach and avoidance coping 
  Approach coping   Avoidance coping 
     β SE z-value p-value     β SE z-value p-value 
Coping (Time 2)  
        
   MBSR  .26** .09 2.86 .004 
 
-.27** .09 -2.88 .004 
   ACT  .32** .10 3.39 .001 
 
-.15 .09 -1.72 .085 
   Coping (Time 1)  .28** .10 2.71 .007 
 
 .34** .12  2.83 .005 
   Age  .01 .09 0.16 .872 
 
-.11 .08 -1.28 .201 
   Gender -.11 .08 -1.37 .170 
 
 .16 .08  1.95 .051 
   General Self-efficacy  .13 .10 1.31 .191 
 
-.06 .09 -0.64 .525 
   Psychological distress -.01 .10 -0.05 .959 
 
 .05 .11  0.42 .675 
   FFMQ (Act-aware) -.22* .10 -2.27 .023 
 
 .14 .09  1.44 .150 
   FFMQ (Non-judge)  .16 .10 1.55 .121 
 
-.14 .10 -1.31 .192 
   Perceived stress (T2) -.08 .14 -0.53 .600 
 
 .19 .14  1.35 .178 
   Stress (T2) x M-only  .13 .11 1.24 .213 
 
-.22* .11 -2.04 .041 
   Stress (T2) x ACT  .14 .11 1.30 .192 
 
-.19 .11 -1.72 .086 
Note. Estimates for MBSR-adapted and ACT conditions plus their interactions with perceived stress 
are in relation to the waitlist condition. All estimates are standardized coefficients. * p < .05, ** p 
< .01. 
A plot of each condition by stress on avoidance coping is in Figure 5, showing that 
perceived stress moderated the effect of the MBSR-adapted intervention upon avoidance 
coping. Although no interaction effect for the ACT condition was obtained, Figure 5 
indicates a similar pattern of results. 
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Figure 5. Standardized plot of event-related perceived stress moderating the effects of the 
MBSR-adapted and ACT conditions on avoidance coping, relative to the waitlist condition.  
 
Discussion 
 
 Studies of multi-session mindfulness interventions and coping have to-date 
produced mixed findings, with some studies reporting significant effects on approach (e.g., 
Halland et al., 2015; Walach et al., 2007)) and avoidance coping (e.g., Halland et al., 2015) 
and others not (e.g., Josefsson et al., 2012; Sears & Kraus, 2009). These have been mostly 
pilot studies (e.g., Sears & Kraus, 2009; Tacón et al., 2003; Walach et al., 2007), with small 
sample sizes and therefore limited statistical power to detect effects. In addition, the mixed 
findings from these interventions may also be because several of them included limited 
application of mindfulness skills to every-day challenges (e.g., Josefsson et al., 2012; Sears 
& Kraus, 2009). Lastly, extending Study 1, the present study tested the possibility that a 
mindfulness intervention would influence coping among relatively stressed individuals 
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(i.e., that perceived stress moderates the effects of a mindfulness intervention upon coping 
responses). 
 To explore these questions, a multi-session (3 x 3 hours) mindfulness intervention 
was administered and compared with the effects of an ACT intervention of the same length, 
against a waitlist control condition. So-called ‘mindfulness-only’ interventions focus solely 
on training mindfulness skills, including present-moment awareness, acceptance and 
curiosity (e.g., MBSR, Kabat-Zinn, 1990; and MBCT, Segal et al., 2002). On the other 
hand, ACT focuses on applying mindfulness to personally-held values, and using 
mindfulness skills to act in values-congruent ways (Hayes et al., 1999, 2006). In this sense, 
ACT teaches mindfulness primarily as a means of acting in values-consistent ways, 
whereas programs such as MBSR and MBCT focus explicitly on training mindfulness 
skills. However, the application of mindfulness skills to values-consistent behaviour in the 
latter is implicit. Although the primary goal of the present study was to test the effects of a 
mindfulness-only intervention (i.e., the MBSR-adapted intervention) on coping responses, 
the secondary aim was to compare the effects of the MBSR-adapted intervention with an 
ACT intervention, against a waitlist control. The author is not aware of any research to have 
done this, despite both approaches (i.e., ACT and MBSR) attracting substantial research 
interest in recent years (for a review see Keng et al., 2011). 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, as predicted, the MBSR-adapted intervention resulted in 
less avoidance coping than the waitlist control at Time 2, controlling for baseline avoidance 
coping. These results remained after including relevant demographic and non-demographic 
covariates in the model. This finding is consistent with those of previous studies of 
mindfulness and coping (Halland et al., 2015; Weinstein et al., 2009), as well with other 
studies showing that mindful-acceptance interventions reduce avoidance of aversive stimuli 
such viewing distressing images (Arch & Craske, 2006), breathing CO2 enriched air (Eifert 
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& Heffner, 2003; Levitt et al., 2004), and receiving an electric shock (Gutiérrez et al., 
2004).  
However, the finding of no difference between the ACT and waitlist conditions on 
any of the three avoidance coping subscales was unexpected. This null effect may have 
been due to the different foci of the two interventions. A central focus of mindfulness 
training lies in exposure and cultivating non-reactivity to unpleasant stimuli (Baer, 2003), 
and all three sessions of the MBSR-adapted intervention, as well as home-practice, 
explored this (see Appendix A). Although the ACT intervention included sessions on 
acceptance and defusion from difficult thoughts, it placed less emphasis on exposure to 
unpleasant experiences and more on values clarification and values-consistent action 
(Hayes et al., 2006; see Appendix B). In turn, this difference in emphasis may explain the 
pattern of results regarding avoidance coping. 
Regarding effects on approach coping, unexpectedly, both interventions resulted in 
increased approach coping at Time 2 compared with the waitlist control, and controlling 
for Time 1 approach coping. These effects remained when demographic and non-
demographic covariates were included in the models. The positive effect on approach 
coping for the ACT intervention provides novel evidence that using mindfulness to act in 
values-consistent ways does, on average, enhance approach forms of coping. Although 
values-consistent action may not enhance approach coping in all cases, this finding suggests 
that, on average, this is the case, consistent with previous research of the effects of 
autonomous motivation on coping (Weinstein et al., 2009) and persistence (Koestner & 
Zuckerman, 1994).  
Regarding the effect of the MBSR-adapted intervention, the findings of this study 
suggest an unintended-but-positive consequence of mindfulness training: although the 
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intervention emphasized not seeking to change present-moment experience, when 
participants were faced with a stressful situation outside the training room, they were more 
likely to enact behaviours that involved directly engaging with, and in some cases seeking 
to change such situations. This replicates findings that the MBSR program enhances 
approach forms of coping such as problem-solving (Halland et al., 2015) and positive 
coping (Walach et al., 2007). It is also consistent with studies that have found a mindfulness 
induction enhances behaviours that are related to approach coping, such as increased 
willingness to view aversive images (Arch & Craske, 2006), breathe CO2 enriched air 
(Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt et al., 2004), and receive an electric shock (Gutiérrez et al., 
2004). Each of these behaviours involves directly contacting a stressor, and so can be 
viewed as analogues of approach coping. The increases in approach coping among the 
MBSR-adapted condition in the present study may be because mindfulness enhances 
willingness to be exposed to unpleasant experiences (Shapiro et al, 2006) and this, in-turn, 
increases the range of possible responses to a threatening experience, making an approach 
response more likely (Halland et al., 2015). Such an explanation is consistent with theories 
of mindfulness (Brown et al., 2007; Hayes et al., 2006; Shapiro et al., 2006) which highlight 
its role in enhancing behavioural regulation in the presence of aversive experience.  
Regarding Hypothesis 2, as predicted, the MBSR-adapted intervention interacted 
with perceived stress to predict less avoidance coping at Time 2; however there were not 
similar effects for approach coping. This finding is consistent with Study 1, which found a 
significant interaction effect of stress by a mindfulness induction on avoidance but not 
approach coping. It is also consistent with Weinstein et al., (2009), who found that 
dispositional and state mindfulness predicted avoidance coping more consistently than it 
did approach coping among individuals exposed to stress. Finally, there was no interaction 
effect found between perceived stress and the ACT intervention for either approach or 
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avoidance coping (though the effect for avoidance coping was close to significance and in 
the expected direction). These null results were unexpected and again may be because the 
MBSR-adapted intervention targeted exposure to aversive thoughts and feelings more than 
the ACT intervention did. It may be that this differential focus in-turn meant that the ACT 
intervention did not have a particular influence on coping behaviour for individuals 
experiencing high levels of stress, while for those in the MBSR-adapted condition, this 
effect was significant. 
Although some of the findings from this study were unanticipated, they appear 
consistent with previous research on coping when the different emphases of both 
interventions are taken into account, and are generally consistent with theories of 
mindfulness. Together, the findings of this study suggest that mindfulness interventions 
that focus on present-moment awareness and acceptance skills (i.e., the MBSR-adapted 
intervention) may be more effective than interventions that apply mindfulness to values-
consistent action (i.e., ACT) in enhancing coping responses – and particularly in reducing 
avoidant forms of coping among relatively stressed individuals. These findings may have 
been because of the particular focus in the MBSR-adapted intervention on acceptance of 
unpleasant experiences, which, in-turn, appears to facilitate less avoidant and more 
approach-focused coping responses. Given the growing interest in mindfulness in non-
clinical group settings such as the workplace, these findings suggest that training 
mindfulness skills enhances how individuals cope with stress, and may be especially 
effective for individuals experiencing high levels of stress, for example military or other 
front-line service provision personnel, who perform some of society’s most stressful roles. 
 This study has several limitations. First, I used adaptions of existing protocols (Stahl 
et al., 2013; Flaxman et al., 2013), rather than exact replications of these. This approach 
was unavoidable, as these two protocols have very different lengths (8 x 2.5 hour sessions 
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plus a full-day retreat for MBSR, as compared with 3 x 3 hour sessions in ACT), and was 
needed in order to compare like-with-like formats. However, it does limit the comparison 
of our findings with studies that have, for example, used the full MBSR protocol (e.g., 
Tacón et al., 2003; Walach et al., 2007). To minimise the drawbacks of this approach, I 
include descriptions of both protocols in Appendices A and B, so readers can identify 
similarities and differences with other protocols. 
Another limitation of both this study and Study 1 was the use of self-report measures 
of coping. There is evidence that retrospective, self-report measures of coping are in some 
cases substantially different from more momentary measures of coping (Shikai et al., 2014; 
Stone et al., 1998). Although the present study sought to minimise the biases associated 
with such measures by making them context-specific (i.e., the most stressful event of the 
past month), rather than global (Ptacek et al., 1994; Stone et al., 1998), future studies of 
mindfulness and coping could improve on this approach by using ecological momentary 
assessments of coping responses, or, ideally, behavioural measures.  
A third limitation was the use of a waitlist rather than an active control group. The 
majority of studies of MBSR and ACT interventions have used waitlist controls (Keng et 
al., 2011; Khoury et al., 2013; Öst, 2014). Several mindfulness researchers have argued for 
the use of active controls such as relaxation in studies of mindfulness (Jain et al., 2007; 
Manocha et al., 2011) and the author is aware of only one published study of mindfulness 
and coping to have done this (Josefsson et al., 2012). Although using a relaxation control 
was logistically impossible in the current study, future studies of mindfulness-based 
protocols and coping would be enhanced by the use an active condition such as a relaxation 
control or concentration task to control for other possible effects of mindfulness processes. 
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A final limitation of this study was the use of only two measurement occasions. 
Subsequent research would benefit from including measures of the longer-term effects of 
the interventions on coping, consistent with some previous studies of mindfulness and 
coping that have done this (e.g., Walach et al., 2007). 
 Notwithstanding these limitations, the present study adds to previous research on 
MBSR-based interventions and coping responses, and extends them by including an ACT 
comparison. The findings of this study suggest that interventions focused solely on 
mindfulness skills training such as MBSR may be particularly effective in enhancing 
coping responses relative to one that applies mindfulness to values-consistent behaviours, 
perhaps because of the emphasis in the former on exposure to and acceptance of unpleasant 
thoughts and feelings. This suggests an unintended-but-positive effect of mindfulness-
focused interventions: despite their focus on merely noticing and accepting present-
moment experience, when faced with a stressor, these skills translate to increased 
engagement with the stressful event, including more active forms of coping. Moreover, this 
study found novel evidence that mindfulness-focused interventions such as MBSR may 
have their biggest effects on coping responses among individuals experiencing high levels 
of stress. However, it is unclear which specific mindfulness components facilitated the 
changes in coping that were reported in this study. Based on the literature reviewed above 
(Chapter 2), I identified two possible ‘active ingredients’ of changes in mindfulness – 
acceptance and cognitive defusion – likely to have a particularly strong influence on coping 
responses. To compare the effects of these two mindfulness components on coping 
responses, Study 3 was conducted.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
STUDY 3 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This study extended Studies 1 and 2 by exploring the third research question of this 
thesis: whether acceptance and cognitive defusion (components of mindfulness as defined 
by Hayes et al., 2006) predict greater approach and less avoidance coping with stress. In 
addition, this study explored whether these effects are moderated by individual differences 
in perceived stress, as was done in Studies 1 and 2. As outlined in Chapter 2, acceptance 
and cognitive defusion are expected to have a particularly strong impact upon approach and 
avoidance coping responses. The present study tested this possibility in a laboratory setting, 
comparing brief inductions of both acceptance and cognitive defusion with two control 
inductions: self-affirmation and relaxation. 
Acceptance involves not seeking to change the form or frequency of thoughts and 
feelings as they arise, so is likely to be associated with less avoidance of stress-related 
thoughts and feelings, and a greater willingness to directly contact such thoughts and 
feelings (Hayes et al., 1999; Hayes et al., 2006). As mentioned in Chapter 2, acceptance 
inductions have been found to reduce behavioural avoidance of an aversive stimuli such as 
exposure to CO2-enriched air (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt et al., 2004) and an electric 
shock (Gutiérrez et al., 2004), and there is evidence that experiential avoidance (the 
opposite of acceptance) is associated with more avoidance and less approach coping 
(Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011). In addition, a study of self-compassion found that following 
academic failure, individual differences in self-compassion were negatively associated with 
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avoidant coping responses among university students (Neff et al., 2005). Self-compassion 
is closely related to acceptance in that it involves acknowledging difficult or unpleasant 
experiences and embracing such experiences with self-kindness (Neff et al., 2007, Yadavia 
et a., 2014). In the present study, a measure of trait self-compassion was used to measure 
individual differences in self-acceptance. 
Regarding cognitive defusion, recall that this aspect of mindfulness describes the 
behaviour of noticing thoughts and distancing from them so that they are viewed with 
greater perspective and in-turn have less control over an individuals’ behaviour (Gillanders 
et al., 2014). Individuals who cognitively defuse from stress-related thoughts are less likely 
to avoid situations where they experience such thoughts, as the content of stress-related 
thoughts has less ‘reality’ (Hayes et al., 2006). Greater cognitive defusion is also likely to 
result in more approach-focused behaviour following stress, as the behaviour-narrowing 
effect of stress-related thoughts is inhibited, making more constructive and approach-
focused more likely (Gillanders et al., 2014). Support for the likely effect of cognitive 
defusion in enhancing approach and inhibiting avoidance coping with stress comes from 
several studies which reported reductions in emotional discomfort and negative thought 
believability among non-clinical samples following brief cognitive defusion manipulations 
that involved a word-repetition exercise (Masuda, Feinstein, et al., 2010; Masuda et al., 
2004; Masuda, Twohig, et al., 2010; Watson et al., 2010). In turn, emotional discomfort 
and threat-activation have been associated with avoidant coping responses (Kessels, Ruiter, 
Brug, & Jansma, 2011; Kessels, Ruiter, & Jansma, 2010; Stowell et al., 2001), suggesting 
a link between cognitive defusion and reduced avoidance coping.  
Another study administered the ‘leaves on a stream’ cognitive defusion protocol, 
used in the present study to induce cognitive defusion, prior to a cold-pressor task (designed 
to produce physical pain) and found that the cognitive defusion manipulation predicted 
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significantly more pain tolerance than those in pain-control and attention-placebo control 
conditions (Takahashi et al., 2002). Pain tolerance involves the non-avoidance of a 
potentially stressful experience and a willingness to experience it, and in this sense is 
related to approach coping. This evidence suggests that, by creating psychological distance 
from one’s stress-related cognitions (as in cognitive defusion), individuals are less 
influenced by their stress-related thoughts, meaning they are less avoidant and are more 
likely to engage in approach coping behaviours following stressful events. 
Evidence that inductions of acceptance and cognitive defusion enhance coping 
responses will extend previous studies of both defusion and acceptance inductions as core 
mindfulness components and also highlight the potential ‘active ingredients’ of more 
generic mindfulness inductions, such as that administered in Study 1 and elsewhere (e.g., 
Arch & Craske, 2006; Heppner et al., 2008; Reb & Narayan, 2014), in enhancing coping 
responses.  
To strengthen the research designs used in Studies 1 and 2, behavioural measures 
of approach and avoidance coping were used in this study to avoid the recall and common-
method biases associated with using retrospective, self-report coping scales (Schwartz, et 
al., 1999; Shikai et al., 2014; Stone et al., 1998). Also, this study included a more direct 
induction of stress than the one used in Study 1 (which was also a laboratory study). In the 
present study, stress was induced via a negative social comparison manipulation (adapted 
from Dweck & Elliott-Moskwa, 2010), as there is evidence that such comparisons are 
highly stressful (Klein, Blier, & Janze, 2001; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). In this study, a 
‘cognitive-ability’ test was administered and all students’ scores were artificially lowered 
relative to the student mean (adapted from Mueller & Dweck, 1998, and Nussbaum & 
Dweck, 2008). Students were then asked to share their (deflated) scores with the class and 
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discuss their performance with peers. This was used to measure approach and avoidance 
coping behaviourally, as described below. 
A final innovation in this study was the inclusion of a self-affirmation induction in 
place of the filler task administered in Study 1, as a ‘treatment as usual’ condition. Self-
affirmation theory and empirical evidence suggest that affirmation of one’s self-concept 
(e.g., writing about an important life-value), even via a brief induction, dampens defensive 
threat responses in general (Good & Abraham, 2007; McQueen & Klein, 2006) and 
avoidance coping in particular (Creswell et al., 2007). However, there is also growing 
evidence that changing one’s relationship with unwanted thoughts and feelings (e.g., via 
mindfulness) may be more effective than changing the content of thoughts (e.g., via self-
affirmations) in improving mental health and behavioural outcomes (Bond et al., 2011; 
Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Gutiérrez et al., 2004; Levitt et al., 2004; Masuda et al., 2004; 
Masuda, Twohig, et al., 2010).  
The present study therefore sought to test whether acceptance and defusion 
inductions enhanced coping responses more than self-affirmation, consistent with recent 
evidence suggesting they should. Lastly, I included a relaxation condition in the present 
study to control for the relaxation effects of mindfulness, as in Study 1 (Jain et al., 2007; 
Manocha et al., 2011). In addition, this study tested whether perceived stress moderated the 
effects of the acceptance and defusion inductions upon approach and avoidance coping 
responses, following evidence for such an interaction effect in Studies 1 and 2 (Chapters 4 
and 5) in relation to avoidance but not approach coping. Specifically, the hypotheses for 
this study were: 
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Hypothesis 1: Acceptance and defusion inductions will result in more approach and 
less avoidance coping following a stressful experience, relative to self-affirmation 
and relaxation controls. 
Hypothesis 2: Perceived stress will moderate the effects predicted in Hypothesis 1, 
resulting in more approach and less avoidance coping among individuals reporting 
relatively high (but not low) levels of perceived stress. 
Method 
 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants were 202 undergraduate students (57% female; mean age = 22; age 
range = 20-26) in a management course at an Australian university. This study was 
approved by the Human Ethics Committee at the Australian National University. First, the 
12 tutorial groups in the course were each randomly allocated to one of four experimental 
conditions.  
Second, all participants completed baseline measures of self-compassion (which 
was the focus of the acceptance induction), cognitive defusion (the focus of the cognitive 
defusion induction) and general perceived stress, to control for baseline differences 
between individuals on these variables. This was followed by a 10-question ‘cognitive 
ability test’. The cognitive ability test was an unofficial test developed by the researchers 
using Mensa problem-solving questions. Piloting (N = 15) indicated that students rated (via 
simple rank-ordering) having a favorable cognitive ability score as more important than 
receiving positive evaluations on measures of social skill, future income earning capacity, 
cultural intelligence and writing about recent failures. On completion of the test, students 
received an automated email message reporting their score (a number between 0 and 10), 
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the fact that they had failed the test (reported as being out of 20), and were informed that 
the global student average for the test was 12/20.  
Third, students attended their tutorial class and were informed that they would be 
asked to share their test score with their peers after completing the experimental inductions. 
Fourth, the experimental inductions were administered. In the acceptance induction, 
participants received guided instruction (adapted from Neff et al., 2007) in reflecting on the 
forthcoming class activity, noticing and naming the emotions they experienced in response 
to this, and cultivating an attitude of self-acceptance and self-kindness to oneself in the 
presence of these emotions.  
The defusion induction was the ‘leaves on a stream’ protocol (see Hayes et al., 1999, 
p. 158 - 161), which has been used in several studies to induce cognitive defusion (e.g., 
Hartnett & Carr, 2013; Takahashi et al., 2002; Tapper et al., 2009). Participants were 
instructed to visualise a stream and each time they noticed a thought entering the mind, to 
place the thought on a leaf and watch it float down the stream. The instructions then asked 
participants to ‘return’ to watching the stream until another thought was noticed occupying 
the attention, at which point the same process was to be repeated. Participants were 
encouraged to not worry about how many thoughts they placed on leaves or the content of 
their thoughts, consistent with the protocol outlined in Hayes et al. (1999). 
In the self-affirmation induction, students were asked to rank a list of values and 
then write about their highest ranked value for 10 minutes (following Crocker, Niiya, & 
Mischkowski, 2008 and Sherman et al., 2000). A writing task was used in this study as this 
is the most commonly-used manipulation of self-affirmation in the literature (see McQueen 
& Klein, 2006).  
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The relaxation induction was the progressive muscle relaxation exercise described 
in Study 1. All inductions were 10 minutes long, and were delivered by the same instructor 
using standard scripts.  
Fifth, after the inductions, students were invited to share their test score with the 
class via an online learning tool, with scores projected on a screen. Following Mueller & 
Dweck (1998), students were told that they could anonymously report a false score if they 
wished, but that this would undermine the value of the subsequent peer review exercise. 
This was a measure of avoidance coping (i.e., avoiding negative social evaluation). Having 
reported their score, students received a copy of the test questions and discussed their 
performance on it with peers. 
Finally, measures of approach coping, event stress, manipulation checks and items 
on suspicion and diffusion were administered. Students were then fully debriefed. 
Measures 
Cognitive defusion was measured with the 13-item Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire, 
rated on a one (never true) to five (always true) Likert scale (Gillanders et al., 2014; α = 
.77; ICC1‡ = .003). This scale was reversed coded so that higher scores on the measure 
represented greater cognitive defusion (Gillanders et al., 2014). 
Self-compassion (ICC1 = .008) was measured with the 12 item Brief Self-
Compassion scale (Raes, Pommier, Neff, & Van Gucht, 2011; α = .88), on a one (almost 
never) to five (almost always) Likert scale.  
                                                          
‡ The intra-class correlations (ICCs) reported in this section refer to the proportion of variance in each study variable that was 
accounted for by being in either of the twelve classrooms. 
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Perceived stress over the past month was measured with the four-item version of 
the Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen et al., 1983; α = .73; ICC1 = .023), as in Study 1. 
Event-related stress (ICC1 = .007) was measured using a single item: “Being told 
that I will have to reveal my cognitive ability test score to the rest of the class made me feel 
stressed and anxious”, rated on a one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree) Likert 
scale.  
Avoidance coping (ICC1 = .027) was measured behaviourally by whether a student 
reported an inflated cognitive ability test score to the class (coded as 0 = no inflation; 1 = 
inflation), adapted from Mueller & Dweck (1998). A total of 23.3 % of subjects in the 
sample (47 out of 202) reported an inflated score. 
Approach coping (ICC1 = .012) was measured by asking students to rate their 
willingness to engage in a remedial tutorial as a means of improving on their cognitive 
abilities, on a single item adapted from Hong et al. (1999) and Nussbaum & Dweck (2008): 
“Research has shown that with training, you can significantly increase your cognitive 
ability. How interested are you in signing up for a remedial tutorial (separate to this class), 
to strengthen your cognitive abilities?” The item was rated on a one (not at all) to five (very 
much) Likert scale. 
Distraction (ICC1 = .012): Two items measured distraction during the inductions as 
a manipulation check, on a one (not at all) to five (very much) Likert scale: “I was finding 
it difficult to stay focused on what was happening” and “I was preoccupied with the future 
or the past”. Scores on these items were added to create a total distraction score for each 
individual. 
Statistical analyses 
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This study had statistical power of .73 (assuming p = .05; an intraclass correlation 
coefficient of ρ = .01 and an anticipated medium effect size of f = .25). Following tests for 
differences between conditions on baseline variables and covariates, I tested the study 
hypotheses using linear mixed models, given the nested nature of these data (i.e., 
individuals within classrooms within experimental conditions). In all models, ‘tutorial 
group’ was included as a random factor (as a random intercept term) and condition was 
treated as a fixed factor. All statistical analyses were conducted in the R 3.2.2 program (R 
Core Team, 2015), using the ‘lme4’ and ‘nlme’ packages.  
Results 
 
Preliminary analysis 
The four conditions were first compared on the baseline measures, and there were 
no significant differences between them on trait cognitive defusion, b = -.51 (.60), t = -.85, 
p = .395, trait self-compassion, b = .11 (.27), t = .41, p = .681, monthly perceived stress, 
b = -.17 (.24), t = -.74, p = .478, and gender, b = .02 (.03), t = .58, p = .574. Nor were there 
significant differences between any of the conditions on cognitive ability test score, b = .08 
(.15), t = .50, p = .626. Bivariate correlations between study variables are in Table 8.  
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Table 8  
Bivariate correlations between study variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Event stress    -        
2. Monthly stress .184**    -       
3. Trait self-compassion -.341** -.410**    -      
4. Trait cognitive fusion  .342** .390** -.629**    -     
5. Distraction   .100 .223** -.175* .255**    -    
6. Test score -.021 -.016 .001 .043 -.083    -   
7. Approach coping -.306** -.267** .199** -.240** -.171* .127    -  
8. Avoidance coping  .352** .208** -.183** .194** .116 -.125 -.231**    - 
9. Gender (female)  .172* .097 -.082 -.011 -.117 -.112 -.075 .089 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
      
 
 
I next tested for the possibility that a person’s score on the cognitive ability test (i.e., 
the deflated score that they were told they received) predicted their coping behaviour. It 
may be that lower scores on the test predicted more avoidance and less approach coping, 
and therefore warrant inclusion in our analyses as a covariate. However, neither approach, 
b = .05 (.03), t = 1.51, p = .133, nor avoidance coping, b = -.03 (.02), t = -1.85, p = .065, 
were predicted by cognitive ability test scores and as a result, cognitive ability test score 
was not included as a variable in subsequent analyses. 
A manipulation check tested how distracted participants were during the 
experimental inductions. Those in the cognitive defusion condition reported significantly 
higher distraction than the relaxation condition, b = 1.68 (.55), t = 3.06, p = .010, and 
marginally significantly more distraction than those in the acceptance, b = 1.10 (.52), t = 
2.11, p = .055, and self-affirmation inductions, b = 1.11 (.55), t = 2.00, p = .082. I also 
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found that distraction during the inductions predicted significantly less approach, b = -.08 
(.03), t = -2.86, p = .005, and nearly significantly more avoidance coping, b = .02 (.01), t = 
1.85, p = .067. As a result, distraction was included as a covariate in subsequent analyses. 
Group means and standard deviations for study variables appear in Table 9.  
Table 9  
Group means and standard deviations for each study variable 
 
Defusion 
 
Acceptance 
 
Self-
affirmation  
Relaxation 
 
(n = 43) 
 
(n = 62) 
 
(n = 48) 
 
(n = 49) 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
Female (%) 63%   59%   44%   61%  
Age 21.61 2.48  22.43 2.16  22.62 2.51  21.28 2.89 
Monthly stress 12.19 3.20  11.90 3.39  12.04 2.90  11.55 2.68 
Event stress 2.93 1.08  2.66 1.23  3.17 1.12  2.90 1.18 
Self-compassion 17.21 3.89  17.58 3.73  17.63 4.48  17.59 4.49 
Cognitive fusion 36.44 9.37  35.77 8.13  35.15 9.71  34.94 9.71 
Distraction  7.16 2.28  6.06 2.61  6.04 2.79  5.49 2.47 
Test score 4.81 1.93  4.95 1.75  4.71 2.14  5.11 1.45 
Approach coping 3.02 0.83  3.35 0.60  2.88 0.89  2.80 0.87 
Avoidance coping 0.26 0.44   0.13 0.34   0.31 0.47   0.29 0.46 
 
Main effects of mindfulness induction on coping 
Next, Hypothesis 1 was tested, that both mindfulness inductions would produce 
more approach and less avoidance coping than the self-affirmation and relaxation 
inductions. There was partial support for this. With approach coping as an outcome 
variable, statistically significant (standardized) differences between the acceptance 
condition and the self-affirmation and relaxation conditions were found (acceptance vs. 
self-affirmation: β = .66 [.23], t = 2.91, p = .023; acceptance vs. relaxation: β = .76 [.21], t 
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= 3.48, p = .007), controlling for test score performance. In addition, there was a significant 
difference in approach coping between the acceptance and cognitive defusion inductions, 
β = .52 (.22), t = 2.30, p = .046. These effects are shown in Figure 6, in unstandardized 
form. 
 
Figure 6. Estimated approach coping scores (unstandardized) for each experimental condition, with 
95% confidence intervals around each estimate.  
 
With avoidance coping as an outcome variable, there were statistically significant 
differences between the acceptance condition and the self-affirmation and relaxation 
conditions in the expected direction (acceptance vs. self-affirmation: β = .39 [.19], t = 2.03, 
p = .044; acceptance vs. relaxation: β = .39 [.19], t = 3.00, p = .037), controlling for test 
score. Unstandardized estimates are shown in Figure 7.                  Estimate 
Std. Error        
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Figure 7. Estimated avoidance coping scores (unstandardized) for each experimental 
condition, with 95% confidence intervals around each estimate.  
 
However as shown in both the above figures, differences between the cognitive 
defusion condition and the self-affirmation and relaxation conditions were not found for 
either approach or avoidance coping. 
Perceived stress as a moderator 
I next tested Hypothesis 2, that perceived stress would moderate the influence of 
both mindfulness inductions (acceptance and defusion) upon coping. This hypothesis was 
tested using two measures of perceived stress described above: monthly and event-specific 
perceived stress. 
Monthly perceived stress as a moderator. The trend lines for the four conditions on 
approach coping, moderated by monthly perceived stress, appear in Figure 8(a). Linear 
mixed effects analysis indicated that the acceptance induction interacted with monthly 
perceived stress to predict significantly more approach coping than the self-affirmation, β 
= .39 (.18), t = 2.23, p = .027, and relaxation inductions, β = .44 (.18), t = 2.40, p = .017. 
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However there was not a similar moderation effect for the defusion induction by monthly 
stress, compared to either the self-affirmation, β = .11 (.19), t = 0.59, p = .560, or relaxation 
conditions, β = .16 (.19), t = 0.81, p = .421. Nor was there a difference between the 
acceptance and defusion conditions on approach coping as a function of perceived stress, β 
= .27 (.17), t = 1.62, p = .107.  
 
 (a) 
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Figure 8. Experimental conditions interacting with monthly perceived stress to predict 
approach coping (a) and avoidance coping (b).  
 
Next, differences between the four conditions on avoidance coping, moderated by 
monthly perceived stress, were tested for. As shown in Figure 8(b), as perceived stress 
increased, those in the acceptance condition reported less of an increase in avoidance 
coping, compared with the other three conditions, however these differences were not 
statistically significant. Together, these results suggest that as monthly stress increases 
between individuals, receiving an acceptance induction facilitates more approach coping 
responses, though not less avoidance coping, relative to receiving a self-affirmation or 
relaxation induction. 
Event-related stress as a moderator. Recall that prior to the inductions, subjects 
were told they would be asked to report their (artificially deflated) cognitive ability test 
score to the class. After receiving this information, students were asked to rate how stressed 
(b) 
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this made them feel, which was our measure of event-related perceived stress in this study. 
Figure 9(a) shows the approach coping scores for the four experimental conditions, 
moderated by event-related perceived stress. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2 and the above pattern of results with monthly stress 
as a moderator, the acceptance induction interacted with event-related stress to predict 
significantly more approach coping than the self-affirmation, β = .39 (.18), t = 2.22, p = 
.028, and relaxation inductions, β = .35 (.17), t = 2.03, p = .044. However, there were not 
similar effects for the defusion induction compared with the control conditions (relative to 
self-affirmation, β = .12 [.20], t = 0.60, p = .547; relative to relaxation, β = .08 [.20], t = 
0.38, p = .702). Nor was there a significant difference between the acceptance and cognitive 
defusion conditions as a function of event-related stress, β = .27 (.19), t = 1.44, p = .152. 
 
 
(a) 
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Figure 9. Experimental conditions interacting with event-related stress to predict approach 
coping (a) and avoidance coping (b).  
 
Finally, the moderating effects of event-related stress on the four experimental 
conditions in predicting less avoidance coping were tested. Figure 9(b) shows the results 
for the four conditions. The acceptance induction interacted with event-related stress to 
predict significantly less avoidance coping, compared with the relaxation induction, β = -
.38 (.17), t = -2.19, p = .030; but not relative to the self-affirmation induction, β = -.15 (.18), 
t = -0.83, p = .409, or the cognitive defusion induction, β = -.35 (.19), t = -1.85, p = .066. 
This suggests that as levels of event-related stress increase between individuals, receiving 
an acceptance induction appears to increase approach coping relative to receiving a 
relaxation or a self-affirmation induction, and lower avoidance relative to a relaxation 
induction.  
(b) 
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Discussion 
Results of this study provided support for our first hypothesis. A mindful-
acceptance induction resulted in significantly more approach and less avoidance coping 
following a stressful experience, relative to self-affirmation and relaxation controls. This 
finding adds to previous acceptance induction studies that found changes in behavioural 
responses to aversive experiences (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Gutiérrez et al., 2004; Levitt et 
al., 2004), extending these findings to coping responses. 
This significant main effect may have been due to the stronger stress manipulation 
administered in this study (reporting a poor cognitive ability test score to peers) compared 
with Study 1, where subjects were asked to recall the stress associated with their most recent 
university exams (though I did not formally compare the effects of the stress manipulations 
between studies). Another possibility is that an induction focused specifically on 
acceptance, rather than on general mindful-awareness (as in Study 1), has a bigger impact 
on individuals’ coping responses. Recall that there is considerable evidence for the effects 
of brief acceptance inductions in increasing individuals’ willingness to engage with an 
aversive experience, such as breathing in CO2-enriched air (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt 
et al., 2004) and being exposed to an electric shock (Gutiérrez et al., 2004). However in 
this study it was not possible to isolate and test these different possibilities.  
This study also found support for Hypothesis 2, replicating the findings in Studies 
1 and 2 that perceived stress moderated the impact of a brief mindfulness induction (Study 
1) and a longer intervention (Study 2) on coping responses. As levels of both event-related 
and general monthly stress increased between individuals, significant differences between 
the acceptance condition and both the relaxation and self-affirmation conditions were found 
on approach and avoidance coping. These findings suggest that mindful-acceptance 
enhances coping particularly among highly stressed individuals. 
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The differences in coping between the acceptance and self-affirmation conditions 
are particularly noteworthy as historically, a primary intervention reported in the literature 
to reduce defensiveness and enhance coping responses has been self-affirmations (for 
reviews, see McQueen & Klein, 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). The present results are 
consistent with more recent evidence that changing one’s relationship to aversive thoughts 
(i.e., engaging in mindful acceptance) may be more effective than changing the content of 
such thoughts (such as via self-affirmation) in supporting healthy behaviour (Bond et al., 
2011) and this study extended this finding to demonstrating changes in coping behaviour. 
It is notable that significant main and interaction effects for the acceptance 
induction were found in this study, but similar results were not found for the cognitive 
defusion induction. Although the cognitive defusion induction resulted in more approach 
and less avoidance coping than the relaxation and self-affirmation inductions (see Table 3), 
these effects were not statistically significant. It is possible that this result occurred because 
the cognitive defusion induction was more difficult for participants to engage with than the 
other inductions. As mentioned above, participants in the defusion induction group reported 
more distraction than those in the other three conditions.  Although the defusion protocol 
used in this study has been successfully used in other studies of mindfulness and behaviour 
change (eg, Tapper et al., 2009), as have similar defusion exercises in other studies (e.g., 
Bach & Hayes, 2002; Bond & Bunce, 2000; Metzler, Biglan, Noell, Ary, & Ochs, 2000), 
it may have been difficult for participants to engage with outside the context of a broader 
intervention. Specifically, it is possible that the instructions to ‘unhook’ from thoughts may 
have been too complex or difficult to engage with for relatively young participants situated 
in a classroom environment. For some participants at least, the cognitive defusion induction 
may have paradoxically drawn participants further into their thoughts, rather than 
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distancing from them, thereby undermining the impact of the induction on coping 
behaviours.  
Another limitation of this study was that I used the randomisation process to control 
for baseline differences in previous mindfulness experience. I did not collect this 
information directly from participants, representing a limitation of the present study that 
could be addressed in subsequent experimental studies of mindfulness. 
A third limitation of this study is that the self-affirmation manipulation involved a 
different format (writing versus listening) to the other three manipulations in the study. The 
manipulations were selected to be consistent with the most commonly-used manipulations 
of each phenomenon, including self-affirmation (McQueen & Klein, 2006), however this 
difference is nonetheless an inconsistency in the induction format between the four 
conditions in this study. 
A final limitation of this study was that it sought to artificially induce stress and 
measure behavioural responses in a laboratory setting. To assess the value of acceptance 
and cognitive defusion in enhancing coping responses in a more naturalistic context, and 
to overcome the potential problems associated with administering brief inductions of 
acceptance and especially cognitive defusion in a laboratory setting, Study 4 was 
conducted.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
STUDY 4 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 This study further examined the third research question of this thesis: whether 
acceptance and cognitive defusion predict enhanced approach coping and reduced 
avoidance coping with stress. As discussed, the null result for the cognitive defusion 
induction in Study 3 may have been in part due to participants misunderstanding or not 
engaging with the induction. The present study examined whether either or both acceptance 
and cognitive defusion as intra- and inter-individual-difference constructs (rather than as 
inductions), influenced coping behaviour. To do this, Study 4 explored the effects of both 
these mindfulness components on how individuals cope with every-day stressors.  
 There is evidence that relatively minor daily hassles, such as being stuck in traffic, 
having arguments with family or a computer malfunctioning, undermine well-being more 
than significant life stressors (Almeida, 2005; Chamberlin & Zika, 1990; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1987; Lu, 1991; Serido, Almeida, & Wethington, 2004). This is likely because 
significant life stressors are relatively rare, whereas daily stressors are more persistent and 
so have cumulative effects that, over time, may result in more serious stress-related 
symptoms such as depression and anxiety (Almeida, 2005; Serido et al., 2004). Therefore 
there is arguably value in studying whether mindfulness components influence coping with 
these every-day stressors. 
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 In addition, this study sought to test whether acceptance and cognitive defusion 
predict coping behaviour independent of the influence of stress-related cognitive appraisals. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the transactional theory of coping identifies two kinds of stress-
related appraisals: a primary appraisal of how threatening or challenging a stressor is; and 
a secondary appraisals of the individual’s level of self-efficacy and personal resources to 
address the stressor (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987). These two stress-related appraisals are 
said to shape an individual’s coping behaviours following a stressful event (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1987).  
 Although there is evidence that primary appraisals of threat result in avoidance 
coping responses (Stowell et al., 2001; Weinstein et al., 2009), and secondary appraisals of 
situational self-efficacy produce approach-focused responses to stress (Folkman & 
Moskowitz, 2004; Terry, 1994), these findings are not unequivocal. For example, threat 
appraisals have been associated with more problem-focused forms of coping and not more 
avoidance coping (Franks & Roesch, 2006). Also, lacking the resources to respond to a 
stressful situation has not always been associated with more emotion-focused and avoidant 
forms of coping as the transactional theory would predict (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; 
Park, Fenster, Suresh, & Bliss, 2006). Thus, there is value in comparing the predictive 
power of mindfulness-based processes, such as acceptance and cognitive defusion, with 
those based on the content of a person’s stress-related thoughts (i.e., primary appraisals of 
threat or challenge and secondary appraisals of personal self-efficacy). 
In several studies, primary appraisal has been measured as a persons’ level of 
perceived self-threat in relation to a stressful encounter (e.g., Hodgins et al., 2010; Terry, 
1994; Terry, 1991; Tomaka et al., 1993). The present study therefore used this as a measure 
of primary appraisal. Also, several studies have used stress-related self-efficacy as a 
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measure of secondary appraisal (e.g., Hodgins et al., 2010; Terry, 1994; Terry, 1991; 
Tomaka, et al., 1993) and the same was done in the present study.  
Finally, this study tested whether both acceptance and cognitive defusion enhanced 
the fit between the level of control an individual has over a stressful event and their coping 
response, per the goodness-of-fit hypothesis (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Park, et al., 
2004). According to the goodness-of-fit hypothesis, when a stressor is controllable, 
problem-solving coping strategies are more likely, while when a stressor is difficult to 
control, more emotion-focused and avoidant strategies are likely. There is substantial 
evidence for the increase in problem-focused strategies (i.e., approach responses) when a 
stressor is controllable, but less evidence for the increase in avoidant responses to 
uncontrollable stressors (Park et al., 2004). This may be because even for uncontrollable 
stressors, for example receiving bad news about one’s health, avoidance coping responses 
such as denial or self-distraction will very often not be adaptive (Folkman & Moskowitz, 
2004; Park et al., 2004)  
Based on the above evidence for the goodness-of-fit hypothesis, in the present study 
acceptance and cognitive defusion were hypothesised to predict active forms of approach 
coping behaviour (i.e., taking direct action to address the stressor) but only for relatively 
controllable stressors. On the other hand, event controllability was not hypothesised to 
moderate the relationship between acceptance or cognitive defusion and avoidance coping, 
consistent with previous research (see Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004).  
This study tested whether both acceptance and cognitive defusion predicted more 
approach and less avoidance coping in three ways: a) as between-subjects effects; b) as 
within-subjects, within-day effects (i.e., whether acceptance and cognitive defusion in 
relation to a stressful event today was associated with enhanced coping responses to the 
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same event) and c) as within-subjects lagged effects (i.e., whether acceptance and cognitive 
defusion in relation to a stressful event yesterday predicted more effective coping responses 
to a stressful event that occurs today).  
Although within-subjects analyses include both level 1 and level 2 information and 
so are nearly always the focus of multi-level longitudinal models (Bolger & Laurenceau, 
2013), exploring between-subjects effects in longitudinal analyses enable researchers to 
examine relations between variables at multiple levels of analysis (Preacher et al., 2015). 
Between-subjects analyses enable individual differences in variables of interest to be 
assessed, independent of intra-individual differences in those variables (Preacher et al., 
2015). In the context of this study, between-subjects analyses enabled one to examine 
relations between average levels of both acceptance and cognitive defusion between 
individuals and average coping responses between individuals. The following between-
subjects predictions were made: 
Hypothesis 1a: Greater-than-average acceptance between individuals during daily 
stressful events will be associated with less avoidance coping with such events, 
independent of the effects of average threat and self-efficacy appraisals in relation 
to daily stressors. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Greater-than-average levels of event control and acceptance 
between individuals during daily stressful events will interact with each other to 
predict higher average approach coping with such events, independent of the effects 
of average threat and self-efficacy appraisals in relation to daily stressors. 
Hypothesis 2a: Greater-than-average acceptance between individuals during daily 
stressful events will be associated with less avoidance coping with such events, 
independent of the effects of average threat and self-efficacy appraisals in relation 
to daily stressors. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Greater-than-average levels of event control and acceptance 
between individuals during daily stressful events will interact with each other to 
predict higher average approach coping with such events, independent of the effects 
of average threat and self-efficacy appraisals in relation to daily stressors. 
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Regarding the within-subjects analyses, longitudinal studies have been criticised for 
estimating daily associations between variables across time and claiming intra-individual 
associations where these have in fact not been tested (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013). This 
study sought to avoid this problem by isolating within-subjects variation in both acceptance 
and cognitive defusion from the between-subjects component of each variable. Within-
subject, within-day analyses effectively involves treating each subject as his or her own 
control. As discussed in Chapter 3, this analyses essentially asks: on any given day, is being 
above one’s own average score across days on a predictor associated with higher levels of 
an outcome variable on that same day? The hypotheses for the within-subjects, within-day 
analyses in this study were therefore: 
Hypothesis 3a: Within-subjects variation in acceptance during a daily stressful 
event will predict less avoidance coping with daily stressors, independent of a 
person’s threat and self-efficacy appraisals. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Event controllability will interact with within-subjects variation in 
acceptance to predict more approach coping with daily stressors, independent of a 
person’s threat and self-efficacy appraisals. 
Hypothesis 4a: Within-subjects variation in cognitive defusion during a daily 
stressful event will predict less avoidance coping with daily stressors, independent 
of a person’s threat and self-efficacy appraisals. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Event controllability will interact with within-subjects variation in 
cognitive defusion to predict more approach coping with daily stressors, 
independent of a person’s threat and self-efficacy appraisals. 
 
Regressing predictors lagged by a meaningful time-period (e.g., one day) upon 
relevant outcome variables enables researchers to draw stronger inferences about the causal 
relations between variables than cross-sectional analyses (Kleiber, & Zeileis, 2008). This 
approach has been used in the study of daily stress previously (e.g., Affleck, et al., 1994; 
Caspi, Bolger, & Eckenrode, 1987; DeLongis & Holtzman, 2005), but not to the author’s 
knowledge in relation to the effects of acceptance and cognitive defusion on responses to 
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stress. The present study also tested whether an individual’s acceptance and cognitive 
defusion during a stressful event ‘spilled over’ to influencing their response to a separate 
stressful event on a subsequent day. Mindfulness skills such as acceptance and cognitive 
defusion have been shown to enhance responses to aversive experiences (Eifert & Heffner, 
2003; Levitt et al., 2004; Masuda, Feinstein, et al., 2010; Masuda, Twohig, et al., 2010), 
which is expected to serve as a positive reinforcer for similar responses to subsequent 
aversive experiences (Hayes et al., 2011). Consistent with this idea, numerous studies have 
found practice effects that consistently show up over a period of one month following a 
mindfulness intervention (for a review, see Sedlmeier et al., 2012). In the context of a 
stressful event, I expected that greater cognitive defusion and acceptance in relation to a 
stressful event on one day is likely to influence the kind of response an individual has to a 
similar event on a subsequent day. The final set of hypotheses in this study were therefore: 
Hypothesis 5a: An individual’s levels of acceptance during a stressful event 
yesterday will predict less avoidance coping in relation to a stressful event today, 
independent of a person’s threat and self-efficacy appraisals yesterday. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Event controllability today will interact with an individual’s levels 
of acceptance during a stressful event yesterday to predict greater approach coping 
in relation to a stressful event today, independent of a person’s threat and self-
efficacy appraisals yesterday. 
 
Hypothesis 6a: An individual’s levels of acceptance during a stressful event 
yesterday will predict less avoidance coping in relation to a stressful event today, 
independent of a person’s threat and self-efficacy appraisals yesterday. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: Event controllability today will interact with an individual’s levels 
of cognitive defusion during a stressful event yesterday to predict greater approach 
coping in relation to a stressful event today, independent of a person’s threat and 
self-efficacy appraisals yesterday. 
 
Although the same predictions were made for both acceptance and cognitive 
defusion in the above hypotheses, separate sets of models were run with each of acceptance 
and cognitive defusion as predictors (and therefore separate hypotheses were created for 
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each) for two main reasons: first, the focus of this study was in assessing the effects of each 
mindfulness component on coping, relative to the effects of primary and secondary stress 
appraisals, rather than comparing the effects of the two mindfulness components directly 
with each other; and second, combining both predictors into a single model makes the 
analyses complex, given that both predictors were examined as interacting with event 
control (i.e., Hypotheses 1b and 2b), and the relatively small sample size in this study (N = 
141). 
 
Method 
 
Participants and procedure 
Participants were a subset of 141 of the 201 participants in Study 2 (76% female; 
mean age 34). Around 74% identified as Caucasian, 14% as East or South Asian and 11% 
as ‘other’. Ninety-five percent of participants held an undergraduate diploma or degree, and 
37% held a master’s or Ph.D. degree.  
Participants in this study were recruited and randomly allocated to three 
experimental conditions, for the separate randomised controlled study reported in Study 2. 
Participants in the mindfulness (n = 59) and mindfulness and values (n = 60) conditions 
paid AUD 100 to participate in the interventions, and received an AUD 100 refund upon 
completion of the pre- and post-intervention surveys described and used in Study 2 
(Chapter 5), as well as 20 daily surveys described below and used in the present study. 
Individuals in the waitlist condition (n = 80) were given the option of completing the daily 
surveys but were not provided a financial incentive to do so. Twenty-two participants from 
the waitlist condition volunteered to complete the daily surveys.  
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Participants completed four sets of five daily surveys (either via email or SMS): 
five daily surveys over the five working days in the week preceding their first training 
session; five daily surveys over the five working days in the week immediately following 
their second training session (four weeks after the first set of daily surveys); five over the 
five working days in the week following their third and final training session (four weeks 
after the second set of daily surveys); and a final set of five surveys over five working days 
four weeks after their final training session. Participants received each daily survey, which 
took approximately two minutes to complete, at 4 pm and were given until 10 am the 
following morning to complete it. Each daily survey included eleven items, six of which 
were for the present study and are described next. 
Measures 
Single-item measures were used in this study in order to minimise the time 
participants spent completing each of the 20 daily surveys. Informal interviews with a 
convenience sample of university students and working professionals (N = 15) indicated 
that a longer survey (e.g., 20-40 items) would substantially increase the likelihood of 
missing data and inaccurate responding in the context of the present study, relative to a 
shorter survey (e.g., 10-12 items). However, the use of single-item measures has several 
short-comings, often increasing measurement error and so weakening results (Cohen, 
Cohen, Aiken, & West, 2003). To address this issue, several steps were taken. First, 
wherever possible, single-item measures were used that had been validated in previous 
research (i.e., the measures of threat-appraisal and coping self-efficacy). Second, where 
such measures did not exist, I adapted single-item measures from multi-item scales that 
have displayed good validity and reliability (i.e., cognitive defusion, Gillanders et al., 2014; 
acceptance, Bond et al., 2010; coping, Carver, 1989). Third, the constructs measured in this 
study were relatively concrete, conceptually simple and unidimensional in nature, making 
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them well-suited to single-item measurement (Fuchs & Diamantopoulos, 2009). Finally, 
all single-item measures were validated against multi-item versions of each construct, and 
the internal as well as the test-retest reliability of each single-item measure was assessed 
(see Appendix C). 
 All variables were measured on a daily basis so as to reduce the recall biases 
common in retrospective measures of coping (Shikai et al., 2014). For each of the 20 daily 
surveys, participants were asked to first reflect on their most stressful or challenging 
situation of the past 24 hours (i.e., “Take a moment to think about your most stressful or 
challenging experience or event of the last 24 hours”). Participants then responded to the 
following items: 
Threat appraisal: A single-item measure of stress appraisal was adapted from 
Hodgins et al. (2010) and Tomaka et al. (1993), on a one (not at all) to five (extremely) 
Likert scale: “How threatening was this experience for you?” 
Self-efficacy appraisal: A single item measure of perceived self-efficacy was taken 
from Chwalisz et al., (1992): “How confident did you feel about your ability to deal with 
this situation?” Subjects rated themselves on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) Likert scale. 
Event controllability: A single-item measure of event controllability was taken from 
Park, et al. (2006): “To what degree was it possible to control this stressful situation?”, on 
a one (not at all) to five (a great deal) Likert scale. 
Cognitive defusion: A single item was adapted from the Cognitive Fusion 
Questionnaire (Gillanders et al., 2014): “How much were you caught up in your thoughts 
and feelings about this situation?”, on a one (not at all) to five (completely) Likert scale. 
To generate a measure of cognitive defusion, scores on this item were reversed. 
Acceptance: A single item was adapted from the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire II (Bond et al., 2011): “How much did you try to control or change thoughts 
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and feelings associated with this situation?”, on a one (not at all) to five (completely) Likert 
scale. To generate a measure of acceptance, scores on this item were reversed. 
Approach coping: A measure of approach coping was adapted from the active 
coping subscale of the Brief COPE Inventory (Carver, 1997): “To what degree did you try 
to resolve this situation?” on a one (not at all) to five (completely) Likert scale.  
Avoidance coping: Avoidance coping was measured using the item: “To what 
degree did you avoid engaging with this situation?” on a one (not at all) to five (completely) 
Likert scale. The item was adapted from the behavioural disengagement subscale of the 
Brief COPE Inventory (Carver, 1997). 
Statistical analyses 
Given the nested nature of these data (time points within individuals within 
conditions), multilevel modelling was used for all analyses in this study, using the ‘lme4’, 
‘lme.Test’ and ‘Hmisc’ packages in the R program (version 3.2.2; R Core Team, 2015). As 
discussed, relations between daily acceptance and cognitive defusion and daily coping 
responses were examined in three ways. In a first set of models, individual differences in 
acceptance and cognitive defusion (averaged over the 20 time-points) were regressed upon 
coping responses. In a second set of models, the within-subjects variation in each 
mindfulness sub-process was regressed upon approach and avoidance coping, to assess the 
predictive power of the intra-individual variation in acceptance and defusion, as distinct 
from individual-difference effects. Finally, a third set of ‘lagged’ models, tested whether 
individuals’ levels of acceptance and cognitive defusion yesterday predicted their coping 
responses today, so as to make stronger inferences regarding the causal relations among 
these variables (Kleiber, & Zeileis, 2008). Each of these approaches is now briefly 
explained. 
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Between-subjects analyses. In between-subjects analyses, the between-subjects 
component of each level 1 predictor is first calculated as the mean score on that variable 
for each individual, across time-points. As discussed in Chapter 3, the between-subjects 
component of relevant predictors is simply regressed on the relevant outcome variable(s), 
controlling for other relevant covariates (Preacher et al., 2015). 
 Within-subjects, within-day analyses. First, the within-subjects component of each 
predictor variable is generated by subtracting each raw score (at each time-point, for each 
individual) from that individuals’ mean score on the variable of interest, to generate a 
within-subjects component of the variable at each time-point and across all individuals. As 
outlined in Chapter 3, the within-subjects component of acceptance and cognitive defusion 
was regressed on coping, controlling for time, time-wave, and other covariates. In addition, 
the random effects component of the model involved modelling intercepts and slopes for 
each individual on the relevant predictor, as well as an error component (Bolger & 
Laurenceau, 2013). 
Lagged analyses. In order to draw stronger causal inferences about the relations 
between both IVs (acceptance and cognitive defusion) and coping, a series of lagged 
models were run (Kleiber & Zeileis, 2008), testing whether acceptance and defusion in 
relation to yesterday’s most stressful experience predicted greater approach and less 
avoidance coping with the today’s most stressful experience. This modelling approach was 
described in some detail in Chapter 3. In essence, it involves lagging relevant IVs by a 
theoretically-valid time-period (one day in the present study) and regressing these on 
relevant DVs (Kleiber & Zeileis, 2008). Importantly, this modelling approach involves 
controlling for the autoregressive effects of the DV across time, by including a lagged 
version of the DV as a time-varying covariate in these models (Kleiber & Zeileis, 2008). 
In the present study, the two other time-varying covariates of interest, threat appraisal and 
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self-efficacy appraisal, were included as lagged variables (i.e., lagged by one day), so as to 
compare like-with-like effects between these covariates and each of acceptance and 
cognitive defusion, which were also lagged by one day. Lastly, when modelling lagged 
effects of acceptance and cognitive defusion on approach coping in this study, event 
controllability was treated as a ‘current day’ variable (rather than a lagged variable). This 
enabled the goodness-of-fit hypothesis (Park et al., 2004) to be tested (i.e., whether 
approach coping was more likely in relation to controllable stressors), and whether either 
mindfulness components supported the fit between a person’s coping response and how 
controllable the stressor was.  
Missing data 
Missing data were minimal in this study, ranging from 0.59% for threat appraisal to 
0.97% for self-efficacy appraisal. The FIML approach to missing data was used in all 
models in this study. As discussed in Chapter 3, this approach has been shown to be superior 
to ad-hoc approaches to missing data, as it produces unbiased estimates when data are 
missing at random (as opposed to missing completely at random), is robust to instances of 
non-normality in error distribution and provide adequate results even for low sample sizes 
and high rates of missing data (Baraldi & Enders, 2010; Graham, 2009; Graham et al., 
2007). 
Results 
 
I first tested for differences in approach and avoidance coping between individuals 
who volunteered to participate in this study and those who received a financial incentive to 
do so, using the Welch Two Sample t-test. There were no differences between these two 
groups for approach, t = 0.94, df = 358.6, p = 0.349, or avoidance coping, t = -0.63, df = 
350, p = 0.531, or any of the other variables in this study. Nor were there significant effects 
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of either experimental condition (mindfulness vs. mindfulness-plus-values) on coping 
responses across time, using multi-level modelling. With approach coping as the outcome, 
the effect of the mindfulness condition was β = -.003 (.013), t = -.230, p = .818, while the 
effect of the mindfulness-plus-values condition was β = .007 (.006), t = 1.117, p = .264. 
With avoidance coping as the outcome, the effect of the mindfulness condition was β = -
.012 (.013), t = -.916, p = .360, while the effect of the mindfulness-plus-values condition 
was β = .000 (.006), t = -.105, p = .916. Experimental effects were therefore not examined 
any further in this study, though ‘experimental condition’ was included as a covariate in all 
multi-level models. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for study variables 
appear in Table 10. 
Table 10  
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between study variables 
 
M  SD Acceptance 
Cognitive 
Defusion 
Avoidance 
coping 
Approach 
coping 
Threat 
appraisal 
Self-
efficacy 
appraisal 
Acceptance 3.58 1.1     -      
Cog. Defusion 3.56 1.09  .311**     -     
Avoidance  3.22 1.19 -.161** -.314**     -    
Approach  1.93 1.07 -.176**   .040 -.243**    -   
Threat appraisal 2.47 1.01 -.242** -.558**  .185** .086**     -  
Self-efficacy 3.2 0.99  .073**  .425** -.272** .262** -.399**    - 
Event control 3.21 1.17 -0.04  .110** -.045* .344** -.151** .295** 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Between-subjects analyses  
Hypotheses 1(a) and (b): Between-subjects acceptance as a predictor of coping responses 
 Hypothesis 1(a) was that having high average levels of acceptance in relation to 
daily stressful events would be associated with lower average avoidance coping, controlling 
for average levels of threat and self-efficacy appraisal in relation to daily stressors. As 
shown in Table 11, I found support for this, with between-subjects acceptance predicting 
less avoidance coping, β = -.12 (.02), t = -5.80, p < .001.  
Table 11  
Between-subjects acceptance predicting avoidance coping 
  β SE t-value p-value 
Intercept   .00 .02 -0.07 .948 
Condition   .02 .04 0.60 .548 
Wave (centred)        -.01 .07 -0.10 .920 
Time (centred)        -.01 .01 -0.41 .680 
Threat-appraisal (between)       .06** .02 2.75 .006 
Self-efficacy appraisal (between) -.13*** .02 -6.21 < .001 
Acceptance (between) -.12*** .02 -5.80 < .001 
Note. All effects are standardized. ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 Hypothesis 1(b) was that individuals’ average levels of event-controllability would 
interact with their average acceptance in relation to daily stressful events to predict lower 
average avoidance coping, controlling for average levels of threat and self-efficacy 
appraisal in relation to daily stressors. Support for this hypothesis was found, as shown in 
Table 12, with a significant interaction between event control and acceptance, β= .09 (.02), 
t = 5.72, p < .001. These findings suggest that higher acceptance on average is associated 
with approach coping in situations of relative control over the stressor. 
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Table 12  
Between-subjects acceptance interacting with event control to predict approach coping 
     β SE t-value p-value 
Intercept      .01 .02 .49 .626 
Condition -.24*** .03 -7.37 < .001 
Wave (centred)     -.06 .06 -1.03 .302 
Time (centred)      .01 .01 1.23 .217 
Threat-appraisal (between) .23*** .02 13.84 < .001 
Self-efficacy appraisal (between) .32*** .02 18.16 < .001 
Acceptance (between) -.10*** .02 -6.11 < .001 
Event control (between) .40*** .02 23.56 < .001 
Acceptance*Ev. Control (between) .09*** .02 5.72 < .001 
Note. All effects are standardized. *** p < .001. 
 
Hypotheses 2(a) and (b): Between-subjects cognitive defusion as a predictor of coping 
responses 
Hypothesis 2 was identical to Hypothesis 1, but was in relation to cognitive defusion 
rather than acceptance as a predictor. Regarding relations between average cognitive 
defusion and less avoidance coping, Table 13 illustrates these results, showing that higher 
average cognitive defusion predicted less avoidance coping, with a small-to-medium effect-
size, β = -.22(.03), t = -8.347, p < .001, controlling for between-subjects threat and self-
efficacy appraisals. 
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Table 13  
Between-subjects cognitive defusion predicting less avoidance coping 
   β SE t-value p-value 
Intercept  .00 .02 -0.086 .931 
Condition  .04 .04 1.107 .268 
Wave (centred)  .00 .07 0.038 .970 
Time (centred) -.01 .01 -0.54 .589 
Threat-appraisal (between) -.04 .03 -1.513 .130 
Self-efficacy appraisal (between) -.08*** .02 -3.747 < .001 
Cognitive defusion (between) -.22*** .03 -8.347 < .001 
Note. All effects are standardized. *** p < .001. 
Regarding the interaction between average cognitive defusion and average event 
control in predicting enhanced approach coping (Hypothesis 2b), Table 14 illustrates these 
results, showing that higher cognitive defusion between individuals interacted with event 
control to predict more approach coping on average, β = .05(.01), t = 4.20, p < .001.  
Table 14  
Between-subjects cognitive defusion interacting with event control to predict enhanced 
approach coping  
  β    SE     t-value       p-value 
Intercept   .00 .02 -.07 .945 
Condition -.23*** .03 -7.03 < .001 
Wave (centred)   -.06 .06 -1.06 .291 
Time (centred)    .01 .01 1.15 .249 
Threat-appraisal (between) .21*** .02 9.80 < .001 
Self-efficacy appraisal (between) .33*** .02 17.76 < .001 
Cognitive defusion (between)   -.02 .02 -1.15 .252 
Event control (between) .42*** .02 23.91 < .001 
Cog. defusion*Ev. control (between) .05*** .01 4.20 < .001 
Note. All effects are standardized. *** p < .001. 
 
Within-subjects analyses 
Hypotheses 3(a) and (b): Within-subjects acceptance as a predictor of coping responses 
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Consistent with Hypothesis 3(a), I found that individuals who were above their own 
mean on acceptance on any given day reported significantly less avoidance coping on that 
day, controlling for time, wave, experimental condition, as well as within-subjects variation 
in threat and self-efficacy appraisals (see Table 15). Although the standardized size of this 
effect was relatively modest (β = -.08 (.02), t = -4.04, p < .001), it is consistent with the 
between-subjects findings reported above. 
Table 15 
Standardized fixed effects of within-subjects acceptance on avoidance coping 
  β SE df t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.01 0.02 2324 -0.50    0.617 
Condition  0.00 0.04 2324 -0.05    0.963 
Wave (centred)  0.11 0.07 2324  1.51    0.131 
Time (centred) -0.03* 0.01 2324 -1.98    0.047 
Threat-appraisal (within)  0.05* 0.02 2324  2.17    0.030 
Self-efficacy-appraisal (within) -0.24*** 0.02 2324 -10.73 < 0.001 
Acceptance (within) -0.08*** 0.02 2324 -4.04 < 0.001 
Note. All effects are standardized. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
 I next examined the effects of acceptance interacting with event controllability in 
predicting greater approach coping (Hypothesis 3b). As Table 16 shows, the interaction 
between event control and within-subjects acceptance (i.e., being above one’s own mean 
on acceptance on any given day) did not predict significantly greater approach coping on 
that day, β = .01 (.02), t = -.20, p = .844. 
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Table 16  
Standardized fixed effects of within-subjects acceptance interacting with event control to 
predict approach coping 
     β SE df t-value p-value 
Intercept  0.08 0.16 2314.00 0.48   0.630 
Condition -0.11 0.06 137.70 -1.74   0.083 
Wave (centred) -0.03 0.06 2234.00 -0.50   0.619 
Time (centred)  0.01 0.01 2228.00 0.68   0.500 
Threat-appraisal 0.19*** 0.02 2238.00 9.15 < 0.001 
Self-efficacy-appraisal 0.25*** 0.02 2228.00 11.61 < 0.001 
Event controllability 0.26*** 0.02 2227.00 13.06 < 0.001 
Acceptance (within) -0.10*** 0.02 136.00 -4.52 < 0.001 
Acceptance (within)*Event control  0.01 0.02 1140.00 -0.20   0.844 
 Note. All effects are standardized. *** p < .001. 
Hypotheses 4(a) and (b): Within-subjects cognitive defusion as a predictor of coping 
responses 
Hypothesis 4 was next tested, that within-subjects cognitive defusion a) will predict 
less avoidance coping on the same day, and b) will interact with event control to predict 
more approach coping on the same day. As displayed in Table 17, within-subjects variation 
in cognitive defusion predicted significantly less avoidance coping, controlling for time, 
the four measurement waves, experimental condition, as well as controlling for within-
subjects variation in threat and self-efficacy appraisals, β = -.19 (.02), t = -7.82, p < .001. 
This result indicates that when a subject’s level of cognitive defusion in relation to any 
given stressful event was above their own mean cognitive defusion score, this was 
associated with significantly less avoidance coping, and is consistent with the between-
subjects effects reported above. 
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Table 17  
Standardized within-subjects cognitive defusion predicting avoidance coping 
  β SE df t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.01 0.02 2327 -0.46    0.643 
Condition  0.00 0.04 2327 -0.03    0.978 
Wave (centred)  0.10 0.07 2327 1.40    0.162 
Time (centred) -0.02 0.01 2327 -1.74    0.083 
Threat-appraisal (within) -0.01 0.02 2327 -0.37    0.712 
Self-efficacy-appraisal (within) -0.19** 0.02 2327 -8.07 < 0.001 
Cognitive defusion (within) -0.19** 0.02 2327 -7.82 < 0.001 
Note. All effects are standardized. ** p < .01. 
Next, the interaction between event controllability and within-subjects cognitive 
defusion was regressed upon approach coping, controlling for time, wave, experimental 
condition, and within-subjects variation in threat and self-efficacy appraisals. Results of 
this analysis are reported in Table 18. Event controllability interacted with within-subjects 
cognitive defusion to predict significantly greater approach coping, β = .09 (.02), t = 4.61, 
p < .001, beyond the effects of threat and self-efficacy appraisals on approach coping. 
Table 18  
Standardized within-subjects cognitive defusion interacting with event control to predict 
approach coping 
  β SE df t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.01 0.02 2324.00 -0.58    0.560 
Condition -0.01 0.04 2324.00 -0.24    0.807 
Wave (centred) 0.01 0.07 2324.00 0.15    0.883 
Time (centred) 0.00 0.01 2324.00 -0.20    0.843 
Threat-appraisal (within) 0.25*** 0.02 2324.00 10.58 < 0.001 
Self-efficacy-appraisal (within) 0.25*** 0.02 2324.00 10.69 < 0.001 
Event controllability 0.21*** 0.02 2324.00 10.54 < 0.001 
Defusion (within) 0.07** 0.02 2324.00 3.04    0.002 
Defusion (within)*Event control 0.09*** 0.02 2324.00 4.61 < 0.001 
Note. ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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 The moderating effect of event control on the relationship between within-subjects 
cognitive defusion and approach coping is displayed in Figure 10. Among individuals 
reporting high and very high levels of event control, greater intra-individual cognitive 
defusion was associated with significantly more approach coping. As levels of event control 
reduced, this effect diminished, such that among individuals reporting very low levels of 
event control, greater within-subjects cognitive defusion was associated with statistically 
significant reductions in approach coping. This suggests a contextual effect whereby 
individuals’ who are relatively high in cognitive defusion are more responsive to the kinds 
of stressors they face – engaging in more approach coping in situations of relatively high 
control; but not in situations where they have low levels of control over the stressful event. 
 
Figure 10. Within-subjects cognitive defusion interacting with levels of event control (very 
low – very high) in predicting approach coping. Note: Approach coping and cognitive 
defusion are in their unstandardized form. 
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Lagged analyses 
 Having examined within-subjects, within-day effects, I moved to examine within-
subjects, lagged effects. Results for lagged acceptance and defusion in predicting each of 
approach and avoidance coping, are reported next. 
Hypotheses 5(a) and (b): Lagged acceptance as a predictor of coping responses 
 Yesterday’s acceptance was regressed on the present day’s avoidance coping 
(Hypothesis 5a), and as an interaction with event controllability in predicting approach 
coping (Hypothesis 5b). However, significant effects were not found for either dependent 
variable: the standardized effect of lagged acceptance on avoidance coping was β = -.003 
(.003), t = -.116, p = .908, and the interaction of lagged acceptance and today’s event control 
on approach coping was β = .03 (.02), t = 1.62, p = .105.  
Hypotheses 6(a) and (b): Lagged cognitive defusion as a predictor of coping responses 
 Finally, I tested Hypothesis 6 that lagged cognitive defusion will predict (a) less 
avoidance coping today, and (b) as an interaction with event controllability, will predict 
more approach coping today. I found support for both hypotheses. As shown in Table 19, 
yesterday’s cognitive defusion predicting significantly less avoidance coping today, 
controlling for yesterday’s threat and self-efficacy appraisals, β = -0.08 (.03), t = -2.55, p 
= .011. That is, being relatively cognitively defused during a stressful event yesterday 
predicted less avoidance coping with a stressful event today, suggesting a spill-over effect 
of cognitive defusion on coping, across stressful events, though this effect was modest in 
size. 
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Table 19  
Lagged cognitive defusion predicting avoidance coping 
     β SE     df t-value p-value 
(Intercept)  0.04 0.07 223.30 0.61 0.541 
Avoidance coping (lagged)  0.04 0.02 2145.70 1.71 0.088 
Condition  0.03 0.08 120.40 0.34 0.737 
Threat appraisal (lagged) -0.06* 0.03 2156.40 -2.43 0.015 
Self-efficacy appraisal (lagged) -0.04 0.02 2155.20 -1.46 0.145 
Cognitive defusion (lagged) -0.08* 0.03 228.20 -2.55 0.011 
Note. All effects are standardized. * p < .05.  
 I next tested whether yesterday’s cognitive defusion interacted with event 
controllability today to predict greater approach coping today (consistent with the 
goodness-of-fit hypothesis), and controlling for yesterday’s threat and self-efficacy 
appraisals. I found support for this interaction effect, as shown in Table 20. 
Table 20  
Lagged cognitive defusion interacting with event control to predict approach coping 
  β SE df t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.04 0.06 290.80 0.64    0.525 
Approach coping (lagged) 0.06** 0.02 2158.50 2.79    0.005 
Condition -0.11 0.07 120.30 -1.58    0.117 
Threat appraisal (lagged) 0.03 0.03 2155.00 1.22    0.221 
Self-efficacy appraisal (lagged) 0.04 0.02 2092.10 1.77    0.077 
Defusion (lagged) -0.04 0.03 2113.10 -1.59    0.112 
Event control 0.30*** 0.02 2089.10 14.45 < 0.001 
Defusion (lagged)*Event control 0.05** 0.02 2154.00 2.74    0.006 
Note. All effects are standardized. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 The moderating effect of event control on the relationship between lagged cognitive 
defusion and approach coping is shown visually in Figure 11. Consistent with the within-
subjects, within-day analysis reported above, this figure suggests that cognitive defusion 
yesterday predicted more context-sensitive coping today, such that for individuals reporting 
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very high levels of event control, there is greater approach coping, while in low control 
settings there is less approach coping.  
 
Figure 11. Lagged cognitive defusion interacting with levels of event control (very low – 
very high) in predicting approach coping. Note. Lagged cognitive defusion and approach 
coping are in unstandardized form. 
 
Discussion 
 
 This study sought to test whether acceptance and cognitive defusion predicted 
enhanced coping with daily stressors, measured in close proximity to their occurrence (i.e., 
on a daily basis). In addition, this study tested whether the effects of both mindfulness 
processes occurred independent of the influence of stress-related cognitive appraisals (i.e., 
threat and self-efficacy appraisals) upon approach and avoidance coping. Support for such 
effects would provide evidence that the way individuals relate to their stress-related 
cognitions (i.e., acceptance and cognitive defusion) predicts coping behaviour 
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independently of the form or acuity of such appraisals (i.e., threat and self-efficacy 
appraisals), consistent with the predictions of third-wave behaviour therapies (Hayes et al., 
2006). Finally, this study tested whether both acceptance and cognitive defusion enhanced 
individuals’ ability to match their coping response with the opportunities afforded to them 
in specific stressful situations – specifically testing whether both acceptance and cognitive 
defusion facilitated more approach coping in situations involving relatively high levels of 
control over the stressor. To address these questions, this study employed state-of-the-art 
multi-level modelling techniques to assess a) between-subjects effects; b) within-subject, 
within-day effects (i.e., the co-occurance of mindfulness components and coping responses 
in relation to the same stressor) and b) within-subjects lagged effects (i.e., the effects of 
mindfulness components upon coping responses over a one-day lag).  
 Results supported several but not all of the hypotheses in this study. Regarding the 
effects of cognitive defusion on coping, there was strong support for this from within-
subjects within-day analyses, within-subjects lagged analyses and between-subjects 
analyses. Within-subjects cognitive defusion predicted less avoidance coping both on the 
same day and on a subsequent day. Also, between-subjects analyses showed that higher 
average cognitive defusion predicted less average avoidance coping, with a similar-sized 
effect to the within-subjects within-day analyses.  
 Further, cognitive defusion interacted with stressor control to predict greater 
approach coping with a stressor within the same day and on a subsequent day. In addition, 
higher cognitive defusion between individuals interacted with event control to predict 
greater average approach coping. While these effects were not as large as those for 
avoidance coping, they were statistically significant for all three forms of analyses in this 
study. 
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The finding of an interaction effect between cognitive defusion and stressor control 
in predicting greater approach coping both within and across days suggests that cognitive 
defusion helps individuals enhance the ‘fit’ between the opportunities available in any 
given stressful situation and the individual’s coping response, consistent with the goodness-
of-fit hypothesis (Park et al., 2004). Specifically, cognitive defusion appears to have 
predicted more context-sensitive responding to stressful events occurring on the same day, 
such that more approach coping occurred in controllable situations, but less approach 
coping in uncontrollable settings (see Figure 10). This study also found evidence for this 
effect in the lagged analyses with cognitive defusion: greater cognitive defusion with a 
stressful event yesterday predicted an enhanced fit between how much control one had over 
a stressor today and the extent to which an active coping response was used (see Figure 
11). These results suggest that cognitive defusion may increase individuals’ situational 
awareness, meaning that the person is better able to match their coping response to the 
opportunities afforded to them by the particular stressful experience, and is consistent with 
the predictions of the psychological flexibility model (Hayes et al., 2006). Lastly, the 
between-subjects effects follow the very same pattern, suggesting that cognitive defusion 
enhances the environment-coping response fit on average, across days, as well as in relation 
to a specific stressors on a given day. 
The above effects of cognitive defusion on coping were independent of stress-
related appraisals (i.e., primary appraisals of threat and secondary appraisals of self-
efficacy). While cognitive defusion predicted enhanced approach and less avoidance 
coping on the subsequent day, self-efficacy appraisal did not have these effects, nor did 
threat-appraisal predict less avoidance coping on the subsequent day. This suggests that the 
relationship an individual has with his or her stress-related thoughts (i.e., being cognitively 
defused) predicts coping responses across time more than the content of such thoughts (i.e., 
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appraisals of self-efficacy and threat). In turn, this suggests that cognitive defusion acts as 
a kind of ‘buffer’ against the negative effects of a stressor on a subsequent day, where 
appraisals of self-efficacy and threat do not. These findings are consistent with both 
theoretical claims and recent evidence from third-wave behaviour therapy research that 
emphasises the importance of context in which thoughts and feelings are experienced as 
much as it does their content (Bond et al., 2011; Hayes et al., 2006). 
Regarding the effects of acceptance on coping, I found less support for this. Within-
subjects acceptance (i.e., being above one’s own mean level of acceptance on any given 
day) predicted less avoidance coping with a stressor on the same day. Also, higher between-
subjects acceptance predicted less avoidance coping on average. These findings are 
consistent with the results for cognitive defusion and avoidance coping above, and suggest 
that higher acceptance on any given day (within-subjects), as well as across days (between-
subjects) is associated with less avoidance coping. However, there was no evidence in this 
study that acceptance predicted less avoidance coping on a subsequent day. Nor was there 
evidence that acceptance interacted with stressor control to predict greater approach coping 
either on the same day or on a subsequent day.  
These findings suggest that variation in acceptance within subjects has limited 
effects on either approach or avoidance coping across days, or indeed on approach coping 
on the same day. In contrast, higher acceptance between subjects interacted with event 
control to predict greater approach coping on average. This further suggests that acceptance 
may have more general effects on coping responses, rather than having proximal effects on 
coping either on the same or on a subsequent day. However, based on previous research of 
acceptance manipulations (e.g., Bowen & Marlatt, 2009; Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Gutiérrez 
et al., 2004; Levitt et al., 2004), and the findings of Study 3, this is a surprising finding. 
Indeed, one would have expected acceptance to be a protective factor which, when applied 
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to specific stressful situations, enhances responses to those very situations, rather than just 
on average across time.  
One explanation for these unexpected findings is that some participants 
misinterpreted the acceptance item. It possible that some participants interpreted “seeking 
to control or change thoughts and feelings” as not necessarily non-acceptance (recall this 
item was reverse-coded to generate a measure of acceptance). For example, thinking 
positive thoughts or trying to generate solutions to a daily stressor may not necessarily 
involve non-acceptance, but could still involve “seeking to change thoughts”. This potential 
inconsistency with the measure of acceptance is illustrated in the validation of the single-
item measures used in this study (see Appendix C) where the single-item measure of 
acceptance did not predict unique variance in the trait measure. On the other hand, the 
cognitive defusion measure (also reverse coded) which asked participants to rate how 
“caught up with your thoughts and feelings about this situation” may have more clearly 
implied rumination and literally believing stress-related thoughts, which is what the item 
targeted. These differences may in-turn explain the differences between the effects of 
cognitive defusion and acceptance in this study. 
Despite questions regarding the acceptance measure in this study, the general 
pattern of results suggests that both cognitive defusion and acceptance are consistently 
associated with reduced avoidance coping. The standardized effect sizes for these 
relationships ranged from -.08 to -.19, with cognitive defusion consistently showing larger 
effects than acceptance. The between-subjects effects were slightly larger, at -.12 and -.22 
for acceptance and cognitive defusion, respectively. These findings are also consistent with 
Studies 1 to 3 of this thesis, which generally found stronger effects of mindfulness on 
avoidance than approach coping.  
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This study has several limitations. First, in this study, I sought to measure 
individuals’ mindfulness, affect and coping responses as close to the time of the stressor as 
possible, in order to reduce the well-reported bias associated with retrospective and global 
measures of stress-related constructs (Schwartz, et al., 1999; Shikai et al., 2014; Stone et 
al., 1998). In order to reduce participant burden and minimise missing data, the present 
study used single-item measures. Several of the single-item measures used in this study 
were taken from single-item measures used in previous research, while other measures used 
in this study were drawn from longer, psychometrically-valid scales. Although studies have 
found that single-item measures can perform as well as multiple-item scales on a range of 
constructs (Gardner, Cummins, Dunham, & Pierce, 1998), there are limitations to their use, 
including in relation to reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity (Fuchs, & 
Diamantopoulos, 2009). To address these concerns, the present study validated the single-
item measures used against trait versions of each construct (see Appendix C). However 
future studies of mindfulness processes and daily stress responses would benefit from using 
multi-item scales that are psychometrically reliable and valid ex ante. 
Second, the standardized effect sizes for acceptance and cognitive defusion in this 
study at the within-subject level were relatively small (ranging from .05 to .19), suggesting 
that both mindfulness processes may be relatively modest predictors of coping responses. 
Having said this, the effect sizes for cognitive defusion were about the same as those of 
threat and self-efficacy appraisals in the present studies, suggesting that the predictions of 
third-wave behaviour therapies add about as much value in predicting coping responses as 
much more established theories of coping, such as Lazarus and Folkman’s (1987) 
transactional theory. 
Despite the exploratory nature of this study and its limitations, this is the first study 
to examine whether acceptance and cognitive defusion enhance how individuals’ cope with 
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daily stressful events, and as such it adds value to both the coping literature and the more 
recent evidence emerging from third wave behaviour therapies (Hayes et al., 2006). The 
current findings suggest that an individual’s relationship to his or her stress-related 
appraisals predicts coping responses to a similar, and in some cases larger, degree as the 
form and intensity of such appraisals. This finding adds to the transactional theory of 
coping, suggesting that a person’s relationship to stress-related thoughts (for example, 
through a construct such as cognitive defusion) could usefully be included in studies aiming 
to predict or influence how individuals cope with stress in daily life. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
  
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
 In this final chapter, I draw together and discuss the main themes that emerged from 
the four substantive chapters of this thesis. Following this, I discuss the implications of this 
research for both mindfulness-based theories and coping theory, as well as exploring the 
practical implications of this research. Finally, I outline several limitations of this body of 
work, before discussing the main conclusions that can be drawn from it. 
 Although the coping literature is vast, the research on mindfulness as a predictor of 
enhanced coping responses is relatively immature. Theories of mindfulness claim it 
enhances self-regulation (Brown et al., 2007; Hayes et al., 2006) but surprisingly little 
research has explored whether this is the case in the context of coping with stressful events. 
In this thesis, I sought to add to the research on mindfulness and coping by testing the 
effects of mindfulness manipulations and individual differences in mindfulness upon 
approach and avoidance coping responses. Specifically, I sought to examine three main 
research questions in this thesis. First, I examined whether mindfulness manipulations 
enhance approach and inhibit avoidance coping responses in the context of naturally-
occurring (Studies 1 and 2) and laboratory-induced stress (Study 3). Second, I tested 
whether perceived stress moderated the effects of a mindfulness manipulation upon 
approach and avoidance coping responses (Studies 1 to 3). Finally, I examined whether 
acceptance and cognitive defusion, as two mindfulness component, enhanced approach and 
inhibited avoidance coping (Studies 3 and 4), and whether these effects were independent 
of stress-related appraisals (Study 4). 
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A summary of the main findings from the four studies in this thesis is shown in 
Figures 12 and 13. Figure 12 shows standardized effects (β) for approach coping, while 
Figure 13 shows standardized effects for avoidance coping. As both figures show, 
mindfulness more consistently predicted less avoidance than it did more approach coping. 
In particular, there was a consistent small-to-medium-sized interaction effect between 
mindfulness and perceived stress on less avoidance coping across Studies 1 to 3, whereas 
this effect did not consistently occur on approach coping. Lastly, the experimental effects 
of mindfulness on coping (Studies 1 to 3) were generally larger than the intra-individual 
longitudinal effects (Study 4). Each of these issues is discussed next. 
 
Figure 12. Standardized effects of mindfulness manipulations and intra-individual 
differences in mindfulness on approach coping. Note. Effects reported from Study 2 were 
the MBSR-adapted intervention relative to the wait-list control; effects reported from Study 
3 were for the acceptance induction relative to both the self-affirmation and relaxation 
inductions (as an average effect-size); while effects from Study 4 were intra-individual 
differences in both acceptance and defusion on approach coping within the same day. 
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Figure 13. Standardized effects of mindfulness manipulations and intra-individual 
differences in mindfulness on approach coping. Note. Effects reported from Study 2 were 
the MBSR-adapted intervention relative to the wait-list control; effects reported from Study 
3 were for the acceptance induction relative to both the self-affirmation and relaxation 
inductions (as a mean effect-size); while effects from Study 4 were intra-individual 
differences in both acceptance and defusion on avoidance coping within the same day. 
 
Main effects of mindfulness on coping 
There were significant main effects of mindfulness manipulations in enhancing 
approach and inhibiting avoidance coping in both Studies 2 and 3, but not Study 1. In Study 
2, these effects were obtained following a brief acceptance manipulation, while in Study 3 
these effects occurred following a multi-session MBSR-adapted intervention (9 hours of 
instruction in total). Although the MBSR-adapted program included a range of mindfulness 
exercises and psycho-education (see Appendix A), there was considerable emphasis in the 
protocol on accepting difficult or unpleasant experiences and willingly engaging with them. 
In addition, the third and final session of the protocol included a segment on self-
compassion, with an emphasis on being accepting and kind to oneself in the face of stress 
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and knowing that such experiences are common to all people (Neff et al., 2007). Although 
the interventions were very different in length and format between Studies 2 and 3, a 
common element in both was the teaching of acceptance skills – particularly self-
acceptance and self-compassion. On the other hand, mindfulness was manipulated in Study 
1 via a raisin-eating exercise, which emphasized present-moment awareness and curiosity 
toward novel experiences, rather than self-acceptance. It may be, therefore, that self-
acceptance is a key ‘active ingredient’ of mindfulness that enhances approach and inhibits 
avoidance coping.  
These findings are consistent with a body of research showing that manipulations 
designed to increase psychological acceptance serve to enhance responses to aversive 
experiences, such as breathing in CO2-enriched air (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt et al., 
2004), receiving an electric shock (Gutiérrez et al., 2004) and quitting smoking (Bowen & 
Marlatt, 2009; Gifford et al., 2004). In addition, self-compassion has been found to predict 
less avoidant coping responses among university students following academic failure (Neff 
et al., 2005). In contrast, there is mixed evidence that present-centred attention (as 
manipulated in Study 1) enhances stress responses, with several studies finding that 
heightened attention to and awareness of internal states, in the absence of an attitude of 
acceptance, can enhance negative affect, anxiety and depression (for a review of this 
research, see Cardaciotto et al., 2008). 
Perceived stress as a moderator of the effects of mindfulness on coping 
 In addition to the above main effects of mindfulness manipulations on coping 
responses, this thesis explored whether perceived stress moderates these effects. It has been 
suggested that mindfulness may only enhance coping responses among relatively stressed 
individuals (Josefsson et al., 2012). There is evidence that increased perceived stress 
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predicts more avoidance and less approach coping behaviour (Stowell et al., 2001), such 
that in relatively low-stress contexts mindfulness is unlikely to enhance coping responses 
as individuals are likely to cope relatively well, whereas in relatively high-stress settings, 
mindfulness should positively influence individuals’ coping responses. This possibility has 
not been tested to-date, and Studies 1 to 3 of the present thesis are the first studies the author 
is aware of to do so. As shown in Figures 12 and 13, mindfulness manipulations interacted 
with perceived stress to predict less avoidance coping more consistently than they predicted 
greater approach coping. 
 These findings suggest that being mindful has differential effects in lowering 
avoidance coping as a function of individuals stress perceptions, whereas these moderation 
effects may not occur for approach coping – or at least not as consistently. Mindfulness – 
and particularly mindful-acceptance, for which the largest interaction effects were observed 
across Studies 1 to 3 – involves noticing and accepting present-moment experiences, 
whether pleasant, unpleasant or neutral in tone (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992). In the context of 
stressful or aversive experiences, being mindful involves not seeking to psychologically 
avoid unpleasant experiences as they occur (Hayes et al., 2006). In-turn, a greater 
willingness to experience unpleasant experiences involves, almost by definition, fewer 
efforts to avoid contacting them, which is likely to involve reduced self-distraction and 
behavioural disengagement (i.e., avoidance coping behaviours). Support for these 
interaction effects on avoidance coping were found with both event-specific perceived 
stress (Studies 2 and 3) as well as general monthly perceived stress (Studies 1 and 3) as 
moderators, suggesting this effect is robust across both situation-specific stress and general 
perceived stress. 
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On the other hand, the effects of mindfulness on approach coping appear to be less 
consistently a function of perceived stress. Manipulations of mindfulness – and particularly 
mindful-acceptance – predicted greater approach coping across levels of perceived stress 
(i.e., main effects in Studies 2 and 3), but not consistently as a function of it (i.e., as a 
moderation effect). This suggests that in relatively high-stress contexts, being more mindful 
does not necessarily function to enhance approach coping. This may be because approach 
coping is a more distal outcome of mindfulness than avoidance coping: One may be in the 
presence of unpleasant experiences and, by being mindful, not seek to avoid them (i.e., less 
avoidance coping), but this does not necessitate taking additional actions to directly remove 
the stressor, such as making plans or strategies to deal with the stressor or taking direct 
actions to remove it or attenuate its effects (i.e., approach coping).  
Taken together, these findings suggest that as levels of perceived stress increase 
between individuals, the effects of mindfulness on coping responses narrow in scope but 
strengthen in intensity: as stress levels increase, mindfulness has increasingly large effects 
on proximal outcomes such as avoidance coping, but this is less the case for more distal 
outcomes such as approach coping. Several studies have reported results that are consistent 
with this interpretation. For example, Halland et al. (2015) found that a shortened form of 
the MBSR program enhanced approach coping (as a main effect), and interacted with 
neuroticism to predict less avoidance coping. The tendency toward being neurotic has been 
shown to be strongly correlated with greater perceived stress and negative emotion 
(Mohiyeddini et al., 2015). Consistent with the findings of the present thesis, Halland et al. 
(2015) found that as levels of neuroticism increase, the effects of mindfulness become 
increasingly large in reducing avoidance coping, but this was not the case for approach 
coping.  
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Further evidence for the differential effects of mindfulness on approach and 
avoidance coping come from Weinstein et al. (2009), who found that individual differences 
in mindfulness predicted less avoidance coping but not more approach coping in relatively 
high-threat situations (laboratory-induced social threat and threat associated with academic 
performance), while they found significant effects on both approach and avoidance coping 
following more benign daily and monthly naturally-occurring stress. Lastly, Tacón et al. 
(2003) found that among women suffering from heart disease (and likely to be relatively 
stressed) a mindfulness intervention resulted in less reactive and impulsive responses to 
stress, but not more approach-oriented responding.  
 In sum, the findings of this thesis provide valuable insights into the function of 
individual stress-perceptions in moderating the effects of mindfulness interventions on 
coping responses. They suggest that as levels of perceived stress (both situation-specific 
and general stress) increase between individuals, being more mindful is likely to inhibit 
avoidant forms of responding, such as conflict avoidance, blame shifting, distraction and 
even denial. On the other hand, effects on approach coping appear to be less reliably a 
function of individual differences in stress.  
Mindfulness components (acceptance and cognitive defusion) as predictors of 
enhanced coping 
In Studies 3 and 4, the effects of acceptance and cognitive defusion on enhanced 
coping responses were tested for. As discussed in the Main effects of mindfulness on coping 
section above, there is substantial experimental evidence that acceptance enhances 
individuals’ willingness to engage with aversive experiences. Similar experimental 
evidence has been found for cognitive defusion, with cognitive defusion manipulations 
resulting in less emotional discomfort and believability of aversive self-relevant thoughts 
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(Mandavia et al., 2015; Masuda, Feinstein, et al., 2010; Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda, 
Twohig, et al., 2010). In the context of stressful events, I therefore expected that both 
acceptance and cognitive defusion would inhibit the tendency to avoid engaging with a 
stressor (avoidance coping) and increase individuals’ willingness to directly engage with 
and seek to resolve it (approach coping). Notably, the effect-sizes for other components of 
mindfulness, such as present-centered awareness and experiencing the self as the observer 
of experience, on related outcomes are smaller than for acceptance and cognitive defusion 
(Levin et al., 2012), justifying the focus on these two mindfulness components in Studies 
3 and 4 of this thesis. The findings from this thesis for the effects of both acceptance and 
cognitive defusion on coping responses are now discussed in-turn. 
Acceptance and coping responses 
In Study 3, the acceptance manipulation predicted both enhanced approach and 
reduced avoidance coping following a social comparison stress manipulation, with 
medium-sized effects. The findings from the MBSR-adapted intervention in Study 2, which 
emphasized acceptance and self-compassion, are also consistent with these results, showing 
increases in approach and reductions in avoidance coping following the intervention. 
Further evidence for this was found in Study 4, where greater between-subjects acceptance 
predicting less avoidance and greater approach coping (as an interaction with stressor 
control), in the context of daily stressful events. Similar effects were also found in Study 4 
from within-subjects, within-day analyses, though only on avoidance coping and not with 
approach coping.  
These findings suggest that acceptance plays an important role in reducing 
avoidance coping following both relatively acute (Study 3) and more benign stressors 
(Study 4). As discussed above, acceptance enhances an individuals’ willingness to be in the 
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presence of unpleasant thoughts and feelings (Bishop, et al., 2004; Hayes et al, 2006). In-
turn, greater willingness to experience aversive experiences opens up the person’s options 
for responding, making avoidant responses less likely (Studies 3 and 4) and making 
approach-type responses more likely (Study 3).  
An explanation for the lack of effects of acceptance on approach coping in Study 4, 
as well as the relatively small effects for acceptance on avoidance coping in that study, 
relates to the measurement of acceptance. The single-item measure of acceptance used in 
Study 4 did not predict the trait measure of acceptance used as a validation measure (see 
Appendix C). This suggests that the measure of acceptance in this study was 
psychometrically problematic. The reason for the non-correlation between state and trait 
acceptance may have been that participants misinterpreted the negatively-worded measure 
of state acceptance in this study. The acceptance item, “To what degree did you seek to 
control or change thoughts and feelings associated with this experience” (i.e., a measure of 
non-acceptance), may not have been perceived as non-acceptance of thoughts and feelings 
for some participants. Instead, some individuals may have tried to positively reframe the 
stressful experience or made a plan for how to resolve it, both of which involve changing 
thoughts relating to the stressful experience, but may not have been non-accepting in nature. 
Subsequent studies of acceptance via a single-item measure would benefit from using a 
more valid and reliable measure of the construct. This methodological short-coming in 
Study 4 in-turn likely weakened the otherwise consistent pattern of results in this thesis 
suggesting that acceptance, and in particular self-acceptance and self-compassion, 
enhances approach and inhibits avoidance coping responses.  
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Cognitive defusion and coping responses 
In Study 4, cognitive defusion predicted less avoidance and more approach coping 
(as an interaction with stressor control) – as between-subjects effects, as within-subjects 
within-day effects, and as within-subjects across-day effects. In that study, cognitive 
defusion had consistently larger effects on avoidance than on approach coping (for 
between-subjects effects, β = -.19 on avoidance, and β = .09 on approach; for within-
subjects within-day effects, β = -.22 on avoidance and β = .05 on approach). This basic 
trend is consistent with Studies 1 and 2, which found more consistent effects of mindfulness 
manipulations on avoidance than approach coping. These findings are also consistent with 
previous evidence that cognitive defusion manipulations result in reduced emotional 
discomfort with an aversive stimulus (Mandavia et al., 2015; Masuda, Feinstein, et al., 
2010; Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda, Twohig, et al., 2010). Emotional discomfort is 
associated with the avoidance of unpleasant thoughts and feelings and a reduced 
willingness to be in contact with such experience (Hayes et al., 1999; Hayes et al., 2006), 
which in-turn is linked to avoidance behaviour, such as self-distraction and behavioural 
disengagement (Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011). 
However, the findings relating to cognitive defusion from Study 3 are not consistent 
with those of Study 4. In the former, there was no evidence that a cognitive defusion 
induction resulted in greater approach or less avoidance than a self-affirmation or relaxation 
control. Moreover, main effects on both approach and avoidance were significantly less for 
the cognitive defusion manipulation than for the acceptance manipulation. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, the likely reason for this is that the cognitive defusion induction in Study 3 was 
relatively difficult for participants to engage with. As evidence for this, participants in the 
defusion induction group reported significantly more distraction during the induction than 
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those in the other three conditions, suggesting that they were not applying themselves to 
the task as much as those in the other conditions. Although several studies have used similar 
defusion exercises (e.g., Bach & Hayes, 2002; Bond & Bunce, 2000; Metzler, et al., 2000), 
it is possible that the instructions to ‘unhook’ from thoughts may have been too complex 
or difficult to engage with for relatively young participants situated in a classroom 
environment. For some participants, the cognitive defusion induction may have in-fact 
drawn participants further into their thoughts, rather than distancing from them, thereby 
undermining the impact of the induction on coping behaviours in Study 3. 
This suggests that future manipulations of cognitive defusion would benefit from 
ensuring the induction has acceptable ecological validity and is appropriately explained and 
introduced to participants. Alternatively, other cognitive defusion manipulations could be 
used that have consistently shown to influence hypothesized outcomes. One example of 
this is the ‘word repetition’ exercise that involves the repetition of (unwanted) words until 
they lose their literal meaning (Hayes et al., 1999). This has been used in several studies of 
cognitive defusion, emotional discomfort and the believability of aversive thoughts (e.g., 
Mandavia et al., 2015; Masuda, Feinstein, et al., 2010; Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda, 
Twohig, et al., 2010). 
Mindfulness components as predictors of enhanced coping independent of effects of 
stress-related appraisals 
 A final aim of this thesis was to test whether mindfulness components predict 
enhanced approach and less avoidance coping, controlling for the effects of stress-related 
appraisals on coping responses. This was the focus of Study 4. Lazarus and Folkman’s 
(1987) transactional theory of coping describes primary and secondary appraisals as 
predicting individuals’ coping responses. Primary appraisals are appraisals of the nature of 
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the stressor – as threatening, challenging, or as representing an opportunity (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1987). In this thesis, primary appraisal was measured as the extent to which a 
stressor was appraised as a threat, following similar approaches used in previous studies 
(Hodgins et al., 2010; Tomaka et al., 1993). On the other hand, secondary appraisals are 
appraisals regarding the individuals’ ability to influence or manage the stressor (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1987). In this thesis, secondary appraisals were operationalized as the 
individuals’ level of perceived self-efficacy regarding a stressful experience, following 
Chwalisz et al., (1992).  
 A key claim of the transactional theory is that stress-related cognitions (i.e., primary 
and secondary appraisals) predict subsequent responses to stress (Folkman et al., 1986). 
While there is strong theoretical and empirical support for this (Folkman et al., 1986; 
Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Lazarus, 1993), it may be that in addition to the form of 
individuals’ stress-related appraisals (i.e., primary and secondary appraisals), the 
relationship an individual has to such appraisals is also a valuable predictor of coping 
responses (Keng et al., 2011; Khoury et al., 2015). Mindfulness involves changing one’s 
relationship to thoughts and feelings (Hayes et al., 1999), so exploring effects of 
mindfulness components on coping responses is a way of examining this possibility. Study 
4 tested whether inter- and intra-individual differences in mindfulness components 
(acceptance and cognitive defusion) predicted more approach and less avoidance coping, 
beyond the effects of primary and secondary appraisals.  
 At both the between- and within-subjects levels of analysis, (primary) threat 
appraisals predicted more avoidance while (secondary) self-efficacy appraisals predicted 
less avoidance, consistent with previous research on stress appraisals and coping (Folkman 
et al., 1986; Franks & Roesch, 2006; Lazarus & Folkman, 1987). However beyond these 
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effects, cognitive defusion and acceptance each predicted less avoidance coping, both 
between- and within-subjects, independent of the effects of stress-related appraisals. These 
findings are the first evidence that the author is aware of showing that an individuals’ 
relationship to his or her stress-related cognitions (i.e., acceptance and cognitive defusion) 
predict less avoidant coping responses. 
 Notably, similar effects were not found as consistently for approach coping. Only 
cognitive defusion predicted enhanced approach coping (between- and within-subjects) 
independent of threat and self-efficacy appraisals. Similar effects were not found for 
acceptance, which, as discussed, may be due to the measure of acceptance used in Study 4. 
Also of note, the effect-sizes (at the between- and within-levels of analysis) for threat and 
self-efficacy appraisal were consistently larger than the mindfulness variables on approach 
coping, while the opposite was the case on avoidance coping.  
 This pattern of results suggests that mindfulness variables may be more important 
than stress-related appraisals in predicting less avoidance coping. This may be because 
avoiding engaging with a stressor (the measure of avoidance coping in Study 4) is a 
relatively immediate and non-cognitive response to a stressful situation (Blumberg, 2000; 
Cramer, 2000), while approach coping is a more elaborate, cognitively-complex response 
(i.e., taking steps to resolve a stressful situation). In the context of a stressful situation, 
defusing from and accepting stress-related cognitions may be enough to inhibit avoidant 
stress responses (Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011), while cognitive appraisals are less likely to 
have an impact on such responses. This explanation is consistent with findings from studies 
comparing the effects of acceptance and control manipulations on stress-responses, where 
acceptance manipulations consistently predicted less avoidance of aversive stimuli 
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(breathing in CO2-enriched air and receiving an electric shock) than efforts to control stress-
related cognitions and behaviour (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Gutiérrez et al., 2004).  
 On the other hand, to facilitate more approach forms of coping such as taking steps 
to directly resolve a stressful situation (the measure of approach coping in Study 4), a 
person’s cognitions in relation to the stressful event and their perceived capacity to 
influence the situation appear to be more important than for avoidance coping. In particular, 
the effect-sizes for self-efficacy appraisals were consistently the largest predictor of 
enhanced approach coping in Study 4. This suggests that only when an individual perceives 
him or herself as having the skills and personal resources to positively influence a stressful 
situation do such efforts occur, and is consistent with the research on self-efficacy and 
coping with stress (Benight & Bandura, 2004; Jex, et al., 2001). Cognitive defusion still 
predicted greater approach coping in Study 4, but with smaller effect-sizes than self-
efficacy appraisals. 
 In sum, Study 4 provided evidence that mindfulness components may be 
particularly important in inhibiting avoidance coping, consistent with findings from Studies 
1 to 3. However, Study 4 extended the findings of Studies 1 to 3 by showing that the effects 
of mindfulness components in reducing avoidant coping responses occur above and beyond 
the influence of stress-related appraisals (i.e., threat and self-efficacy appraisals). This 
pattern of results suggests that avoidance coping is a relatively cognitively basic response 
to stress, more easily influenced by mindfulness; while approach coping, on the other hand, 
is a more cognitively complex behaviour, meaning that mindfulness has less of an influence 
on it. 
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Contribution of the thesis to theories of mindfulness 
 Theories of mindfulness highlight its role in enhancing behavioural regulation in 
the presence of aversive experience (Brown et al., 2007; Hayes et al., 2006; Shapiro et al., 
2006). Mindfulness is claimed to increase individuals’ willingness to be exposed to 
aversive experiences and reduce reactivity to them, thereby expanding the range of possible 
responses and the flexibility of these responses (Hayes et al., 2006; Shapiro et al., 2006). 
In the context of coping with stress, it was expected that, by enhancing psychological 
acceptance and perspective-taking, greater mindfulness would result in less reactive and 
avoidant forms of coping and at the same time result in more efforts to resolve the stressful 
issue or make plans for how to do so (i.e., approach coping). 
 The findings of this thesis are generally consistent with this theoretical prediction, 
but add an important nuance to it. Namely, that the effects of mindfulness on stress-
responses are not uniform across both approach and avoidant coping responses. Instead, 
the findings of this thesis suggest that as stress increases, mindfulness has an increasingly 
large effect in reducing avoidance coping, but no parallel effect in increasing approach 
coping. As discussed, avoidance coping is a relatively proximal outcome of mindfulness. 
That is, the very behaviour of mindfulness – and especially acceptance, which had the 
largest effects on coping in this thesis – involves the non-avoidance of present-moment 
experience. By being non-avoidant with one’s internal experience (i.e., thoughts, feelings 
and sensations), avoidant coping behaviours such as self-distraction and behavioural 
disengagement are significantly less likely to occur (Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011), as these 
are public behaviours aimed at avoiding unwanted internal experience. 
 On the other hand, approach coping is a more distal outcome of enhanced 
mindfulness. It involves cognitions and actions aimed at directly resolving, or planning to 
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resolve, a stressful experience, as well as positive reappraisals that re-frame stressful events 
in a more positive light. These behaviours are not directly manipulated by mindfulness, 
which involves simply noticing and accepting moment-by-moment experience. In this 
thesis, I found less consistent evidence for perceived stress moderating the effects of 
mindfulness on enhanced approach coping. These findings suggest that in order for 
mindfulness to enhance approach coping behaviours, there needs to be a clear pathway to 
controlling the stressor or resolving it, as a means of down-regulating negative affect. The 
moderated effects of stressor control with mindfulness in Study 4 are consistent with this 
explanation; as are the findings of greater approach coping in Study 3, where there was a 
clear path to remediation following failure. 
 This general pattern of findings can be characterized as a ‘narrowing and 
intensifying’ effect of mindfulness: As negative affect increases for individuals, the 
benefits of mindfulness appear to narrow to have less of an influence on relatively distal 
outcomes (e.g., approach coping), but simultaneously intensify to have increasingly large 
effects on relatively proximal outcomes (e.g., avoidance coping). I expect that this is 
because as stress increases for a person, stress-related thoughts and feelings command an 
increasing amount of the person’s attention. In this context, any increases in mindfulness 
are directed toward being aware and accepting of such thoughts and feelings, which, in-
turn, is associated with less avoidant coping behaviour. Conversely, as stress increases, the 
individual has less and less attentional and affective capacity to engage in more distal 
approach coping behaviours.  
 This explanation of mindfulness processes is consistent with other stress-related 
theories, such as the conservation of resources model (Hobfoll, 1989), which suggests that 
individual responses to stress are aimed at conserving limited resources (e.g., energy, self-
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efficacy, security and social relationships). The present research suggests that being present 
with and not avoiding stressful experiences, as primed by mindfulness, may be an efficient 
way of the individual conserving energy, otherwise spent in rumination and worry. 
Moreover, as stress increases, this becomes an increasingly effective strategy compared 
with attempting more distal approach coping strategies, which have a less direct influence 
on the energy-depleting effects of stress-related anxiety and rumination. 
 Taken together, the present studies suggest that mindfulness has differentiated 
effects on individuals’ responses to stress as a function of how stressful such situations are 
appraised to be. Rather than opening up response options in similar ways, as proposed in 
previous theoretical accounts of how mindfulness works (e.g., Shapiro et al., 2006), our 
findings suggest that mindfulness has a differential effect on stress-related behaviour, 
which can be termed the ‘narrowing and intensifying’ effect of mindfulness. 
Contribution of the thesis to theories of coping with stress 
 This thesis makes a valuable addition to Lazarus and Folkman’s (1987) 
transactional theory of coping. According to their theory, coping responses are preceded 
(and can be predicted) by stress-related appraisals of two kinds: primary appraisals of 
threat, challenge or opportunity; and secondary appraisals of the individual’s capacity to 
influence the stressor. A key assumption of this theory is that the form of these appraisals 
(e.g., opportunity versus threat), or their acuity (e.g., high versus low threat), predict coping 
responses (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987). Rather than describing the form or frequency of 
specific stress-related cognitions, mindfulness describes the relationship an individual has 
with his or her cognitions and emotions (Hayes et al., 2006; Shapiro et al., 2006).  
 The finding in the present thesis that mindfulness – and particularly acceptance – 
predicted less avoidance and in some cases enhanced approach coping suggests that the 
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relationship an individual has to his or her stress-related thoughts and feelings is in-fact a 
valuable predictor of coping responses. In Study 4, I found evidence for this, independent 
of stress-related appraisals. Together, these findings suggest that measuring the 
relationship an individual has with their stress-related thoughts and feelings (e.g., mindful 
or accepting versus unmindful or non-accepting) is useful in examining the antecedents of 
individuals’ coping responses. In-turn, this has implications for the transactional theory of 
coping, suggesting that in studying coping responses, including a measure of the kind of 
relationship a person has with their stress-related cognitions is a useful adjunct to measuring 
primary and secondary appraisals.   
Practical implications of this thesis 
 There are three main practical implications from this thesis. First, the findings from 
Studies 2 and 3 suggest that acceptance, and self-acceptance in particular, has an important 
role to play in enhancing how individuals cope with stress. Both of these studies found 
significant increases in approach coping and reductions in avoidance coping following 
acceptance interventions. This suggests that for organisations or groups seeking to enhance 
individual resilience and coping with stress, an intervention that targets acceptance, self-
acceptance and self-compassion may be particularly useful. Importantly, cultivating 
acceptance does not imply that the stressful issues people face should then simply be 
tolerated, without any efforts to change them. Instead, acceptance as a mindfulness 
component describes the relationship a person has to their own thoughts and feelings: it is 
possible to be accepting but still seek to influence or reduce the impact of a stressor, as 
Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated. As an example of this, in Study 2, individuals in the MBSR-
adapted condition reported significantly greater planning and active efforts to address the 
stressor they identified than those in the waitlist condition, suggesting that it is possible to 
be accepting, but also to take direct action to reduce the impact of a stressful experience. 
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 Second, this thesis found that mindfulness, and acceptance in particular, inhibits 
avoidance coping more consistently than it enhances approach coping. This suggests that 
mindfulness and acceptance interventions would be most usefully targeted at reducing 
avoidant behaviours. In the workplace, examples of avoidant behaviours include conflict 
avoidance (i.e., covering over or avoiding having difficult but important conversations with 
colleagues when there are conflicting opinions or agendas), blame-shifting or denying links 
to potentially stressful or challenging issues, turning a blind eye to risky or problematic 
issues, or taking periods of leave to avoid stressful periods at work. All of these behaviours 
involve efforts to take an individual away from engaging with a stressful issue or 
experience. In work or other group settings where there are significant or ongoing stressful 
issues that need to be addressed for a group or team to function effectively, mindfulness 
skills – and particular mindful acceptance - may be of significant value.  
 A third and final practical contribution of this thesis relates to the effects of 
mindfulness on coping in high-stress settings. This thesis found that mindfulness (Studies 
1 and 2) and mindful-acceptance (Study 3) interventions resulted in less avoidance coping 
as a function of levels of perceived stress between individuals. However, similar effects 
were not consistently found for approach coping. This suggests that mindfulness 
interventions are likely to be particularly effective in terms of reducing avoidance coping 
behaviours among individuals experiencing relatively high levels of stress. In-turn, this has 
implications for high-stress environments such as stressful workplaces, including, for 
example, the defense-forces and other front-line law-enforcement and emergency services 
agencies, which tend to be the most stress-inducing places of work. For people working in 
these sorts of environments, mindfulness training should be particularly effective; and more 
specifically, should reduce avoidance behaviours, such as taking periods of extended leave 
of absence, not raising issues or concerns at work due to avoidance of potential conflict or 
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sanction, and using distraction or substances such as drugs and alcohol to avoid dealing 
directly with stressors. 
Limitations and future directions 
 This thesis has a number of limitations. First, all four studies in this thesis included 
students in their samples, limiting the applicability of its findings to a wider adult 
population. Studies 1 and 3 were both with undergraduate samples, while Studies 2 and 4 
included a mix of undergraduate, post-graduate students and university staff. Future studies 
of mindfulness and coping would benefit from drawing on non-student samples, for 
example working samples, to broaden the scope of this research. Examining these research 
questions among a high-stress working sample may be a particularly worthwhile replication 
and extension of the present thesis (following Josefsson et al., 2012 and Walach et al., 
2007), given the growing costs of stress-related illness in modern workplaces and the 
associated increasing interest in mindfulness in the workplace. 
 Second, there were potential short-comings with manipulations and measures of 
cognitive defusion and acceptance, respectively, in Studies 3 and 4 of this thesis. These 
issues mean that the findings in relation to mindfulness components in this thesis were 
perhaps less consistent than they otherwise would have been. In Study 3, the manipulation 
of cognitive defusion does not appear to have been efficacious. Subjects who received that 
intervention reported themselves as being significantly more distracted during it than those 
in the other three conditions of that study. Future studies of cognitive defusion and coping 
with stress should explore using other cognitive defusion manipulations that have more 
consistently been shown to influence outcomes related to coping. One candidate is the 
word-repetition manipulation used in several cognitive defusion studies (e.g., Mandavia et 
al., 2015; Masuda, Feinstein, et al., 2010; Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda, Twohig, et al., 
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2010). A laboratory replication of Study 3, using a different manipulation of cognitive 
defusion, would be a logical next step in this line of research. 
 In addition, the measure of acceptance used in Study 4 appears to have been 
problematic. Although self-report, multi-item scales generally display stronger 
psychometric properties than single-item scales (Fuchs, & Diamantopoulos, 2009), there is 
arguably value in studying coping responses as close to the stressor as is possible (Todd et 
al., 2004), meaning that daily or momentary reports of behaviour, with shorter scales, are 
often a necessity in this context. Future studies of acceptance as an intra- and inter-
individual difference predictor of coping with stress would benefit from using a well-
validated measure of acceptance. Although the other single-item measures used in Study 4 
appeared to have displayed acceptable psychometric properties, future studies of 
mindfulness and coping with daily stress would be well-served by using already-validated 
measures of all items, so as to minimize the likelihood of psychometric problems being 
identified for measures after they have been administered. 
 A third shortcoming of this thesis was the absence of process or mediating variables 
in any of the four studies. Mindfulness-based theoretical frameworks identify a number of 
mechanisms by which mindfulness is expected to have beneficial effects on outcomes of 
interest (e.g., Brown et al., 2007; Shapiro et al., 2006). For example, a well-cited mediator 
is ‘reperceiving’, or a shift in perspective from one’s thoughts and emotions as being the 
subject of one’s experience to these being an object of experience (Shapiro, et al., 2006; 
Teasdale et al., 2002). Although testing mediators of change for mindfulness on coping 
responses was not a goal of this thesis, doing so in future research would provide clearer 
insights into how mindfulness enhances coping responses. 
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 Finally, given the evidence that daily stressors have a larger impact on well-being 
than more acute stressors (Almeida, 2005; DeLongis & Holtzman, 2005), future research 
into mindfulness and coping would benefit from focusing on these kinds of stressors, as 
was done in Study 4 of this thesis.  
Conclusion  
 This thesis set out to explore three main research questions: first, whether 
mindfulness manipulations enhance approach and inhibit avoidance coping; second, 
whether perceived stress moderates these effects; and third, whether mindfulness 
components, namely acceptance and cognitive defusion, predict more approach and less 
avoidance coping. Although these issues were examined using a range of different methods, 
and the empirical studies in this thesis focused on coping with stress in a number of different 
contexts, several general conclusions nonetheless emerge from this work.  
 First, regarding main effects of mindfulness manipulations on enhancing approach 
and inhibiting avoidance coping, mindfulness appears to predict less avoidance coping 
more consistently than it does enhanced approach coping. This is in-line with previous 
research on mindfulness and coping that found similar results (Halland et al., 2015; Tacón 
et al., 2003; Weinstein et al., 2009), but makes a useful contribution to theories of 
mindfulness. In the context of stressful experiences, greater mindfulness is associated with 
less avoidance of the thoughts and feelings associated with such experiences, including less 
avoidance coping behaviours such as self-distraction, behavioural disengagement and 
denial. On the other hand, approach coping is a more distal and cognitively complex 
response to a stressful event that appears to be less directly linked to mindfulness 
behaviours.  
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 Regarding the second research question in the thesis, I found consistent evidence 
across three studies that mindfulness manipulations have increasingly large effects on 
coping responses as a function of individual perceived stress. This is the first evidence the 
author is aware of in support of this moderation effect, although it has been proposed 
elsewhere (Josefsson et al., 2012). I found that this moderation effect occurred most 
consistently for avoidance coping, and less so for approach coping. As discussed, this may 
be because as stress levels increase between individuals, the effects of enhanced 
mindfulness narrow in scope but strengthen in intensity. That is, their effects narrow to 
more proximal outcomes, and in terms of approach and avoidance coping, this means 
limiting effects to avoidance coping. However, I also found that these effects intensify: 
across Studies 1 to 3, the effects of mindfulness in reducing avoidance coping increased as 
a function of increases in perceived stress. This is a novel finding, suggesting that 
mindfulness may have its largest benefits for how people cope with stress in highly stressful 
contexts. 
 Third, the findings of this thesis suggest that acceptance may be a particularly 
valuable component of mindfulness, in terms of improving coping responses – and again, 
most consistently in reducing avoidance coping. Studies 3 and 4 found, respectively, that 
manipulations of and individual differences in acceptance predicted less avoidance coping, 
measured in two very different contexts: laboratory-induced social comparison stress in 
Study 3 and naturally-occurring daily stress in Study 4. In addition, the MBSR-adapted 
intervention in Study 2 contained considerable emphasis on acceptance and willingness to 
engage with aversive experiences, as well as self-compassion. Together, these findings 
suggest that acceptance, and especially self-acceptance and self-compassion, may have a 
particularly useful role to play in enhancing coping responses. In Study 4 I found evidence 
that cognitive defusion may also have a valuable role to play in predicting improved coping 
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responses – particularly less avoidant responses – though further research is needed to test 
this possibility. 
 Lastly, this thesis provides important theoretical insights to the study of mindfulness 
and stress responses. A first insight is that an individual’s relationship to his or her stress-
related appraisals (measured in this thesis via mindfulness, acceptance and cognitive 
defusion) is an important predictor of subsequent stress-responses, above and beyond the 
effects of primary and secondary appraisals. This adds to Lazarus and Folkman’s (1987) 
transactional theory of coping, highlighting an additional source of variance in individual 
coping responses beyond those included in the theory. Second, the findings of this thesis 
add a potentially valuable nuance to basic theories of mindfulness, suggesting that 
mindfulness may have effects on stress-responses that are a function of the levels of stress 
the person encounters. As levels of negative affect increase between individuals, 
mindfulness serves to narrow but intensify stress-responses, increasingly inhibiting 
avoidant behaviours but at the expense of enhancing approach responses. This suggests a 
kind of ipsative process whereby the effects of mindfulness become increasingly targeted 
at more proximal behaviours (i.e., reduced avoidance), but at the expense of more distal 
ones (i.e., enhanced approach). 
 Taken together, this thesis explored several under-researched areas of the 
mindfulness and coping literature. Although this research raises a number of still 
unresolved issues that need further examination, it makes a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of the efficacy of mindfulness as a means of enhancing individual 
behavioural responses to stressful events as they occur. In the context of rapidly growing 
interest in mindfulness as a stress-management tool, this thesis found that mindfulness is 
useful for enhancing responses to stress, beyond how such events make a person feel. In 
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particular, this suggests that interventions targeting acceptance, and self-acceptance in 
particular, are an effective means of enhancing responses to stress, especially for 
individuals navigating the demands of highly stressful roles. 
 
 167 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Affleck, G., Tennen, H., Urrows, S., Higgins, P. (1994). Person and Contextual Features 
of Daily Stress Reactivity: Individual Differences in Relations of Undesirable Daily 
Events With Mood Disturbance and Chronic Pain Intensity. Journal of Personality 
& Social Psychology, 66(2), 329–340. 
Agee, J. D., Danoff-Burg, S., & Grant, C. A. (2009). Comparing Brief Stress 
Management Courses in a Community Sample: Mindfulness Skills and Progressive 
Muscle Relaxation. Explore: The Journal of Science and Healing, 5(2), 104–109. 
doi:10.1016/j.explore.2008.12.004 
Aldwin, C. M. (1991). Does age affect the stress and coping process? Implications of age 
differences in perceived control. Journal of Gerontology, 46(4), P174–P180. 
Almeida, D. M. (2005). Resilience and vunerability to daily stressrs assessed via diary 
methods. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(2), 64–68. 
Antoniou, P., & Bebetsos, E. (2003). Psychological skills of Greek badminton athletes. 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 97(3), 1289–1296. doi:10.2466/pms.2003.97.3f.1289 
Arch, J. J., & Craske, M. G. (2006). Mechanisms of mindfulness: emotion regulation 
following a focused breathing induction. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44(12), 
1849–58. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.12.007 
Ayduk, O., Mischel, W., & Downey, G. (2002). Attentional Mechanisms Linking 
Rejection to Hostile Reactivity: The Role of “Hot” Versus “Cool” Focus. 
Psychological Science (Wiley-Blackwell), 13(5), 443–448. Retrieved from 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=7225327&site=e
host-live 
 168 
 
Bach, P., & Hayes, S. C. (2002). The use of acceptance and commitment therapy to 
prevent the rehospitalization of psychotic patients: a randomized controlled trial. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 70(5), 1129–1139. 
doi:10.1037/0022-006X.70.5.1129 
Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., Hopkins, J., Krietemeyer, J., & Toney, L. (2006). Using self-
report assessment methods to explore facets of mindfulness. Assessment, 13(1), 27–
45. doi:10.1177/1073191105283504 
Baer, R. A. (2003). Mindfulness Training as a Clinical Intervention, Clinical Psychology: 
Science and Practice, 10(2), 125–143. doi:10.1093/clipsy/bpg015 
Baraldi, A. N., & Enders, C. K. (2010). An introduction to modern missing data analyses. 
Journal of School Psychology, 48(1), 5–37. doi:10.1016/j.jsp.2009.10.001 
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Funder, D. C. (2007). Psychology as the Science of 
Self-Reports and Finger Movements. Psychological Science, 2(4), 396–403. 
Benight, C. C., & Bandura, A. (2004). Social cognitive theory of posttraumatic recovery: 
The role of perceived self-efficacy. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42(10), 1129–
1148. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2003.08.008 
Bergen-Cico, D., Possemato, K., & Cheon, S. (2013). Examining the efficacy of a brief 
mindfulness-based stress reduction (Brief MBSR) program on psychological health. 
Journal of American College Health, 61(6), 348–60. 
doi:10.1080/07448481.2013.813853 
Bergomi, C., Ströhle, G., Michalak, J., Funke, F., & Berking, M. (2013). Facing the 
dreaded: does mindfulness facilitate coping with distressing experiences? A 
moderator analysis. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 42(1), 21–30. 
 169 
 
doi:10.1080/16506073.2012.713391 
Bishop, S. R., Lau. M., Shapiro, S., Carlson, L., Anderson, N. D., Carmody, J., Segal, Z. 
V., Abbey, S., Speca, M., Velting, D. & Devins, G. (2004). Mindfulness: A 
Proposed Operational Definition. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 11(3), 
230–241. doi:10.1093/clipsy/bph077 
Blackledge, J. T. (2007). Disrupting Verbal Processes: Cognitive Defusion in Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy and Other Mindfulness-Based Psychotherapies. The 
Psychological Record, 57, 555–576. 
Blumberg, S. J. (2000). Guarding against Threatening HIV Prevention Messages: An 
Information-Processing Model. Health Education & Behavior, 27(6), 780–795. 
doi:10.1177/109019810002700611 
Bolger, N., & Laurenceau, J. P. (2013). Intensive longitudinal methods: An introduction 
to diary and experience sampling research. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Bollen, K. A. (1989). Structural equations with latent variables. New York: Wiley.  
Bond, F. W., & Bunce, D. (2000). Mediators of change in emotion-focused and problem-
focused worksite stress management interventions. Journal of Occupational Health 
Psychology, 5(1), 156–163. doi:10.1037/1076-8998.5.1.156 
Bond, F. W., Hayes, S. C., Baer, R. A., Carpenter, K. M., Guenole, N., Orcutt, H. K., … 
Zettle, R. D. (2011). Preliminary psychometric properties of the Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II: A revised measure of psychological inflexibility and 
experiential avoidance. Behavior Therapy, 42(4), 676–88. 
doi:10.1016/j.beth.2011.03.007 
Bond, F. W., Hayes, S. C., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2006). Psychological Flexibility, ACT, 
 170 
 
and Organizational Behavior. Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, 
26(1/2), 25–54. doi:10.1300/J075v26n01 
Bowen, S., & Marlatt, A. (2009). Surfing the urge: brief mindfulness-based intervention 
for college student smokers. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors: Journal of the 
Society of Psychologists in Addictive Behaviors, 23(4), 666–71. 
doi:10.1037/a0017127 
Brinkborg, H., Michanek, J., Hesser, H., & Berglund, G. (2011). Acceptance and 
commitment therapy for the treatment of stress among social workers: A randomized 
controlled trial. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49(6-7), 389–398. 
doi:10.1016/j.brat.2011.03.009 
Brown, K. W., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its 
role in psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
84(4), 822–848. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.4.822 
Brown, K. W., Ryan, R. M., & Creswell, J. D. (2007). Mindfulness : Theoretical 
Foundations and Evidence for its Salutary Effects. Psychological Inquiry: An 
International Journal of the Advancement of Psychological Theory, 18(4), 211–237. 
Brown, S., & Locker, E. (2009). Defensive responses to an emotive anti-alcohol message. 
Psychology & Health, 24(5), 517–528. doi:10.1080/08870440801911130 
Campbell-Sills, L., Barlow, D. H., Brown, T. A.., & Hofmann, S. G. (2006). Effects of 
suppression and acceptance on emotional responses of individuals with anxiety and 
mood disorders. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1251–1263. 
doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.10.001 
Cardaciotto, L., Herbert, J. D., Forman, E. M., Moitra, E., & Farrow, V. (2008). The 
 171 
 
assessment of present-moment awareness and acceptance: the Philadelphia 
Mindfulness Scale. Assessment, 15(2), 204–23. doi:10.1177/1073191107311467 
Carver, C. S. (1997). You want to measure coping but your protocol’s too long: consider 
the brief COPE. International Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 4(1), 92–100. 
doi:10.1207/s15327558ijbm0401_6 
Carver, C. S., & Connor-Smith, J. (2010). Personality and coping. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 61, 679–704. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100352 
Carver, C. S., Scheier, M. F., & Weintraub, J. K. (1989). Assessing coping strategies: a 
theoretically based approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(2), 
267–83. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2926629 
Caspi, A., Bolger, N., & Eckenrode, J. (1987). Linking person and context in the daily 
stress process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(1), 184–195. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.52.1.184 
Chamberlin, K. & Zika, S. (1990). The minor events approach to stress: Support for the 
use of daily hassles. British Journal of Psychology, 81(4), 469–481. 
Chambers, R., Lo, B. C. Y., & Allen, N. B. (2007). The impact of intensive mindfulness 
training on attentional control, cognitive style, and affect. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 32(3), 303–322. doi:10.1007/s10608-007-9119-0 
Chatzisarantis, N. L. D., & Hagger, M. S. (2007). Mindfulness and the intention-behavior 
relationship within the theory of planned behavior. Personality & Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 33(5), 663–76. doi:10.1177/0146167206297401 
Chawla, N., Collin, S., Bowen, S., Hsu, S., Grow, J., Douglass, A., & Marlatt, G. A. 
(2010). The mindfulness-based relapse prevention adherence and competence scale: 
 172 
 
development, interrater reliability, and validity. Psychotherapy Research: Journal of 
the Society for Psychotherapy Research, 20(4), 388–397. 
doi:10.1080/10503300903544257 
Chen, F. F. (2007). Sensitivity of goodness of fit indexes to lack of measurement 
invariance. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 14(3), 464–
504. doi:10.1080/10705510701301834 
Chen, G., Gully, S. M., & Eden, D. (2001). Validation of a new general self-efficacy 
scale. Organizational Research Methods, 4(1), 62–83. 
doi:10.1177/109442810141004 
Cheung, G. W., & Rensvold, R. B. (2002). Evaluating Goodness-of- Fit Indexes for 
Testing Measurement Invariance. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary 
Journal, 9(2), 233–255. doi:10.1207/S15328007SEM0902 
Chiesa, A. (2012). The Difficulty of Defining Mindfulness: Current Thought and Critical 
Issues. Mindfulness, 4(3), 255–268. doi:10.1007/s12671-012-0123-4 
Chiesa, A., & Serretti, A. (2011). Mindfulness based cognitive therapy for psychiatric 
disorders: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Psychiatry Research, 187(3), 441–
53. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2010.08.011 
Chwalisz, Kathleen, Altmaier, Elizabeth, M. and Russell, D. (1992). Causal attributions, 
self-efficacy cognitions, and coping with stress. Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology, 11(4), 377–400. 
Cohen, S., Karmarck, T., & Mermelstein, R. J. (1983). A global measure of perceived 
stress. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 385–396. 
Cook, S. W., & Heppner, P. P. (1997). A Psychometric Study of Three Coping Measures. 
 173 
 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 57(6), 906–923. 
doi:10.1177/0013164497057006002 
Cramer, P. (1998). Coping and Defense Mechanisms: What’s the Difference? Journal of 
Personality, 66(December), 919–946. 
Cramer, P. (2000). Defense mechanisms in psychology today: Further processes for 
adaptation. American Psychologist, 55(6), 637–646. doi:10.1037//0003-
066X.55.6.637 
Creswell, J. D., Lam, S., Stanton, A. L., Taylor, S. E., Bower, J. E., & Sherman, D. K. 
(2007). Does self-affirmation, cognitive processing, or discovery of meaning explain 
cancer-related health benefits of expressive writing? Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 33, 238–250. doi:10.1177/0146167206294412 
Crocker, J., Niiya, Y., & Mischkowski, D. (2008). Why does writing about important 
values reduce defensiveness? Self-affirmation and the role of positive other-directed 
feelings. Psychological Science, 19(7), 740–747. 
De Young, K. P., Lavender, J. M., Washington, L. A., Looby,  A., & Anderson, D. A. 
(2010). A controlled comparison of the Word Repeating Technique with a word 
association task. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 41(4), 
426–432. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2010.04.006 
Deisinger, J. A., Cassisi, J. E., & Whitaker, S. L. (1996). Relationships between coping 
style and PAI profiles in a community sample. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
52(3), 303–10. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-4679(199605)52:3<303::AID-
JCLP7>3.0.CO;2-S 
DeLongis, A., & Holtzman, S. (2005). Coping in context: the role of stress, social 
 174 
 
support, and personality in coping. Journal of Personality, 73(6), 1633–56. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2005.00361.x 
Doron, J., Trouillet, R., Gana, K., Boiché, J., Neveu, D., & Ninot, G. (2014). Examination 
of the Hierarchical Structure of the Brief COPE in a French Sample: Empirical and 
Theoretical Convergences. Journal of Personality Assessment, (May), 37–41. 
doi:10.1080/00223891.2014.886255 
Duangdao, K. M., & Roesch, S. C. (2008). Coping with diabetes in adulthood: a meta-
analysis. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 31(4), 291–300. doi:10.1007/s10865-008-
9155-6 
Dweck, C. S., & Elliott-Moskwa, E. S. (2010). Self-theories: The roots of defensiveness. 
In J. E. Maddux & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Social psychological foundations of clinical 
psychology (pp. 136–153). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Ehlers, A., & Breuer, P. (1996). How good are patients with panic disorder at perceiving 
their heartbeats? Biological Psychology, 42(1-2), 165–182. doi:10.1016/0301-
0511(95)05153-8 
Eifert, G. H., & Heffner, M. (2003). The effects of acceptance versus control contexts on 
avoidance of panic-related symptoms. Journal of Behavior Therapy and 
Experimental Psychiatry, 34(3-4), 293–312. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2003.11.001 
Enders, C. (2010). Applied missing data analysis. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Flaxman, P. E., Bond F. W., & Leventhal, F. (2013). The mindful and effective employee: 
An Acceptance & Commitment Therapy manual for improving well-being and 
performance. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger. 
Folkman, S., Lazarus, R. S., Dunkel-Schetter, C., DeLongis,  A., & Gruen, R. J. (1986). 
 175 
 
Dynamics of a stressful encounter: cognitive appraisal, coping, and encounter 
outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50(5), 992–1003. 
Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3712234 
Folkman, S., Lazarus, R. S., Gruen, R. J., & Delongis, A. (1986). Appraisal, Coping, 
Health Status, and Psychological Symptoms, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 50(3), 571–579. 
Folkman, S., & Moskowitz, J. T. (2004). Coping: pitfalls and promise. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 55, 745–74. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.141456 
Fontaine, K. R., Manstead, A. S. R., & Wagner, H. (1993). Optimism , perceived control 
over stress , and coping. European Journal of Personality, 7, 267–281. 
Franks, H. M., & Roesch, S. C. (2006). Appraisals and coping in people living with 
cancer: A meta-analysis. Psycho-Oncology, 15(12), 1027–1037. 
doi:10.1002/pon.1043 
Fuchs, C., & Diamantopoulos, A. (2009). Using single-item measures for construct 
measurement in management research: conceptual issues and application guidelines. 
Die Betriebswirtschaft, 69(2), 195–210. 
Gardner, D. G., Cummins, L. L., Dunham, R. B., & Pierce, J. L. (1998). Single-item 
versus multiple-item measurement scales: an empirical comparison. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 58(6), 898–915. doi:10.1177/1056492611432802 
Gaspard, H., Dicke, A., Flunger, B., Brisson, B. M., Häfner, I., Nagengast, B., Trautwein, 
U. (2015). Developmental Psychology Fostering Adolescents’ Value Beliefs for 
Mathematics With a Relevance Intervention in the Classroom. Developmental 
Psychology. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000028. 
 176 
 
Gianakos, I. (2002). Predictors of Coping With Work Stress: The Influences of Sex, 
Gender Role, Social Desirability, and Locus of Control, Sex Roles, 46(March), 149-
157. 
Gifford, E. V., Kohlenberg, B. S., Hayes, S. C., Antonuccio, D. O., Piasecki, M. M., 
Rasmussen-Hall, M. L., & Palm, K. M. (2004). Acceptance-based treatment for 
smoking cessation. Behavior Therapy, 35(4), 689–705. doi:10.1016/S0005-
7894(04)80015-7 
Gifford, E. V., Kohlenberg, B. S., Hayes, S. C., Pierson, H. M., Piasecki, M. P., 
Antonuccio, D. O., & Palm, K. M. (2011). Does Acceptance and Relationship 
Focused Behavior Therapy Contribute to Bupropion Outcomes? A Randomized 
Controlled Trial of Functional Analytic Psychotherapy and Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy for Smoking Cessation. Behavior Therapy, 42(4), 700–715. 
doi:10.1016/j.beth.2011.03.002 
Gillanders, D. T., Bolderston, H., Bond, F. W., Dempster, M., Flaxman, P. E., Campbell, 
L., … Remington, B. (2014). The development and initial validation of the cognitive 
fusion questionnaire. Behavior Therapy, 45(1), 83–101. 
doi:10.1016/j.beth.2013.09.001 
Glomb, T. M., Duffy, M. K., Bono, J. E., & Yang, T. (2012). Mindfulness at Work. 
Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management, 30, 115-157. 
Good, A., & Abraham, C. (2007). Measuring defensive responses to threatening 
messages: a meta-analysis of measures. Health Psychology Review, 1(2), 208–229. 
doi:10.1080/17437190802280889 
Goyen, M. J., & Anshel, M. H. (1998). Sources of acute competitive stress and use of 
coping strategies as a function of age and gender. Journal of Applied Developmental 
 177 
 
Psychology, 19(3), 469–486. doi:10.1016/S0193-3973(99)80051-3 
Graham, J. W. (2009). Missing data analysis: making it work in the real world. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 60, 549–576. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085530 
Graham, J., Olchowski, A., & Gilreath, T. (2007). How many imputations are really 
needed? Some practical clarifications of multiple imputation theory. Prevention 
Science, 8, 206–213. doi:10.1007/s11121-007-0070-9 
Gutiérrez, O., Luciano, C., Rodríguez, M., & Fink, B. C. (2004). Comparison between an 
acceptance-based and a cognitive-control-based protocol for coping with pain. 
Behavior Therapy, 35(4), 767–783. doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(04)80019-4 
Halland, E., de Vibe, M, Solhaug, I., Friborg, O., Rosenvinge, J. H., Tyssen, R., Sorlie, 
T., & Bjorndal, A. (2015). Mindfulness Training Improves Problem-Focused Coping 
in Psychology and Medical Students: Results From a Randomized Controlled Trial. 
College Student Journal, 49(3), 387–399. 
Haney, C. J., & Long, B. C. (1995). Coping Effectiveness: A Path Analysis of Self-
Efficacy, Control, Coping, and Performance in Sport Competitions. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 25(19), 1726–1746. doi:10.1111/j.1559-
1816.1995.tb01815.x 
Harnett, D., & Carr, A. (2013). Leaves on a stream: The effectiveness of a mindfulness-
based exercise on the frequency, and difficulty in “letting go” of anxious self-
statements. Journal of Articles in Support of the Null Hypothesis, 10(1), 41–52. 
Retrieved from http://www.jasnh.com/pdf/Vol10-No1-article4.pdf 
Hayes, S. C., Luoma, J. B., Bond, F. W., Masuda, A., & Lillis, J. (2006). Acceptance and 
 178 
 
commitment therapy: model, processes and outcomes. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 44(1), 1–25. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.06.006 
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy: An experiential approach to behaviour change. New York, NY: Guilford 
Press. 
Hayes, S. C., Wilson, K. G., Gifford, E. V., Bissett, R., Piasecki, M., Batten, S. V., 
Gregg, J. (2004). A preliminary trial of twelve-step facilitation and acceptance and 
commitment therapy with polysubstance-abusing methadone-maintained opiate 
addicts. Behavior Therapy, 35(4), 667–688. doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(04)80014-5 
Hayes, S. C & Fletcher, L. (2005). Relational Frame Theory, Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy and a Functional Analytic Definition of Mindfulness. Journal 
of Rational Emotive and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, 23(4), 1–28. 
Heppner, W. L., Kernis, M. H., Lakey, C. E., Campbell, W. K., Goldman, B. M., Davis, 
P. J., & Cascio, E. V. (2008). Mindfulness as a means of reducing aggressive 
behavior: dispositional and situational evidence. Aggressive Behavior, 34(5), 486–
96. doi:10.1002/ab.20258 
Hobfoll, S. E. (1989). Conservation of resources. A new attempt at conceptualizing stress. 
The American Psychologist, 44(3), 513–524. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.44.3.513 
Hodgins, H. S., Weibust, K. S., Weinstein, N., Shiffman, S., Miller, A., Coombs, G., & 
Adair, K. C. (2010). The cost of self-protection: threat response and performance as 
a function of autonomous and controlled motivations. Personality & Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 36(8), 1101–14. doi:10.1177/0146167210375618 
Hofmann, S. G., Sawyer, A. T., Witt, A. A., & Oh, D. (2010). The effect of mindfulness-
 179 
 
based therapy on anxiety and depression: A meta-analytic review. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 78(2), 169–83. doi:10.1037/a0018555 
Hong, Y., Chui, C., Dweck, C. S., Lin, D. M.-S. and Wan, W. (1999). Implicit Theories, 
Attributions, and Coping: A Meaning System Approach. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 77(3), 588–599. 
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure 
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation 
Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 6(1), 1–55. 
doi:10.1080/10705519909540118 
Hülsheger, U. R., Alberts, H. J. E. M., Feinholdt, A., & Lang, J. W. B. (2012). Benefits of 
Mindfulness at Work: The Role of Mindfulness in Emotion Regulation, Emotional 
Exhaustion, and Job Satisfaction. Journal of Applied Psychology, 98(2), 310–325. 
doi:10.1037/a0031313 
Jain, S., Shapiro, S. L., Swanick, S., Roesch, S. C., Mills, P. J., Bell, I., & Schwartz, G. E. 
R. (2007). A randomized controlled trial of mindfulness meditation versus relaxation 
training: effects on distress, positive states of mind, rumination, and distraction. 
Annals of Behavioral Medicine: A Publication of the Society of Behavioral 
Medicine, 33(1), 11–21. doi:10.1207/s15324796abm3301_2 
Jex, S. M., Bliese, P. D., Buzzell, S. and Primeau, J. (2001). The Impact of Self-Efficacy 
on Stressor-Strain Relations: Coping Style as an Explanatory Mechanism. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 86(3), 401–409. 
Jorm, A. F, Morgan, A. J., & Hetrick, S. E. (2008). Relaxation for depression (Review). 
The Cochrane Library, (4). doi:10.1002/14651858.CD007142.pub2 
 180 
 
Josefsson, T., Lindwall, M., & Broberg, A. G. (2012). The Effects of a Short-term 
Mindfulness Based Intervention on Self-reported Mindfulness, Decentering, 
Executive Attention, Psychological Health, and Coping Style: Examining Unique 
Mindfulness Effects and Mediators. Mindfulness. doi:10.1007/s12671-012-0142-1 
Kabat-Zinn, J., Massion, A. O., Kristeller, J., Peterson, L. G., Fletcher, K. E., Pbert, L., 
Santorelli, S. F. (1992). Effectiveness of a Meditation-Based Stress Reduction 
Program in the Treatment of Anxiety Disorders. American Journal of Psychiatry, 
149(7), 936–943. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1992JB01500014 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1990). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind 
to face stress, pain, and illness. New York, NY: Dell. 
Kapsou, M., Panayiotou, G., Kokkinos, C. M., & Demetriou, A. G. (2010). 
Dimensionality of coping: an empirical contribution to the construct validation of the 
brief-COPE with a Greek-speaking sample. Journal of Health Psychology, 15(2), 
215–29. doi:10.1177/1359105309346516 
Karekla, M., & Panayiotou, G. (2011). Coping and experiential avoidance: unique or 
overlapping constructs? Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 
42(2), 163–70. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2010.10.002 
Kato, T. (2013). Frequently Used Coping Scales: A Meta-Analysis. Stress and Health : 
Journal of the International Society for the Investigation of Stress. 
doi:10.1002/smi.2557 
Keng, S.-L., Smoski, M. J., & Robins, C. J. (2011). Effects of mindfulness on 
psychological health: a review of empirical studies. Clinical Psychology Review, 
31(6), 1041–56. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2011.04.006 
 181 
 
Kessels, L. T. E., Ruiter, R. A. C., Brug, J., & Jansma, B. M. (2011). The effects of 
tailored and threatening nutrition information on message attention. Evidence from 
an event-related potential study. Appetite, 56(1), 32–8. 
doi:10.1016/j.appet.2010.11.139 
Kessels, L. T. E., Ruiter, R. A. C., & Jansma, B. M. (2010). Increased attention but more 
efficient disengagement: neuroscientific evidence for defensive processing of 
threatening health information. Health Psychology: Official Journal of the Division 
of Health Psychology, American Psychological Association, 29(4), 346–354. 
doi:10.1037/a0019372 
Kessler, R. C., Andrews, G., Colpe, L. J., Hiripi, E., Mroczek, D. K., Normand, S. L. T., 
Zaslavsky, A. M. (2002). Short screening scales to monitor population prevalences 
and trends in non-specific psychological distress. Psychological Medicine, 32(6), 
959–976. doi:10.1017/S0033291702006074 
Kessler, R. C., Barker, P. R., Colpe, L. J., Epstein, J. F., Gfroerer, J. C., Hiripi, E., Alan, 
A. M. (2003). Screening for serious mental illness in the general population. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 60(2), 184–189. 
Khoury, B., Lecomte, T., Fortin, G., Masse, M., Therien, P., Bouchard, V., Hofmann, S. 
G. (2013). Mindfulness-based therapy: a comprehensive meta-analysis. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 33(6), 763–71. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2013.05.005 
Khoury, B., Sharma, M., Rush, S. E., & Fournier, C. (2015). Mindfulness-based stress 
reduction for healthy individuals: A meta-analysis. Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 78(6), 519–528. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychores.2015.03.009 
Kleiber, C. & Zeileis, A. (Eds.). (2008). Applied Econometrics with R. Retrieved from 
http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-0-387-77318-
 182 
 
6/page/1\npapers3://publication/uuid/D8338B50-36A6-434B-B720-
6AAB90F1E36A 
Klein, W. M. P., Blier, H. K., & Janze, A. M. (2001). Maintaining Positive Self-
Evaluations: Reducing Attention to Diagnostic but Unfavorable Social Comparison 
Information When General Self-Regard is Salient. Motivation and Emotion, 25(1), 
23–40. 
Koestner, R., & Zuckerman, M. (1994). Causality orientations, failure, and achievement. 
Journal of Personality, 64, 321–346. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1994.tb00300.x 
Kramer, U. (2010). Coping and defence mechanisms: what’s the difference?--second act. 
Psychology and Psychotherapy, 83(Pt 2), 207–21. doi:10.1348/147608309X475989 
Lakey, C. E., Campbell, W. K., Brown, K. W., & Goodie, A. S. (2007). Dispositional 
Mindfulness as a Predictor of the Severity of Gambling Outcomes. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 43(7), 1698–1710. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2007.05.007 
Lau, M. A., Bishop, S. R., Buis, T., Anderson, N. D., Carlson, L., & Carmody, J. (2006). 
The Toronto Mindfulness Scale: Development and Validation. Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 62(12), 1445–1467. doi:10.1002/jclp 
Lazarus, R. S. (1993). Coping theory and research: past, present, and future. 
Psychosomatic Medicine, 55(3), 234–47. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8346332 
Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1987). Transactional theory and research on emotions and 
coping. European Journal of Personality, 1(3), 141–169. 
doi:10.1002/per.2410010304 
Levin, M. E., Hildebrandt, M. J., Lillis, J., & Hayes, S. C. (2012). The Impact of 
 183 
 
Treatment Components Suggested by the Psychological Flexibility Model: A Meta-
Analysis of Laboratory-Based Component Studies. Behavior Therapy, 43, 741–756. 
doi:10.1016/j.beth.2012.05.003 
Levitt, J. T., Brown, T. A., Orsillo, S. M., & Barlow, D. H. (2004). The effects of 
acceptance versus suppression of emotion on subjective and psychophysiological 
response to carbon dioxide challenge in patients with panic disorder. Behavior 
Therapy, 35(4), 747–766. doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(04)80018-2 
Linehan, M. M. (1993). Cognitive-behavioral treatment of borderline personality 
disorder. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Little, T. D. (2013). Longitudinal structural equation modeling. New York: Guilford 
Press. 
Lu, L. (1991). Daily hassles and mental health: A longitudinal study. British Journal of 
Psychology, 82, 441–447. 
Lyne, K., & Roger, D. (2000). A psychometric re-assessment of the COPE questionnaire. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 29(2), 321–335. doi:10.1016/S0191-
8869(99)00196-8 
Mandavia, A., Masuda, A., Moore, M., Mendoza, H., Donati, M. R., & Cohen, L. L. 
(2015). The application of a cognitive defusion technique to negative body image 
thoughts: A preliminary analogue investigation. Journal of Contextual Behavioral 
Science, 4(2), 86–95. doi:10.1016/j.jcbs.2015.02.003 
Manocha, R., Black, D., Sarris, J., & Stough, C. (2011). A randomized, controlled trial of 
meditation for work stress, anxiety and depressed mood in full-time workers. 
Evidence-Based Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 2011. 
 184 
 
doi:10.1155/2011/960583 
Manzoni, G. M., Pagnini, F., Castelnuovo, G., & Molinari, E. (2008). Relaxation training 
for anxiety: a ten-years systematic review with meta-analysis. BMC Psychiatry, 8, 
41. doi:10.1186/1471-244X-8-41 
Masuda, A., Feinstein, A. B., Wendell, J. W., & Sheehan, S. T. (2010). Cognitive 
defusion versus thought distraction: a clinical rationale, training, and experiential 
exercise in altering psychological impacts of negative self-referential thoughts. 
Behavior Modification, 34, 520–538. doi:10.1177/0145445510379632 
Masuda, A., Hayes, S. C., Sackett, C. F., & Twohig, M. P. (2004). Cognitive defusion and 
self-relevant negative thoughts: Examining the impact of a ninety year old technique. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 477–485. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2003.10.008 
Masuda, A., Twohig, M. P., Stormo, A. R., Feinstein, A. B., Chou, Y. Y., & Wendell, J. 
W. (2010). The effects of cognitive defusion and thought distraction on emotional 
discomfort and believability of negative self-referential thoughts. Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 41(1), 11–17. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2009.08.006 
McCallie, M. S., Blum, C. M. & Hood, C. J. (2008). Progressive Muscle Relaxation. 
Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment, 13(3), 51–66. 
doi:10.1300/J137v13n03 
McCracken, L. M., & Yang, S. (2008). A contextual cognitive-behavioral analysis of 
rehabilitation workers’ health and well-being: Influences of acceptance, mindfulness, 
and values-based action. Rehabilitation Psychology, 53(4), 479–485. 
McQueen, A., & Klein, W. M. P. (2006). Experimental manipulations of self-affirmation: 
 185 
 
A systematic review. Self and Identity, 5(4), 289–354. 
doi:10.1080/15298860600805325 
Medco. (2011). America’s state of mind. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1148663 
Medibank. (2008). The Cost of Workplace Stress in Australia Medibank Private and 
Workplace Health. Econtech. Retrieved from http://www.medibank.com.au/ 
Metzler, C. W., Biglan,  A., Noell, J., Ary, D. V., & Ochs, L. (2000). A randomized 
controlled trial of a behavioral intervention to reduce high-risk sexual behavior 
among adolescents in STD clinics. Behavior Therapy, 31, 27–54. Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0005789400800039 
Millsap, R. E. (2011). Statistical approaches to measurement invariance. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Millsap, R. E., & Meredith, W. (2007). Factorial invariance: Historical perspectives and 
new problems. In R. Cudeck & R. MacCallum (Eds.) Factor analysis at 100 (pp. 
131-152) Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.  
Mohiyeddini, C., Bauer, S., & Semple, S. (2015). Neuroticism and stress: the role of 
displacement behavior. Anxiety, Stress, and Coping, 28(4), 391–407. 
doi:10.1080/10615806.2014.1000878 
Mueller, C. M., & Dweck, C. S. (1998). Praise for intelligence can undermine children’s 
motivation and performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(1), 
33–52. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.75.1.33 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (2004). Worker health chartbook 
(Publication no. 2003-46). Cincinnati, OH: Author. 
 186 
 
Neff, K. D., Hsieh, Y.-P., & Dejitterat, K. (2005). Self-compassion, Achievement Goals, 
and Coping with Academic Failure. Self and Identity, 4(3), 263–287. 
Neff, K. D., Kirkpatrick, K. L., & Rude, S. S. (2007). Self-compassion and adaptive 
psychological functioning. Journal of Research in Personality, 41(1), 139–154. 
doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2006.03.004 
Nicholls, A. R., & Polman, R. C. J. (2007). Coping in sport: A systematic review. Journal 
of Sports Sciences, 25(1), 11–31. doi:10.1080/02640410600630654 
Nussbaum, A. D., & Dweck, C. S. (2008). Defensiveness versus remediation: self-
theories and modes of self-esteem maintenance. Personality & Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 34(5), 599–612. doi:10.1177/0146167207312960 
OECD. (2014). Making Mental Health Count. Making Mental Health Count, (July), 1–8. 
doi:10.1787/9789264208445-en 
OECD. (2015). Fit Mind, Fit Job: From Evidence to Practice in Mental Health and 
Work. Mental Health and Work, OECD Publishing, Paris. doi:http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/employment/fit-mind-fit-job_9789264228283-en 
Öst, L. G. (2008). Efficacy of the third wave of behavioral therapies: A systematic review 
and meta-analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(3), 296–321. 
doi:10.1016/j.brat.2007.12.005 
Öst, L.-G. (2014). The efficacy of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: An updated 
systematic review and meta-analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 61, 105–
121. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2014.07.018 
Ostafin, B. D., & Kassman, K. T. (2012). Stepping out of history: mindfulness improves 
insight problem solving. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2), 1031–6. 
 187 
 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.02.014 
Páez-Blarrina, M., Luciano, C., Gutiérrez-Martínez, O., Valdivia, S., Ortega, J., & 
Rodríguez-Valverde, M. (2008). The role of values with personal examples in 
altering the functions of pain: Comparison between acceptance-based and cognitive-
control-based protocols. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(1), 84–97. 
doi:10.1016/j.brat.2007.10.008 
Palmer, Angèle & Rodger, S. (2009). Mindfulness, Stress, and Coping Among University 
Students. Canadian Journal of Counselling, 43(3), 198–212. 
Parent-Thirion, A., Macais, E. F., Hurley, J. & Vermeylen, G. (2007). Fourth European 
working conditions survey. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions. 
Park, C. L., Armeli, S., & Tennen, H. (2004). Appraisal-coping goodness of fit: a daily 
internet study. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 558–569. 
doi:10.1177/0146167203262855 
Park, C. L., Fenster, J. R., Suresh, D. P., & Bliss, D. E. (2006). Social support, appraisals, 
and coping as predictors of depression in congestive heart failure patients. 
Psychology & Health, 21(6), 773–789. doi:10.1080/14768320600682368 
Penley, J. A., Tomaka, J., & Wiebe, J. S. (2002). The association of coping to physical 
and psychological health outcomes: a meta-analytic review. Journal of Behavioral 
Medicine, 25(6), 551–603. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12462958 
Pensgaard, A.M., Ursin, H., & Roberts, G.C. (1999). Motivational factors and coping 
strategies of Norwegian Paralympic and Olympic winter sport athletes. Adapted 
 188 
 
Physical Activity Quarterly, 16, 238-250. 
Poulin, P. A., Mackenzie, C. S., Soloway, G., & Karayolas, E. (2008). Mindfulness 
training as an evidence-based approach to reducing stress and promoting well-being 
among human services professionals. International Journal of Health Promotion & 
Education, 46(March), 72–80. doi:10.1080/14635240.2008.10708132 
Preacher, K. J., Zhang, Z., & Zyphur, M. J. (2015). Multilevel Structural Equation 
Models for Assessing Moderation Within and Across Levels of Analysis. 
Psychological Methods. Retrieved from 
http://www.quantpsy.org/pubs/preacher_zhang_zyphur_(in.press).pdf 
Ptacek, J. T., Smith, R. E., & Zanas, J. (1992). Gender, Appraisal, and Coping: A 
Longitudinal Analysis. Journal of Personality, 60(4), 747–770. 
Ptacek, J. T., Smith, R. E., Espe, K. & Raffety, B. (1994). Limited Correspondence 
Between Daily Coping Reports and Retrospective Coping Recall. Psychological 
Assessment, 6(1), 41–49. 
R Core Team (2015). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Australia. URL https://www.R-
project.org/. 
Raes, F., Pommier, E., Neff, K. D., & Van Gucht, D. (2011). Construction and factorial 
validation of a short form of the Self-Compassion Scale. Clinical Psychology & 
Psychotherapy, 18(3), 250–5. doi:10.1002/cpp.702 
Rayburn, N. R., Wenzel, S. L., Elliott, M. N., Hambarsoomians, K., Marshall, G. N., & 
Tucker, J. S. (2005). Trauma, depression, coping, and mental health service seeking 
among impoverished women. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 73(4), 
 189 
 
667–677. doi:10.1037/0022-006X.73.4.667 
Reb, J., & Narayanan, J. (2014). The Influence of Mindful Attention on Value Claiming 
in Distributive Negotiations: Evidence from Four Laboratory Experiments. 
Mindfulness, 5(6), 756–766. doi:10.1007/s12671-013-0232-8 
Reb, J., Narayanan, J., & Chaturvedi, S. (2012). Leading Mindfully: Two Studies on the 
Influence of Supervisor Trait Mindfulness on Employee Well-Being and 
Performance. Mindfulness, 1(1). doi:10.1007/s12671-012-0144-z 
Reb, J. & Narayan, J. (2013). The Influence of Mindful Attention on Value Claiming in 
Distributive Negotiations: Evidence from Four Laboratory Experiments. 
Mindfulness, (Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business). 
Rippetoe, P. A., & Rogers, R. W. (1987). Effects of components of protection-motivation 
theory on adaptive and maladaptive coping with a health threat. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 52(3), 596–604. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3572727 
Roelofs, J., Peters, M. L., Patijn, J., Schouten, E. G.W., & Vlaeyen, J. W. S. (2004). 
Electronic diary assessment of pain-related fear, attention to pain, 
and pain intensity in chronic low back pain patients, Pain, 112(3), 335-342. 
Roesch, S. C., Adams, L., Hines, A., Palmores, A., Vyas, P., Tran, C., & Vaughn, A. A. 
(2005). Coping with prostate cancer: a meta-analytic review. Journal of Behavioral 
Medicine, 28(3), 281–93. doi:10.1007/s10865-005-4664-z 
Roth, S., & Cohen, L. J. (1986). Approach, avoidance, and coping with stress. The 
American Psychologist, 41(7), 813–9. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3740641 
 190 
 
Schafer, J. L., & Kang, J. (2008). Average causal effects from nonrandomized studies: A 
practical guide and simulated example. Psychological Methods, 13(4), 279–313. 
doi:10.1037/a0014268 
Schumacker, R. E., & Lomax, R. G. (2010). A Beginner’s Guide to Structural Equation 
Modeling. doi:10.1002/9781118133880.hop202023 
Schwartz, J. E, Neale, J., Marco, C, Shiffman, S. S., & Stone, A.A. (1999). Does Trait 
Coping Exist? A Momentary Assessment Approach to the Evaluation of Traits. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(2), 360–369. 
Sears, S., & Kraus, S. (2009). I Think Therefore I Om: Cognitive Distortions and Coping 
Style as Mediators for the Effects of Mindfulness Meditation on Anxiety, Positive 
and Negative Affect, and Hope. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 65(6), 561–573. 
doi:10.1002/jclp 
Sedlmeier, P., Eberth, J., Schwarz, M., Zimmermann, D., Haarig, F., Jaeger, S., & Kunze, 
S. (2012). The psychological effects of meditation: a meta-analysis. Psychological 
Bulletin, 138(6), 1139–71. doi:10.1037/a0028168 
Segal, Z. V., Teasdale, J. D., Williams, J. M., & Gemar, M. C. (2002). The mindfulness-
based cognitive therapy adherence scale: Inter-rater reliability, adherence to protocol 
and treatment distinctiveness. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 9, 131–138. 
doi:10.1002/cpp.320 
Serido, J., Almeida, D. M., & Wethington, E. (2004). Chronic stressors and daily hassles: 
unique and interactive relationships with psychological distress. Journal of Health 
and Social Behavior, 45(1), 17–33. doi:10.1177/002214650404500102 
 191 
 
Seymour L. & Grove, B. (2005). Workplace interventions for people with common mental 
health problems: Evidence, review and recommendations. London: British 
Occupational Health Research Foundation.  
Shapiro, S. L., Carlson, L. E., Astin, J. A., Freedman, B. (2006). Mechanisms of 
Mindfulness. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62(3), 373–386. doi:10.1002/jclp 
Sharma, M., & Rush, S. E. (2014). Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction as a Stress 
Management Intervention for Healthy Individuals: A Systematic Review. Journal of 
Evidence-Based Complementary & Alternative Medicine, 19(4), 271–286. 
doi:10.1177/2156587214543143 
Sherman, D. A. K., Nelson, L. D., & Steele, C. M. (2000). Do Messages about Health 
Risks Threaten the Self? Increasing the Acceptance of Threatening Health Messages 
Via Self-Affirmation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(9), 1046–
1058. doi:10.1177/01461672002611003 
Sherman, D. K. &, & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The Psychology of Self-Defense: Self-
Affirmation Theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 38(May), 183–
242. 
Shikai, N., Nagata, T., & Kitamura, T. (2014). Do people cope with situations as they 
say? Relationship between perceived coping style and actual coping response. 
Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 68(2), 154–9. doi:10.1111/pcn.12094 
Siegling, A. B., & Petrides, K. V. (2014). Measures of trait mindfulness: Convergent 
validity, shared dimensionality, and linkages to the five-factor model. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 5(October), 1164. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01164 
Singer, J. D. (1998). Using SAS PROC MIXED to Fit Multilevel Models, Hierarchical 
 192 
 
Models, and Individual Growth Models. Journal of Educational and Behavioral 
Statistics, 23(4), 323–355. doi:10.3102/10769986023004323 
Singer, J. D. & Willett, J. B. (2003). Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis: Modeling 
Change and Event Occurrence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Skinner, E. A., Edge, K., Altman, J., & Sherwood, H. (2003). Searching for the structure 
of coping: A review and critique of category systems for classifying ways of coping. 
Psychological Bulletin, 129(2), 216–269. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.2.216 
Stahl, B. & Goldstein, E. (2013). A mindfulness-based stress reduction workbook. 
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger. 
Stone, A. A., Schwartz, J. E., Neale, J. M., Shiffman, S., Marco, C. A., Hickcox, M., & 
Cruise, L. J. (1998). A comparison of coping assessed by ecological momentary 
assessment and retrospective recall. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
74(6), 1670–80. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9654765 
Stowell, J. R., Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K., & Glaser, R. (2001). Perceived stress and cellular 
immunity: when coping counts. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 24(4), 323–39. 
Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11523331 
Suls, J., & Fletcher, B. (1985). The relative efficacy of avoidant and nonavoidant coping 
strategies: a meta-analysis. Health Psychology, 4(3), 249–88. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/4029107 
Tabachnick, B. G. & Fidell, L. S. (2013). Using multivariate statistics. Sixth Edition. 
Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education.  
Tacón, A. M., McComb, J., Caldera, Y., & Randolph, P. (2003). Mindfulness meditation, 
anxiety reduction, and heart disease: a pilot study. Family & Community Health, 
 193 
 
26(1), 25–33. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12802125 
Takahashi, M., Muto, T., Tada, M., & Sugiyama, M. (2002). Acceptance rationale and 
increasing pain tolerance: Acceptance-based and FEAR-based practice. Japanese 
Journal of Behavior Therapy, 28, 35–46. 
Tan, L. B. G., Lo, B. C. Y., & Macrae, C. N. (2014). Brief Mindfulness Meditation 
Improves Mental State Attribution and Empathizing. PloS One, 9(10), e110510. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110510 
Tanay, G., & Bernstein, A. (2013). State Mindfulness Scale (SMS): Development and 
initial validation. Psychological Assessment, 25(4), 1286–99. doi:10.1037/a0034044 
Tapper, K., Shaw, C., Ilsley, J., Hill, A. J., Bond, F. W., & Moore, L. (2009). Exploratory 
randomised controlled trial of a mindfulness-based weight loss intervention for 
women. Appetite, 52(2), 396–404. doi:10.1016/j.appet.2008.11.012 
Teasdale, J. D., Moore, R. G., Hayhurst, H., Pope, M., Williams, S., & Segal, Z. V. 
(2002). Metacognitive awareness and prevention of relapse in depression: Empirical 
evidence. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 70(2), 275–287. 
doi:10.1037/0022-006X.70.2.275 
Terry, D. J. (1991). Coping resources and situational appraisals as predictors of coping 
behavior. Personality and Individual Differences, 12(10), 1031–1047. 
doi:10.1016/0191-8869(91)90033-8 
Terry, D. J. (1994). Determinants of Coping: The Role of Stable and Situational Factors. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(5), 895–910. 
Todd, M., Tennen, H., Carney, M. A., Armeli, S., & Affleck, G. (2004). Do we know 
how we cope? Relating daily coping reports to global and time-limited retrospective 
 194 
 
assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86(2), 310–9. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.2.310 
Tomaka, J., Blascovich, J., Kesley, R. M., Leitten, C. L. (1993). Subjective, Physiological 
and Behavioral Effects of Threat and Challenge Appraisal. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 65(2), 248–260. 
Twohig, M., Hayes, S., & Masuda,  A. (2006). Increasing Willingness to Experience 
Obsessions: Acceptance and Commitment Therapy as a Treatment for Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder. Behavior Therapy, 37(1), 3–13. 
doi:10.1016/j.beth.2005.02.001 
Twohig, M. P., Shoenberger, D., & Hayes, S. C. (2007). A Preliminary Investigation of 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for Marijuana Dependence in Adults. Journal 
of Applied Behavior Analysis, 40(4), 619–632. doi:10.1901/jaba.2007.619 
van ‘t Riet, J., & Ruiter, R. A. C. (2013). Defensive reactions to health-promoting 
information: an overview and implications for future research. Health Psychology 
Review, 7(sup1), S104–S136. doi:10.1080/17437199.2011.606782 
Virgili, M. (2013). Mindfulness-Based Interventions Reduce Psychological Distress in 
Working Adults: a Meta-Analysis of Intervention Studies. Mindfulness. 
doi:10.1007/s12671-013-0264-0 
Walach, H., Nord, E., Zier, C., Dietz-Waschkowski, B., Kersig, S., & Schüpbach, H. 
(2007). Mindfulness-based stress reduction as a method for personnel development: 
A pilot evaluation. International Journal of Stress Management, 14(2), 188–198. 
doi:10.1037/1072-5245.14.2.188 
Watson, C., Burley, M. C., & Purdon, C. (2010). Verbal repetition in the reappraisal of 
 195 
 
contamination-related thoughts. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 38, 337–
353. doi:10.1017/S1352465810000196 
Weinstein, N., Brown, K. W., & Ryan, R. M. (2009). A multi-method examination of the 
effects of mindfulness on stress attribution, coping, and emotional well-being. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 43(3), 374–385. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2008.12.008 
Williams, V., Ciarrochi, J., & Deane, F. P. (2010). On being mindful, emotionally aware, 
and more resilient: Longitudinal pilot study of police recruits. Australian 
Psychologist, 45(4), 274–282. doi:10.1080/00050060903573197 
Woods, D. W., Wetterneck, C. T., & Flessner, C. A. (2006). A controlled evaluation of 
acceptance and commitment therapy plus habit reversal for trichotillomania. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44(5), 639–656. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.05.006 
Yadavaia, J. E., Hayes, S. C. & Vilardaga, R. (2014). Using acceptance and commitment 
therapy to increase self-compassion: A randomized controlled trial. Journal of 
Contextual Behavioral Science, 3(4), 248–257. 
Zenner, C., Herrnleben-Kurz, S., & Walach, H. (2014). Mindfulness-based interventions 
in schools: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Frontiers in Psychology, 5(June), 
1–20. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00603 
 
 
 
 
  
 196 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A – MBSR-adapted protocol summary from Study 2 (Chapter 5) 
 
Workshop 
Component 
Objectives Key content / exercises 
Workshop 1 
 
The stress 
response 
To understand how the stress response 
works and its impacts 
To identify individual-specific issues causing 
stress 
Overview of the stress 
response 
Stress audit 
Introduction to 
mindfulness 
To define mindfulness 
To experience mindfulness in-practice 
To nominate one routine activity to perform 
mindfully 
Definition of mindfulness 
Raising eating exercise 
 
Attitude and 
intention in 
mindfulness 
practice 
To understand the basic attitudes of 
mindfulness 
To understand, experientially, the role of 
mind-wandering in mindfulness practice and 
how to direct attention mindfully 
Explanation of attitudes of 
mindfulness 
Overview of mind wandering 
and directing attention 
Mindful breathing meditation 
Pleasant and 
unpleasant 
experiences 
To notice responses to pleasant and 
unpleasant sensations 
To understand how these responses apply 
to pleasant and unpleasant aspects of one’s 
life in general 
Exercise noting pleasant / 
unpleasant sensations in the 
body 
 
Home practice Formal mindfulness practice: One guided meditation per day (5-20 min 
meditations provided on a website) 
Informal mindfulness practice: Nominating one routine activity to perform 
mindfully each day 
Identifying one ongoing unpleasant experience / issue one wishes to infuse 
with mindfulness 
Workshop 2 
 
Review of home 
practice 
To identify enablers and barriers to 
mindfulness practice 
To identify an additional routine activity to 
perform mindfully 
Peer-to-peer discussion and 
whole-of-group review 
Identifying an additional 
routine activity to perform 
mindfully 
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Attention and 
mind wandering 
To understand the function of mind 
wandering 
To develop skills in mindful awareness of 
the mind and its thoughts 
To gently direct attention to a chosen object 
The STOP exercise 
Overview and discussion of 
how we typically respond to 
unwanted thoughts 
The body scan 
Stress as bodily 
sensations and 
thoughts 
To experience stress as bodily sensations 
plus thoughts 
Stress recall exercise 
Exercises drawing bodily 
sensations and writing down 
thoughts associated with a 
stressful experience 
Moving 
mindfulness 
To enhance body-awareness through 
mindful movement  
To identify routine movements (eg, walking, 
running etc) to bring mindfulness to 
Guided tai-chi exercises 
Perspective 
taking 
To gain first-hand experience of the 
observing perspective on ongoing 
experience 
Choiceless awareness 
meditation 
Home practice Formal mindfulness practice: One guided meditation per day (5-20 min 
meditations provided on a website) 
Informal mindfulness practice: Nominating one routine activity to perform 
mindfully each day 
Identifying one ongoing unpleasant experience / issue to bring bodily and 
thought-awareness to 
Using the STOP exercise between activities to gain calm and focus 
Workshop 3 
 
Review of home 
practice 
To further clarify enablers and barriers to 
ongoing mindfulness practice 
To share experiences with peers 
Peer-to-peer discussion and 
whole-of-group review 
 
Stress audit To identify life-stressors that have changed 
following mindfulness skills training 
Stress audit exercise and 
peer discussion 
Mindfulness 
and self-
compassion 
To explore the effect of cultivating self-
compassion in relation to challenging 
experiences 
Self-compassion meditation 
Goal setting Identifying clear, time-bound goals for 
ongoing formal and informal mindfulness 
practice 
Self-reflection and writing; 
peer discussion 
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Appendix B – ACT protocol summary from Study 2 (Chapter 5) 
 
Workshop 
Component 
Objectives Key content / exercises 
Workshop 1 
 
Two skills 
diagram  
To understand relationship between 
mindfulness and values-based action  
Introduction of two skills and 
how they are related 
Introduction to 
mindfulness 
To define mindfulness 
To experience mindfulness in-practice  as 
compared with autopilot  
To nominate one routine activity to perform 
mindfully 
Definition of mindfulness 
Raising eating exercise 
Discussion 
  
 
Introduction to 
formal 
mindfulness 
practice 
To experience a formal mindfulness practice 
To understand that mindfulness practice can 
be formal or informal 
To understand that the five senses and 
cognitions can all be used as foci of 
attention in mindfulness practice 
To understand, experientially, the role of 
mind-wandering in mindfulness practice and 
how to direct attention mindfully 
Formal body and breath 
awareness exercise 
Discussion on types of 
mindfulness practice and 
different foci for practice 
Overview of mind wandering 
and directing attention 
 
Introduction to 
values    
To understand definition of values and why 
they are important 
To understand how values are different to 
goals, needs and feelings 
To gain insight into key personal values 
Definition of values 
Compass metaphor 
Future birthday exercise 
Values card sort 
 Exercise 
Discussion 
 
Introduction to 
values based 
actions 
To understand ways that values can be lived 
in daily life 
To identify past and future values based 
actions  
Definition of values based 
action 
Writing exercise values 
consistent and inconsistent 
actions and identifying new 
actions for this week 
Discussion 
Home practice Practice 1: Identifying three values based actions to be performed over next 
two weeks and noting experience 
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Practice 2: Formal mindfulness practice: At least three times over next two 
weeks (5-20 min meditations provided on a website) 
Practice 3: Informal mindfulness practice: Nominating one routine activity to 
perform mindfully each day. Record experiences in diary. 
 
Workshop 2 
 
Mindfulness 
practice 
To bring attention to experience Mindfulness exercise (breath 
and body) 
Review of home 
practice 
To identify enablers and barriers to 
mindfulness practice 
To identify an additional routine activity to 
perform mindfully 
Peer-to-peer discussion and 
whole-of-group review 
Identifying an additional 
routine activity to perform 
mindfully 
Mindfulness of 
thoughts   
To understand that we can be mindful of 
thoughts and this can help us notice and let 
go of unhelpful thoughts  
To experience noticing and letting go of 
thoughts in a formal exercise  
To communicate why the mind continually 
judges and problem solves from an 
evolutionary perspective  
  
The Leaves on a Stream 
exercise 
Overview and discussion of 
the judgement mind 
Passengers on the bus 
metaphor 
  
Defusion  To understand concept of fusion and 
defusion with thoughts 
To identify personal habitually unhelpful  
thoughts 
To practice defusing from thoughts using 
exercises  
Writing exercise of hot 
thoughts 
Defusion exercise “I notice 
I’m having the thought”  
Discussion of experience 
Experiential 
avoidance  
To understand typical responses to strong 
emotions (avoid or control) 
To understand concept of experiential 
avoidance and acceptance  
To experience opening up to emotions  
Overview of typical 
responses to strong 
emotions 
Experiential exercise – 
physicalizing strong 
emotions 
  
Choice Point 
introduction  
To understand the choice point tool as a 
way to use  mindfulenss, defusion, 
acceptance, values and values based action 
in real time in daily life  
Introduction of Choice Point 
Tool  
Writing exercise identifying 
an ongoing stressful situation 
and application of Choice 
Point to this situation  
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Home practice Practice 1: Apply skills to stressful situation identified in Choice Point 
exercise 
Practice 2: Formal mindfulness practice: At least 10 minutes 2 x a week  
Practice 3: Informal mindfulness practice: Nominating one routine activity to 
perform mindfully each day. Record experiences in diary. 
 
Workshop 3 
 
Mindfulness 
practice 
To bring attention to experience Exercise incorporates: 
Breath, body and notice 
three things can hear and 
see) 
Review of home 
practice 
To further clarify enablers and barriers to 
ongoing mindfulness practice 
Use of Choice Point skills in daily life 
To share experiences with peers 
Peer-to-peer discussion and 
whole-of-group review 
 
Review of 
content 
To review types of mindfulness practice, 
choice point , defusion and acceptance 
Summary of skills 
Group discussion   
Observer 
self/Self as 
context 
To gain understanding of role of observer 
self with chess board metaphor 
To gain first-hand experience of the 
observer self  
Chess board metaphor 
Self as context experiential 
exercise and discussion 
Review of 
values 
To review values and values based action 
content 
 To link values and goals 
Summary of values  
Exercise: ‘Looking back from 
future” at achievements and 
values  
Goals and values writing 
exercise  
Reflection and 
future 
commitment 
To allow individuals to reflect on what they 
haven’t learned 
To set goals for commitment to practices  
Self-reflection and writing; 
peer discussion 
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Appendix C - Validating single-item measures in Study 4 (Chapter 7) 
 
 In order to validate the single-item measures used in this study, as well as estimate 
their reliability and test-retest reliability, the single-item measures were regressed against 
the following multi-item measures of the same constructs: 
Cognitive defusion was measured with the 13-item Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire, 
rated on a 1 (never true) to 7 (always true) Likert scale (Gillanders et al., 2014). This scale 
was reversed coded to represent a measure of cognitive defusion (Gillanders et al., 2014). 
Sample items include “I struggle with my thoughts” and “I tend to get very entangled in 
my thoughts”. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was α = .93. 
Acceptance was measured using the 7-item Acceptance & Action Questionnaure 
(AAQ) II (Frank W Bond et al., 2011), which has a 1 (never true) to 7 (always true) Likert 
scale. Sample items include “I am afraid of my feelings” and “worries get in the way of my 
success”. This scale displayed good internal consistency with α = .90. 
Approach coping was measured using the active coping subscale of the COPE 
Inventory (Carver et al., 1989). Each subscale was composed of four items, rated on a 1-5 
Likert scale (“I did not do this at all” to “I did this a lot”). Sample items included “I took 
direct action to get around the problem” and “I did what had to be done, one step at a time.” 
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .75. 
Avoidance coping was composed of the behavioral disengagement, self-distraction  
and denial subscales of the COPE Inventory (Carver et al., 1989), following similar 
approaches by Cook & Heppner (1997), Deisinger et al. (1996), Lyne & Roger (2000) and 
Stowell et al. (2001). Each subscale contained four items rated on a 1-5 Likert scale (“I did 
not do this at all” to “I did this a lot”). Sample behavioral disengagement items were “I 
gave up the attempt to get what I want” and “I reduced the amount of effort I put into 
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solving the problem”; sample self-distraction items were “I turned to work or other 
activities to take my mind of things” and “I went to the movies or watched TV to think 
about it less”; and sample denial items were “I acted as though it hadn’t happened” and “I 
pretended that it hadn’t really happened.” Cronbach’s alpha for this scale with the present 
sample was .81.  
New general self-efficacy scale (G. Chen et al., 2001). This scale is made up of eight 
items scored on a 5-point Likert scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). 
Sample items include “I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself” 
and “Even when things are tough, I can perform quite well”. This scale displayed good 
internal consistency among the present sample (α = .91). 
 I regressed each single-item scale onto its multi-item version of the same construct, 
using multi-level models (following Brown & Ryan, 2003). ‘Time’ was included as a 
random factor in each model to account for the effects of within-subjects variation in each 
single-item measure upon each multi-item scale. As shown in Table 1, all single-item 
measures accept for ‘acceptance’ predicted their multi-item counterpart, with highly 
significant small-to-medium-sized effects.  
A significant caveat with this approach, however, was that several of the multi-item 
scales measured global traits (i.e., present-moment awareness, cognitive defusion and 
acceptance). Global trait measures of constructs have been shown to have only modest 
correlations with context-specific versions of the same construct (e.g., Shikai, Nagata, & 
Kitamura, 2014). Moreover, the multi-item measures of coping were administered in 
relation to monthly stressors, while the single-item measures were administered in relation 
to daily stressors. This again brings problems of bias associated with the same construct 
measured over different time-frames (Stone et al., 1998). 
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Second, as an indication of scale reliability, I compared the portion of within-
subjects versus between-subjects variation in each single-item measure. Between-subjects 
variation, indicated by the intraclass correlation coefficient, ρ, provides an indication of the 
extent to which each measure captures individual differences in the construct it is 
measuring (Singer, 1998). This analysis (see Table 1) indicated that between 18% and 27% 
of variation in the single-item measures was due to individual differences. Given that each 
of these measures is highly situationally-contingent, these levels of between-subjects 
variation are as-expected, suggesting that these measures capture a small but substantial 
amount of variation due to individual differences. 
Finally, I calculated test-retest reliabilities for each of the single-item measures by 
first calculating mean scores for each of the four data-collection waves, for each study 
variable. I then calculated bivariate correlations between these four different mean scores, 
for each variable. Lastly, I calculated a mean bivariate correlation for each variable, to 
generate test-retest reliability estimates, shown in Table 1. I anticipated relatively low test-
retest reliabilities for study variables due to their highly situational (and therefore variable) 
nature, especially the variable related to affect (stress-related threat appraisal). The 
estimates in Table 1 confirm this, with test-retest reliabilities of around .50 for all scales, 
except for threat appraisal which was closer to .40. 
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Table 1 
Standardized fixed effects of single-item measure on multi-item scales, intraclass 
correlations coefficients and mean test-retest reliabilities for each single-item measure 
  Validating single-item with multi-item measures   ICC(1) 
Mean 
test-retest 
reliabilities 
  β SE df t-value p-value      
Acceptance 0.11 0.04 3.90 2.65 0.058  0.263 0.55 
Cognitive defusion 0.21 0.04 3.77 4.93 0.009  0.214 0.53 
Approach coping 0.11 0.04 649.00 2.91 0.004  0.187 0.47 
Avoidance coping 0.16 0.04 651.00 3.93 < 0.001  0.214 0.56 
Self-efficacy appraisal 0.21 0.04 649.00 5.61 < 0.001  0.194 0.49 
Threat appraisal       0.181 0.41 
Event controllability - - - - -   0.231   
Note: The single-item measure of acceptance was regressed on the Acceptance & Action Questionnaire II; 
the single-item measure of cognitive defusion was regressed on the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire, and the 
estimate reversed; the single-item measures of approach and avoidance coping were regressed respectively 
on the ‘Active coping’ and ‘Mental disengagement’ subscales of the COPE Inventory; while the single-item 
measure of self-efficacy was regressed on the New General Self-Efficacy Scale. ‘ICC’ = Intra-class 
correlation coefficient. 
 
Together, these analyses suggest that the single-item measures were reasonably 
reliable and valid measures of their respective constructs, notwithstanding the fact that a) 
they were measuring constructs that are highly situation-contingent (and therefore variable 
within-individuals) and b) they were validated against either global or monthly measures 
of the respective constructs in all cases. 
 
 
 
